Page 356 according to their qualifications, in the Government and the political institutions to be established. At the same time, until their partnership with Europeans becomes fully effective, there must be adequate provision in the constitution for African welfare and advancement. Finally, the unit of government which is established for the Central African territories must be able to stand on its own feet economically; and it must be autonomous financially." The detailed recommendations in the Report are designed to satisfy these conditions.
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6. The Report rejects amalgamation and recommends that association should be on a federal basis; in paragraphs 35-45 it gives reasons for this and for the belief that on such a basis adequate safeguards for the interests of Africans can be provided. Subject to these safeguards, the federal Government would have full responsibility within the sphere allotted to it under a Ministerial system and with a federal Legislature. The federal subjects would include defence, external affairs, immigration (but not land settlement and alienation), economic development plan- ning, customs, posts and telecommunications, railways, and civil aviation. The authority of the Centre, however, would be limited to the specified subjects declared to be "federal," and the whole sphere of government in all three territories would, apart from these specified subjects, remain with the Governments and Legislatures of the territories constituted as at present. The Territorial subjects would include all those matters that are most closely related to the life of the African inhabitants: for example, African education, health, agriculture, land and settlement questions, local government and native administration generally, police, mines and labour. In respect of all subjects not made federal the relationship of each territory to the United Kingdom Government would remain exactly as it is now and African political development would go forward as at present in the two territories. (The Conference assumed that the federal State would come, and Southern Rhodesia would remain, within the scope of the Commonwealth Relations Office, while Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would remain within that of the Colonial Office. There would be the closest consultation between the two Offices in all important questions affecting Central Africa.)
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7. Thus in all matters most closely affecting Africans existing safeguards would remain unaltered and the control of the Colonial Office in respect of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would continue as at present. But in federal matters (e.g., customs or railways) decisions would have to be taken affecting African interests. To meet this the proposals provide, in the federal field, for African representation in the Legislature; for an African Affairs Board including an African member from each Territory (with the duty of scrutinising all projected federal legislation which, if the Board considered it detrimental to African interests, could not be brought into force without the approval of the United Kingdom Govern- ment); and for a Minister for African Interests in the federal Cabinet (with power to defer executive action proposed by the federal Government, if he considered it detrimental to African interests, pending reference to the United Kingdom Govern- ment who could, if they thought it necessary, refuse agreement to such action). The Minister for African Interests would be appointed and dismissed not by the Prime Minister of the federal Government, but by the Governor-General acting in his discretion and then only with the approval of the Secretary of State; the Minister would thus be responsible through the Governor-General to the United Kingdom Government.
8. To secure co-ordinated planning over Central Africa as a whole, to minimise-friction between the federal and territorial authorities, and to promote from the outset a habit of co-operation rather than rivalry, the proposals (para- graphs 53-56, 70, and 77) provide, in the spheres of economic and development policy and of finance, for the establishment of consultative machinery through joint federal-territorial bodies.
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Our Conclusions and Recommendations
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9. For the reasons given in paragraph 4 above and particularly because of the need to counter South African pressure, we are satisfied that closer association is urgently desirable in the interests of the Territories (including those of the African inhabitants) and of the Commonwealth. The scheme put forward appears to us to be constructive and workable; whether it can be brought into force will depend on the reactions to it of European and African opinion in the Territories and to that we will revert below. We do not at present ask pur colleagues for decisions Page 356 of 587
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on the specie 357mmendations; we will therefore confine our contents on these
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Page 357 to certain points affecting the safeguards for African interests.
10. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have special respon- sibilities towards the African inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which they have an inescapable obligation to fulfil. The safeguards proposed in
Report
the existin are necessarily different, within the limited federal field only, from
the existing methods of exercising our responsibilities in respect of the two northern Territories; but we see no reason why they should not be effective. And it is noteworthy that they would apply to the Africans in Southern Rhodesia, who would thus acquire, again in the federal field, safeguards which they have not now.
11. The linchpin of the proposed federal safeguards is the "Minister for African Interests." Though a member of the federal Cabinet, and appointed to it as a Member of the federal Parliament (from those nominated thereto to represent African interests), he would be outside the ordinary political field and would be appointed with the approval of, and be ultimately responsible to, the United Kingdom Government. The arrangement is certainly unusual, but we do think it would be workable and we regard it as an essential part of the scheme. It is only by being within the Cabinet that the guardian of African interests could be fully effective; and a Minister appointed-ostensibly to protect African interests on ordinary party grounds would not necessarily be an adequate safeguard.
12. It should be recognised that if the Southern Rhodesian Government agree to the scheme recommended they for their part will be accepting, within the range of subjects proposed to be made federal, the reimposition (through the safeguards already referred to) of a measure of control from London which would amount to an appreciable curtailment of Southern Rhodesia's present degree of independence. From their standpoint this would be a very severe concession which it would require a great effort to commend to their Legislature and contituents. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would also be making an important concession, although only within the limited federal field, in respect of our respon- sibility for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; but we should at the same time secure powerful safeguards within this field for African interests. We should also gain the acceptance by Southern Rhodesia of the representation of African interests in the federal Legislature a most important and a new step for Southern Rhodesia. In the allocation of seats in the federal Legislature between the three territories, we understand that it only just proved possible-with no margin-to find a basis that the members of the Conference felt might be capable of acceptance by their respective Governments. Indeed, it seems evident that, as regards the main lines of the recommendations, there is very little scope for manœuvre, and that any attempt on our part to push the Southern Rhodesians still further would probably wreck any hope of securing a practical outcome.
13. Amalgamation being ruled out (paragraph 38 of the Report), the only form of closer association worth considering is federation; and it is therefore a choice between federation and doing nothing. If we do nothing, and so prevent the Southern Rhodesians from linking with their northern neighbours, they will inevitably tend more and more to look southwards. The absorption of Southern Rhodesia into the Union would then probably be only a matter of time. If Southern Rhodesia were absorbed, Northern Rhodesia, through its geographical position and economic circumstances, would be exceptionally vulnerable to Union pressure and eventual absorption and it is most doubtful if Nyasaland, at present a backward territory, could in those circumstances stand out against encroachment by the Union.
14. That the danger is real and urgent can be seen by a perusal of paragraphs 5-8 of the Confidential Minute. Afrikaner infiltration into both Southern and Northern Rhodesia is proceeding apace--at present the flow of immigration from the Union is almost double of that from the United Kingdom. Not all the immi- grants from the Union are Afrikaners, and not all the Afrikaners have strong political views; but those who do obviously form a base for the extension of Nationalist South African influence. There has always been an appreciable minority body of opinion in Southern Rhodesia which would not be averse from incorporation into the Union, and indeed we have just heard from Southern Rhodesia of a reported movement there for the formation (under local Afrikaner auspices) of a new political party with incorporation as its main plank. The rejection of closer association would enable this party to increase its influence.
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Page5358af5ask must in fact be to take every possistep to haize Southern
Rhodesia to look northwards rather than southwards and to strengthen those in Southern Rhodesia who favour a more liberal policy towards Africans. Much progress has been made by Southern Rhodesia in recent years in services for the benefit of Africans and a more liberal attitude is developing, particularly among settlers from this country since the war; we must do everything we can to encourage this process. In the absence of an organised African public opinion in Central Africa, the most effective counter to Union influence is the attachment to the British connection of a large section of the Europeans in all three Territories. By forging a constitutional link between them and creating a strong Central African block we shall at once put Central Africa in a better position to resist Union pressure and strengthen the British connection.
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16. Economically the Union overshadows Central Africa, and if the Central African territories were to encounter a serious slump in production or the export of their products the danger of the economic attraction to--and pressure from-the Union would be aggravated. A Central African block, forming a strong economic unit, would be in a better position to resist this pressure than three separate units.
17. It will be a difficult and delicate matter to enable these vital considerations to play a part in convincing Parliamentary and public opinion here of the need for positive action to keep Southern Rhodesia out of the Union. They cannot well be Stated publicly by United Kingdom Ministers. We shall have, by one indirect means or another, to endeavour to bring them to the notice of influential quarters in the Press and of others, including certain members of the Parliamentary Labour. Party, who will seek to lead public opinion. We must aim at persuading those who are concerned for the welfare of Africans that if we do nothing--with the consequence of driving Southern Rhodesia into the Union-we are likely to expose the welfare of the Africans to much greater dangers than any that may arise from the pursuit of closer association, specially if the latter includes the important safe- guards embodied in the Conference's proposals.
18. The Governments concerned, including our own, have given assurances that before any decision is taken to bring about closer association adequate oppor- tunity will be afforded for public discussion of any proposals that may be put forward. This can only be done on the basis of a set of concrete proposals. For this reason the Conference has framed its Report in a form suitable for publication. We recommend that, if (as expected) the other Governments agree, the Report should be published here for general information in the form of a White Paper early in June, shortly after the Secretary of State for the Colonies returns from East Africa. (Two separate documents that provide relevant background a factual survey of the territories and a comparative survey of native policy would be published at the same time.)
19. In addition to publishing the Report, we consider that His Majesty's Government should also (on the broad lines of the draft statement at Annex III) commend it in general terms for the careful consideration of all the peoples concerned as embodying a constructive approach. As no decisions would be taken until after public reactions have been obtained, this would in no wise conflict with our undertakings.
20. In the public discussion of the proposals in Central Africa the crucial factors are likely to be the attitude of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia and of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; the latter is bound powerfully to affect the reaction in this country and in Parliament. Vocal African opinion in the northern Territories has expressed itself as opposed to closer association with Southern Rhodesia and the conference recognised (paragraph 20) that this is a serious obstacle to closer association. But the Conference took the view that in the last resort the African reaction in the northern Territories would depend on the nature of the scheme put forward. They thought it unlikely that Africans would withdraw their opposition to amalgamation, but they felt that, provided that some form of closer association could be designed containing adequate provision for African representation and adequate protection for African interests and provided that the services more intimately affecting the daily life of Africans were outside the scope of a federal Government, Africans might well come to realise the very substantial advantages of closer association from their point of view587
21. Il fait cefta that Africans do not at present realise SL at IV ® fondy
It is by setting up a strong Central African block that Union influence, which they greatly fear, can be effectively countered. It is clearly most desirable that before His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have to make final decisions they should be fully aware of African
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between representatives of Opinion in the northern Terrot is equally
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desirable that there should be opportunity for full discussion of the proposals His Majesty's Government in the Kingdom and Africans in the northern Territories and Europeans, as well, of course, as the three Central African Governments. The matter is of such importance to Central Africa and the Commonwealth as a whole that we think that, if this proves practic- able, we should both proceed to Central Africa during the summer recess after there has been sufficient time for consideration of the proposals by the public for the purpose of such discussions. A Conference could then be held in which we should take part and which would settle the form of the proposals which the Governments would formally sponsor for the consideration of the Legislatures and the public in Central Africa and, of course, of Parliament here. The holding of such a Conference, whether here or in Central Africa, could of course only be decided upon with the
colleagues we propose to seek this forthwith. In our view it is most important that of our
the intention of holding such a Conference and if possible of a visit by ourselves should be referred to in the announcement accompanying the publication of the proposals; this would discourage public opinion in the Territories, whether European or African, from reaching premature conclusions, pending our visit, either for the acceptance or rejection of the proposals or particular features of them pending the opportunity of discussion with ourselves.
agreement of the Governments concerned, and subject to the appro With the
J. G.
P. C. G. W.
280
3rd May, 1951.