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52. If we are to hold the Territories, we must, therefore, as an integral part of this policy, take public opinion in the Union into account and so direct our actions as to play upon it. (This is, in my view, the decisive reason why the Territories should be administered by the C.R.O.)
53. This means that we cannot in what we do in the Territories ignore reactions upon South African public opinion. There are many things we can and should do that they do not like. For instance, they do not like the way we are putting development funds into the Territories. Nor will they like it when we set up an independent Post Office in Swaziland, as we intend to do. What we must refrain from doing are those acts that would unite and inflame Union public opinion. That is a luxury that we cannot afford if we seriously want to hold the Territories and use them as part of our policy of containing the Union.
54. Amongst acts that would unite and inflame Union opinion would have been the recognition of Seretse and Ruth. This view was confirmed by several leading Africans in the Union with whom I discussed the matter. After seeing things on the spot for myself, I am more convinced than ever that our decision about Seretse was right. Quite apart from internal Bamangwato considerations, a decision to recognise Seretse would have very gravely endangered our tenure of the Territories.
So probably would a decision to arm the Africans in the Territories. We can once again very usefully raise Pioneer Corps amongst them, but were we to arm Africans in the midst of the Union, we would run a very grave risk of losing the Territories.
55. While we firmly announce our intention to keep the Territories-by reiterating our established policy about consultation-and while we develop them economically and refrain only from extremely provocative actions at the same time we should be ready to develop those relations with the Union that bind her to us and make her unwilling to risk a break with us. These relations are also in our own direct interest. Chief amongst them come co-operation in defence and in economic matters. Also important is to give the Union what help and guidance we decently can at the United Nations. Those who argue that because we dislike the Union's Native policy we should ostracise her and have nothing to do with her completely fail to understand the realities of the situation. Such a policy would not only gravely harm us in the defence and economic fields, it would also weaken our power to deter South Africa from foolhardy acts from fear of breaking with us. It would immediately and directly reduce our chances of holding the Territories, which form a vital part in any policy of containing and confining the Union's influence and territorial expansion in Southern Africa.
Commonwealth Relations Office,
16th April, 1951.
P. G. G.-W.
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G.R.
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