Page 441 basis of such information as they have at present, are by no means con-
vinced that it is in the power of the Chinese to launch heavy and repeated
air attacks.
I understand that at the "briefing meetings" in the State Depart-
ment your views on the necessity for retaliatory air action have been
made known to certain Governments. If you would be so good as to
let us know with which Governments this question has been discussed, I
shall consider what we should do. I have in mind particularly the
Governments of France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South
Africa. I consider that His Majesty's Government should inform at least
these Governments of the decision taken by us. In order that we may do
so it would be desirable that they should first be informed of your views.
I would therefore hope that you would feel able to consult them now as
fully as you have consulted us.
Air attacks from bases in Soviet territory would raise separate
and even graver problems, and our present decision does not cover this
We should therefore wish to be consulted fully before we
contingency.
could agree to retaliatory action against these bases also.
It would be helpful to us to have your assessment of the military
and political consequences which you consider might follow any attack on
Chinese bases, and in particular, your estimate of the Soviet attitude to
such an attack.
You refer to sanctions against China. As you know, we are
opposed to political sanctions.
They would not influence the course of
the campaign in Korea and indeed would have little effect on China except
to strengthen the hands of the Chinese Government against those sections
of Chinese opinion who still look to the west. These sections of opinion
are not politically important in China today, but there is nothing to gain by
alloping the Russians to point to futile political sanctions 1asffingther
evidence of the implacable hostility of the west to the new China.
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Page 449nomic sanctions I view differently. For a long time we have
kept an eye on trade with China to ensure that no goods of direct military
value reached her from British sources. The system has worked well
so far as concerns most of the goods that could directly assist the Chinese
war effort in Korea, except in the case of rubber, and there we had to take
steps last month to check the increasing exports of rubber from Malaya
and Singapore to China even though the restrictions cannot be fully effective
without the co-operation of other producers and purchasers.
There has
been so much misunderstanding of our policy in the matter of trade with
China that we have considered it necessary to make public what the policy
has been.
In this we
May I say a word about Hong Kong? It is simply not possible to
cut off Hong Kong from China without giving rise to the gravest internal
problems of unemployment, starvation and unrest in other words, with-
out creating for Communism the ideal conditions in which it can flourish.
What we have been trying to do is to ensure, with as little publicity as
possible (in order to minimise repercussions in Hong Kong) that exports
from Hong Kong do not contribute to the Chinese war effort.
have been much more successful than your or our own Press gives us
credit for. To go to the extreme limit of cutting off trade between Hong
Kong and the mainland in ordinary consumer goods and in foodstuffs would
make no difference whatsoever to the fighting in Korea, and would on the
other hand risk the loss of an important centre of free speech and western
ideas. Everyone (Chinese included) who goes to Hong Kong from China
breathes more freely and senses the contrast. Is this of no value in
the world wide war of ideas? With its fine harbour Hong Kong, in wrong
hands, would be a menace to the South China seas. I am sure you would
not wish to give it to China.