13
D* 4
Page 382
37. We can see no grounds for recommending this suggestion, and we observe that in any case it would not achieve the objective of closer association of the three Central African territories. The areas away from the line of rail
the line of rail itself
are intihanked with territories. These Copperbelt, they provide
the labour supply for the industrial areas, which in their turn provide the finance for the development of the rural areas. While, no doubt, some arrange- ment could be made for the outlying areas of Northern Rhodesia to be subsidised under an agreed formula by the enlarged Southern Rhodesia, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to adjust such a financial settlement as circumstances changed in the future. But there are more fundamental objec- tions to the proposal than this. The areas cut off from the line of rail would be incapable of any economic or political existence or development on their own and would in our view be condemned to continued stagnation. We have no doubt that the arrangement would be strongly objected to by both European and African opinion in Northern Rhodesia.
(i) Amalgamation
Solutions Rejected
38. One solution that has been before us is that the three territories should be amalgamated to form a unitary State, having a single Government and bi-cameral Legislature, with special safeguards for African interests and representation of those interests in both Houses of the Legislature: the State to occupy in relation to the United Kingdom a constitutional position broadly similar to that of Southern Rhodesia at present. The separate Governments and Legislatures of the three territories would cease to exist. Strong grounds of simplicity and efficiency have been advanced in favour of such a solution. On the other hand account must be taken of the fact that the territories are at different stages of political and economic development. Moreover, the elimina- tion of His Majesty's Government's present control over native policy in the northern territories would, we believe, be quite unacceptable to the great bulk of African opinion in the northern territories even with the insertion of the safeguards referred to above, and would fail to secure acceptance by the United Kingdom Government. After full consideration our conclusion is that a solution by amalgamation, although it has many intrinsic merits, stands so little chance of general acceptance that if only for that reason we.cannot recommend it.
(ii) A League
to
39. Another solution that has been before us is that each of the territories should retain its present constitution, powers, and status, and its existing Government and Legislature, but that they should enter into a “League which by agreement all three would hand over certain functions and powers, to be exercised by it on their behalf. The distinctive feature of this scheme. would be that the "League's " governing body and legislative organ would be projections of the Governments and Legislatures of the three separate territories, and would exercise only a delegated authority. The scheme has been advocated as largely preserving the existing channels of responsibility and authority. On the other hand, it would be difficult to work efficiently, would be liable to pro- duce friction and deadlock, and would not have adequate authority to secure the prosecution of constructive policies throughout the area. Moreover, we believe that it would be quite unacceptable in Southern Rhodesia, where it would be regarded as involving disproportionate complexities and hindrances while not substantially achieving for the territories the important benefits that are the aim of closer association. After full consideration we recommend that