Page 281 can be carried is a direct function of the water available. Moreover, the railway that runs through this Territory and provides most of its revenue must have increased water-supplies if it is to carry increased traffic. Unless this is done there is danger of an alternative line being built outside the Territory. For political reasons South Africa is pressing such a project. This would pretty well ruin Bechuanaland. Improving water-supplies is an expensive undertaking in itself and there seems to be no certain way of ensuring that every bore-hole will in fact tap water.
Ultimately Bechuanaland may become extremely prosperous cattle-country. Apart from the Colonial Development Corporation project, large parts of the Kalahari desert have underground water; but to develop this desert, roads and railways would have to be built.
There seems to be no prospect of any of this Bechuanaland meat coming to Britain. The demand for meat in Africa is rapidly mounting. Indeed, a meat shortage (and general food shortage) is one of Africa's most pressing problems.
18. I do not deal in this section of my report with the problem of how we can keep the Territories out of the Union (that problem can only be properly considered in relation to the Union). But, if we are to keep these Territories, we must be prepared to put money into them. One of South Africa's best arguments for incorporation has been their general backwardness. The three Territories are shop-windows in the midst of the Union and we must keep them economically strong and progressive. We cannot hope to spend as much on them as South Africa spends on her corresponding Native Reserves-nor is this necessary in order to hold their loyalty. Their African inhabitants feel themselves to be free men, and they rate this above mere material prosperity. Nevertheless, we must develop the Territories if we are to hold them. They must get at least their fair share of whatever money we are putting into our Colonies. The decision to hold the Terri- tories is a political decision which cannot possibly pay us economically. We must therefore be ready to face the economic consequence of our political decision.
19. I gave special attention in the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the Bamang- wato tribe (from which Seretse and Tshekedi come). I attended a Kgotla that was said to be the biggest to assemble for the conduct of business. A Kgotla is theoretically the assembly of the whole tribe: every male inhabitant is entitled to attend. In fact, some 10,000 attended, most of them coming in lorries from outlying districts. All this occurred during the ploughing season--which is the one time when the men (as distinct from the women) work and when they all want to be in the fields.
The Kgotla was a friendly one and I was greeted in an enthusiastic way on my arrival and before it could be known what I was to say. Before I spoke there was one main speech and nine subsidiary speeches all on the same theme and all in a broiling sun. They wanted Seretse back: above all they wanted Tshekedi and all his followers excluded for ever from the Territory. There was, of course, some organisation and rehearsal behind all this but it is quite impossible to stage a Kgotla of 10,000. Moreover, each of the nine subsidiary speakers came from one of the "allied" or "subject" peoples who are ruled over by the Bamangwato and whom Tshekedi had claimed were on his side.
I had already discussed the whole situation with the first-rate officials who are now in charge. They had produced overwhelming evidence of Tshekedi's extreme unpopularity. This seems to rest partly on the feeling that he is seeking to usurp the Chieftainship to which he is not lineally entitled; but mainly on sheer fear. He is an extremely able, ruthless and unforgiving man, and everyone is frightened that if he comes back into the Reserve in any capacity he will get back to power and revenge himself on all who have either supported Seretse or failed to support Tshekedi.
I am quite convinced that the tribe cannot settle down nor can the newly instituted system of councils be got to work until the Bamangwato are convinced that Tshekedi will not be allowed to return to the Tribal Reserve. Once this is made clear the tribe will settle down and will begin to make up its mind about Seretse. (It was significant that the desire to exclude Tshekedi was even more strongly expressed than the desire to have Seretse back, and that not a single mention was made at any time of Ruth.)
In these circumstances I made a speech to the Kgotla saying that His Majesty's Government adhered to the White Paper policy (under which both Seretse and Tshekedi dragaudeaf; 5that we would reconsider the matter inPayout five years;
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