BALANCE OF CIVIL PAY
151
Page 171
Report by the Chairman of an Official Committee
In C.P.(50) 274 the Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested that the practice should be discontinued in any future war of paying civil servants called up for military service the difference between their civil and their military pay. After considering his arguments and the counter arguments of the Minister of Defence (C.P.(51) 2) and of the Home Secretary (C.P.(50) Z25), the Cabinet (C.M.(51) 4th Conclusions, Minute 2) invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer to arrange for officials of the Departments concerned to consider the issue raised in greater detail.
2.
The Chancellor directed that the Treasury should look into this matter in consultation with representatives of the -
(a)
Service and Supply Departments Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Labour
Post Office
Ministry of Pensions
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Health
Home Office
Ministry of Transport
Inland Revenue
In making this report our object has been:-
to present the factual information insofar as it can be
obtained;
(b) to summarise again the arguments for and against the con-
tinuance of the system.
A. Factual Information
3.
The scope of the problem. This problem is not confined to the Civil Service. In the last war civil pay was made up not only by the Civil Service but by local authorities to teachers and other local govern- ment servants and by the police, i. e. the practice covered the whole field of public employment. The range of public employment has since greatly extended and if balance of civil pay continues in any future war in the old public employments, it will inevitably extend to the new - the Public Boards and the National Health Service. These new public employments have staff (including industrials) of some 2.4 millions compared with the 2.5 millions staff in the old public employments, and the tendency of private employers to follow the same practice would undoubtedly be stimulated by the extension of the practice to this wider field of public employment. In short, if balance of civil pay is paid in any future war in the Civil Service, a substantial proportion of the total population of the country is likely to get the same treatment.
4.
The effect on this problem of improvements in Service pay. The Government have not yet decided whether conscripts in any future war are to have the improved rates now paid to regulars or whether they should receive the rates force before the recent improvements oflearly the
-1-
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numbPage 172 suf8to whom balance of civil pay woulBage shed will be considerably affected by this decision. But it may help the Cabinet if they are given some indication under both alternatives of the type of public employee likely to benefit from balance of civil pay.
5.
The improved rates of Service pay for regulars under the latest improvements give the following annual rates of cash remunera- tion:-
Single
Married
(a)
On enlistment
£127.15s. Od
£237. 5s. Od
(b)
On promotion to
Corporal
- £219
£328.10s. Od
(c)
On promotion to
Sergeant
£301. 2s. 6d
£428.17s. 6d
The earlier rates now payable to conscripts during their first months of service give the following annual remuneration:-
Single
Married
(b)
흐흐
(a)
On enlistment
£73
£164. 5s. Od
On promotion to
Corporal
£136.17s. 6d
£228. 2s. 6d
(c). On promotion to
£191.12s. 6d
£295.18s, Od
Sergeant
It will be seen from these figures that, even if regular rates were given to conscripts in a future war, the only public servants who would not receive balance of civil pay would be those earning less than between £130 and £240 on enlistment or less than £220 to £330 and £300 to £430 on promotion to Corporal and Sergeant respectively. What proportion of the public service which is likely to be conscripted would fall in this category? Clearly, the answer to this question cannot be given with any precision, but it is obvious that a very considerable number of public servants would draw balance of civil pay for part, if not all, of their military service.
All industrial civil servants get a minimum annual rate of £280; the postmen are at about the same level; the clerks get £230 at age 20; the Executives £300 at the same age and rise by annual increments to
£410 and £535 respectively at age 30. These classes together account for 75 per cent of the whole Civil Service and clearly for a far higher proportion of that part of the Civil Service which is likely to be called up. The position in the other public services is broadly comparable. All industrials get more than the lower rates even of Regular Service pay and a high proportion of the clerical staff are in the same position. The broad conclusion is that, despite the recent improvements in Service pay, the cash emoluments of public servants (which, unlike Service rates, are* not supplemented by very valuable emoluments in kind) are likely to exceed Service pay in the case of a wide range of those public servants that are called up.