Circulated 10/3/51 (8am)-
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(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
SECRET
C.P.(51) 76
9TH MARCH, 1951
CABINET
COPY NO.
31
PACIFIC DEFENCE
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations
At their meeting on 1st March the Cabinet decided to defer con- sideration of the proposed Tripartite Treaty between the United States, Australia and New Zealand (C.M.(51) 16th Conclusions, Minute 3). Subsequently a meeting was held under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister in an attempt to resolve the differences of view among the Ministers concerned. It was then suggested that a personal message might be sent to the Prime Minister of Australia explaining our anxieties to him frankly. I have had a draft letter prepared accordingly and attach
it as Annex A.
2.
After carefully considering the terms of this draft in the light of the previous discussion, I am bound to say that I believe that such a message would seriously damage our relations with Australia. the following considerations in mind:-
(a)
(b)
(c)
I have
However we may phrase it, Australia would regard a message on
these lines as in effect seeking to frustrate their achievement of a security agreement with the United States which Mr. Menzies has described as "of the first importance". We can be in no doubt about the strong feelings which this would arouse in Australia. This is made abundantly clear in the letter from Mr. Menzies which forms Appendix B to C.P.(51) 64 and in the memorandum handed by the Australian Resident Minister in London to the Prime Minister on 22nd February (which was circulated to the Cabinet in C.R.O. telegram to Canberra No. 179 of 23rd February).
Australia, and New Zealand, will find our attitude difficult to
understand. They will recall that in the discussion on the Japanese Peace Treaty at the Meeting of Prime Ministers in January (P.M.M(51) 6th Meeting) it was accepted not only that Australia and New Zealand ought to have a guarantee from the United States but also that it might take some form of Pacific Pact.
We are unable to make any constructive suggestion as to what might now take the place of the proposed Tripartite Treaty. Wider and more far-reaching conceptions such as an Asian Pact are not capable of early realisation.
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Page 8w€58hnot prevent Australia and New Zealalagemfah87d if
they wish to and I am sure that they will not be deterred. We do not want them to go ahead in anger.
3.
I think it right to restate briefly the broad advantages which would flow for the United Kingdom from the conclusion of the draft Tripartite Treaty:-
4.
(a)
(b)
(c)
We know that the Australian Government feel that public opinion
in Australia would not allow them to send troops to the Middle East unless Australia's back door is bolted by a guarantee, In present circumstances such a guarantee could only be given effectively by the United States. A contribution from Australia to the defence of the Middle East is vital to our strategic plans,
The Australian representatives at the Meeting of Prime
Ministers repeatedly emphasised that they needed security against future aggression by Japan and they made it clear that they would not be able to contemplate a Peace Treaty with Japan on the lines we want unless they had such security.
In the Commonwealth of today it is right that Australia and New Zealand should take the lead in the Pacific. Indeed by placing such responsibilities fairly and squarely on their shoulders we shall encourage Australia to assume a bigger share of the defence burdens of the Commonwealth.
Any suggestion by us that the whole nature of the agreement should be reconsidered or that it should be extended to include the United Kingdom would endanger the prospects of a United States guarantee by imposing a delay and by re-opening a draft which has already been initialled. The Treaty in its present form provides the only prospect of an early guaran- tee by the United States of Australian and New Zealand security. I suggest therefore that the alternative before us is whether there should be a guarantee in the form of the present Treaty or none at all. For the reasons which I have indicated in the preceding paragraph, it seems to me clear that it is to our advantage that there should be an early guarantee.
5.
There is a possibility that the United States Government or Senate might, for quite other reasons, fail to bring the Treaty to com- pletion. If this were to happen following an attempt by us to secure a major revision of the Treaty, there is no doubt that we should be regarded by Australia as having been responsible and our relations with them would be most seriously affected.
6.
But while we should refrain from pressing for United Kingdom participation, there are nevertheless two aspects on which we must do our best to secure that our own wishes are met:-
(a)
The inclusion of the Philippines in the proposed Treaty would be very unfortunate from our point of view. We should certainly put our anxieties on this score strongly to Australia and New Zealand and urge them to support us in resisting it. We must, however, recognise that United States pressure for the inclusion of the Philippines may be irresistible, and in the last resort we may have to accept it, undesirable as it is, in the wider interests. Page 8 of 587