Page 39f5alty of the central government should be set up capable of inspiring
the inhabitants of Central Africa and of defending the territories from the dangers that threatened them from within and without. Federal schemes were open to a variety of objections, e.g., complexity, cost in money and man-power, and relative weakness; amalgamation alone would ensure the full advantages of the closer association that was agreed to be necessary. The Southern Rhodesian members recognised the diffi- culties, notably opinion in the United Kingdom. The objections of Africans, they felt, could be faced and overcome; for example, examination showed that the native policies in all three territories were much closer than critics had supposed. In their suggestions they incorporated a number of features designed to operate as safe- guards for African interests when His Majesty's Government divested itself of its responsibility.
Rejection of Amalgamation
11. The Conference, appreciating the sincerity with which the case for amalgamation had been stated, examined it with great care and sympathy. Members were impressed by the advantages claimed for amalgamation and by the endeavour made to meet its difficulties. On the other hand, it was equally strongly argued from the point of view of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that, given the different stages of material and political development of the territories, amalgamation in existing circumstances would not be the right solution. In any case the Conference found itself forced to the conclusion that, despite the safeguards suggested, there was no hope that, even with the utmost exercise of explanation and persuasion, amalgamation would be accepted either by Africans in the Northern territories or by Parliament and public opinion in the United Kingdom. That being so, to propound a scheme which was certain to be rejected in so many quarters would set back indefinitely all hope of forging a constitutional link between the territories; progress could only be made possible by recommending the most practicable scheme that had a reasonable chance of winning general assent.
Amalgamation with the Copperbelt
12. A scheme had been put forward in certain quarters for amalgamating with Southern Rhodesia the Copperbelt and Line of Rail in Northern Rhodesia (the principal area of European settlement), leaving Barotseland and the remainder of Northern Rhodesia to be administered as native areas on the lines of the High Commission Territories. The scheme was considered by the Conference and rejected without dissent; apart from the financial difficulties which it would create for the non-amalgamated areas it was condemned as a scheme of vivisection, not of closer association; it was completely at variance with the policy of partnership between European and African; and it would be bitterly opposed by both Europeans and Africans in Northern Rhodesia.
League
13. Since amalgamation, despite its practical advantages, had to be excluded, the problem before the Conference was to decide what advance could be made towards an effective form of closer association without forfeiting the chance of acceptance by African and European opinion. One solution considered was the establishment of some form of league between the territories under which they. would set up machinery for co-operation in matters of common interest without surrendering any part of their sovereignty or affecting the channels for the discharge of the responsibilities of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom towards the Africans. Under this scheme there would be an inter-territorial organisation which, without disturbing the existing channels of responsibility, would provide on the basis of delegated powers-for the direction and administration of a specified list of common services by means of a legislature elected by the territorial Legislatures, a small executive consisting of members of the territorial Cabinets or Executive Councils, and a central secretariat and Departments. Assent to legisla- tion would rest with the three Governors.
14. There was general agreement that this scheme would not prove satis- factory. There were grave doubts whether the cost of such a scheme would be justified by the results or whether indeed it would really work. Not the least difficulty would be the establishment of an effective ministerial framework. The ceptral organisation would be weak and continually dependent on the goodwill
of theories. The Conference had to recognise that it would provide
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