15
395
Page 788
APPENDIX I—NAVY
STRENGTH OF THE ROYAL NAVY ON ANNUAL NAVY ESTIMATES OF £201 MILLION FOR 1950-51 To 1952-53
Man-power
It is intended to reduce the man-power bearing (Vote A) to 124,000 by 1953, the run-down to this figure being as follows:-
1st April, 1950
1st April, 1951 1st April, 1952
1st April, 1953
141,100
128,300
124,800
124,000
2. These numbers will enable approximately the same number of ships as at present to remain in commission, permit the necessary sea training to be carried out, and provide the nucleus on which to expand in the event of war.
3. The National Service intake into the Royal Navy is being reduced to 2,000 a year from 1st October, 1949. It will remain at this level for about two years, after which it will cease altogether, except for a small number of men to be trained as pilots and observers. The problem of providing the required number of Naval Reserves when the National Service entry ceases is being examined by the Admiralty and a scheme is under consideration for the creation of a National Service Reserve into which men would be entered direct without any period of full-time service.
Peace-time Fleet
4. On £201 million it will be possible to maintain the same Fleet in commission as at present for the next three years. When the backlog of shore training has been övertaken, it may be possible to make some increase in the small ships in commission.
5. The Navy will therefore maintain the same support to our Foreign and Colonial Policy as now, continue to play its present part in the cold war and carry out training as a preparation for war.
6. The peace-time disposition of the Fleet at the present time is given in Table I.
Wartime Fleet
7. In the following table is set out the strength of the Fleet in 1950, giving ships in commission and in reserve. In the column headed 1957 is given the minimum war Fleet that the Admiralty consider essential for the control of sea communications, it is based on the United States Navy providing half the Naval Forces required in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean/Middle East area, which is the most they can promise:-
Type
Battleships
Fleet Carriers
Light Fleet Carriers
Aircraft Repair Ships
Cruisers
1950 In
In Commission Reserve
1957
Total
1
4*
1+4*
1+4*
3
3
6
5+1†
4
2
6
4.
...
1
0
1
1
15
12
27
18
Fast Minelayers
0
3
3
3
...
Destroyers
39
15
54
62
Frigates
60
165
225
182
Submarines
33
30
63
53
Ocean Minesweepers
15
46
61
61
Coastal or Inshore M/S
.10
72
82
250
Mine-location Craft
0
0
0
36
Front-Line Aircraft ...
150
150
250
Page 788
Not to be modernised until guided weapons are in uge 788 of 1097
Page
supply.
↑ Modernised for deck landing training only.
16
pageComparing the strength of the Fleet in 1950 with that required for war in 1959, it will be seen that in some types there is a shortage of ships while in others there is an excess; the latter the Admiralty proposes to dispose of. To make good the shortages new construction is required and the proposed programme for the next three years is given in paragraph 11. It will, however, be necessary to increase greatly the building programme after 1952-53 if the shortages are to be made good and over-age ships replaced by 1957.
9. Although the numerical strength of the war-time Fleet for the next three years is not below the Admiralty's minimum figure, except for shortages referred to above, an average sum of £201 million during this period has a serious effect in later years, as many of our ships are obsolescent and their re-equipment will be deferred. Also the speed at which the Fleet can be mobilised will be slow owing to lack of stockpile of stores and equipment for mobilisation.
10. After 1957 the rate at which ships become obsolete is such that there will be a steady decline of numerical strength of the Navy from then onwards. This remains true even if the rate of new construction from 1952-53 onwards, referred to in paragraph 8 above, were continued.
New Construction
11. Below is set out the new construction which the Admiralty proposes to put in hand during the next three years; two Fleet Carriers, four Light Fleet Carriers and eight Destroyers, at present under construction, are not shown in the table.
Frigates
Submarines
NEW CONSTRUCTION
1950-51 1951-52 1952-53
Total
3
0
0
2
5
11
5
8
6
0
1
...
2
4 0
2∞∞ ∞ ++
5
0
2
8
24
8
21
8
14
4
9
4
6
Coastal Minesweepers
Inshore Minesweepers
Coastal Forces MTB/MGB
Mine Location Craft
Seaward Defence A/S Craft
12. The above new construction programme is larger than that proposed in the Harwood Report but smaller than that which the Admiralty hold to be the minimum necessary; it does, however, make some provision for minesweepers as well as replacing wornout ships.
Modernisation and Conversion of Ships
13. As many of our ships are rapidly becoming obsolescent, particularly in regard to the weapons used against modern forms of attack, it is necessary to re-equip and modernise them if they are to carry out their tasks; the conversion of a number of our older Fleet Destroyers to fast A/S frigate is required in order to control the fast submarine.
14. The Admiralty propose to put in hand the following modernisation and conversions during the next three years :-
15.
Modernisation of Fleet Carriers
Modernisation of Cruisers
Modernisation of Destroyers
Modernisation of Frigates
Convert old Fleet Destroyers to A/S Frigates Convert "T T" Class Submarines to fast battery drive
1
1 12
9
10
2
The rate of conversion and modernisation is much slower than that which the Admiralty hold to be the minimum necessary; the above programme does make a start in re-equipping the Fleet to meet submarine and air attack, but it only modernises about one-eighth of the force.
Naval Aviation
16. A front-line strength of 250 aircraft is considered to be the minimum which wiglonable Naval Aviation to carry out its prescribed rôles in wartime. It was planned to reach this strength through gradual pansiy9957.
17.
17. The reduction of the Naval Vote to £201 million will, however entail holding the front line at its existing level of 150 aircraft during the next three years with a reduced reserve backing.
18. During the next three years it is planned that a few squadrons of more modern aircraft will replace some of the existing types now in service; this can be provided for to a limited extent within the £201 million estimates.
War Reserves of Stores
19.
The Admiralty have planned to allocate some £6.2 million for stock- piling of war reserves of stores for the next three years; this figure has been cut by a third. Should war break out before stocks are built up, many essential stores for fighting and seagoing efficiency would run out after the first few months, and it would only be possible to provide uniforms for a proportion of men called up for service.
Administrative Economies
20. The Admiralty have already proposed the most drastic economies in administrative and shore establishments. It is the intention to press on firmly with these measures, but it is clear that, due to the variety of the interests involved, there will be difficulty in achieving the financial savings planned as early as expected.
Station
Home
TABLE I
THE PRESENT PEACETIME Fleet
Class of Ship
Fleet Carrier
Light Fleet Carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers
...
Mediterranean
Light Fleet Carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers
Frigates
Submarines
Number
1
...
2
3
16
Ocean, Coastal and Inshore
Minesweepers
Cruisers
East Indies
Frigates
...
America and West Indies Cruisers
Frigates
South Atlantic
Cruisers
Frigates
...
Far East
Light Fleet Carrier
Aircraft Repair Ship
Cruisers
Destroyers
...
14
11
7
8
9
25
1
3
1
12 T
1
3
7
10
396
Trials and Training
Frigates
Battleships
Fleet Carriers
1 (Harbour Training Squadron)
2 (One for
Harbour Training Squadron)
Cruisers Destroyers
Frigates Submarines
Page 790cean, Coastal
Coastal Minesweepers
37949
1
5
33
25
and Insparge 790 of 1097
D
Pag&tation of 1097
Summary
18
Class of Shpage 791 of Number
Battleships
Fleet Carriers
Light Fleet Carriers
Aircraft Repair Ship
Cruisers
•
Destroyers
Frigates
Submarines
...
1
3
4
...
1
15
•
39
60
33
...
20
Ocean, Coastal and Inshore
Minesweepers
APPENDIX II-THE ARMY
THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE ARMY THAT WOULD BE PROVIDED FOR AN AVERAGE ANNUAL SUM OF £304 MILLION IN 1950–51, 1951-52 AND 1952–53
Size of Active Army
Such
1. The size of the Army allowed by the available money would just enable sufficient strength to be maintained to meet our estimated commitments provided that the tempo of the Cold War does not increase. In assessing the size of the garrisons throughout the world, certain assumptions have had to be made as to the possibility of reducing or even withdrawing various garrisons. assumptions have been based on as realistic an estimate as possible of the world situation over the three-year period. The garrisons which we would be able to maintain based on these assumptions and with the available money and man- power are as follows:
1st April, 1st April,
Germany-
1st January, 1stApril,
1950
1951
1952
1953
Armoured Division
1
1
1
1
Infantry Division
1
1
1
1
Infantry Brigade
1
1
1
1
Austria-
Brigades
1
1
Trieste-
Brigades
1
1
1
Melf-
Infantry Division...
1
1
1
1
Infantry Brigade Group
2
1
1.
1
Farelf-
Infantry Division
1
1
2-3
2-3
British/Ghurka Division
1
1
1
1
Infantry Brigade
1
1
...
United Kingdom-
Infantry Division
Brigades
A.A. Regiments
(less one Brigade Group)
Guards Battalions
Home Service Units
(Underposted)
Parachute Brigade
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
24
24
24
24
16
26
28
24
1
1
1
1
++
(Underposted)
(NOTE. For ease of presentation only those independent major units in the
United Kingdom have been fully listed.)
Other Garrisons-
Theagentumfpossible garrisons would be rePaiged/ Gflatar, Bermuda,
and West Indies.
19
2. The overheads for this active Army would be a bare minimum to provide for the traininganda@hilration of the active formations agthe units in the United Kingdom would be sufficient to give a measure of assistance to the Territorial Army, though this assistance is necessarily less than was originally hoped for, owing to the strength of these units having to be reduced. Some measure of balance would still be maintained and the disbandment of major units would be avoided, so that expansion in case of war would not be prejudiced on this score.
Manpower Requirement
3. The manpower requirement (men only) of the above forces would gradually fall, mainly owing to administrative economies, as follows :
1 April, 1950 1 April, 1951 1 April, 1952
364,400
339,500
Size of the Territorial Army
335,750
4. The Territorial Army would consist of:—
(a) Anti-Aircraft-155 A.A. Regiments (T.A.)
1 April, 1953
332,750
These would have their R.A. units at only 40 of their existing estab- lishment by 1954, the balance having to be made up on mobilisation, or perhaps during a crisis period preceding general mobilisation.
(b) Field Force-
1 Armoured Division
3 Infantry Divisions
2 Independent Armoured Brigades.
(c) Home Defence (including the provision of Mobile Columns to assist in Čívil Defence)-
5 Divisions
Even by 1954 it is unlikely to be possible to fill these divisions to full establishment in peacetime.
(d) Administrative Units-
These would provide the administrative backing for both the active and Territorial Armies in war.
Equipment
5. General
(a) The money allotted for new equipment would enable the Army to maintain existing production of such essential items as tanks, ammunition and modern radar. It should also permit starting production of a number of new items when these reach the appro- priate stage of development, though the extent to which this will be possible is likely to be severely restricted, since the money alloca- tion does not increase year by year. The Army therefore regards the ability to carry forward any shortfall in a year's production programme to the next, thus treating the whole period as a financial entity, as a vitally important feature of the equipment plan
A.A. Command
(b) By April of 1953 A.A. Command would have sufficient modern equip- ment for training purposes, and would be capable of mobilising all Regular and Territorial Army regiments with adequate gun spares and test equipment. Modern fire control and tactical control radar would be about 75 per cent. of requirements. All the guns mobilised would be of last war types, though about quarter would have been fully modernised, including a
37949
Pammend in the shape of the 3.7-inch Littlejohn gun
by the Air Defence Committee.Pawith few excep- tions, stocks of Heavy Anti-Aircraft ammunition would be well
D 2
397
20
Page 793 the target figure of 3,000 r.pg and there would be large deficiencies in general stores, including uniform. All the vehicles required for mobilisation would have to be impressed, with the exception of those necessary for initial deployment.
Active Army
(c) By April of 1953 the Active Army would be equipped to war scales, with the exception of certain administrative stores. Armoured regiments would be re-equipped with Centurion IIIs, but otherwise, most of the equipment would be of last war types. This would also apply to wheeled vehicles, which would be mainly rebuilt types, with serious deficiencies especially in specialist categories. Great reliance would have to be placed on the impressment of civilian type vehicles for an emergency.
Territorial Army
(d) By April of 1953 the Field Force of our divisions (including one armoured) and two armoured brigades would be equipped to war scales including tanks, but excluding certain administrative stores, and wheeled vehicles would be on very reduced scales. Equip- ment would be of last war types. The five remaining Territorial Army divisions would be equipped at training scales only, but would be capable of assisting in civil defence or against airborne landings.
War Reserves
6. (a) The quantity of stores and vehicles produced would not fully cover the Army's mobilisation requirements, still less would it make any provision for the reserves that would be necessary in the early months of war to keep our forces in the field while industry was expanding. Any start in the provision of these reserves would necessitate a much larger financial allotment.
(b) The effects of this lack of reserves would become less serious in proportion to the development of a healthy armament export industry, a course which is strongly advocated.
Works
7. The original plan was to complete the modernisation of barracks in ten years and the provision of married quarters at home in four years. On the assumption that a loan is obtained sufficient to finance the building of at least two-thirds of the married quarters at home it is hoped still to complete that part of the programme in four years; but it will now be necessary to spread the modernisation programme over sixteen years.
Increase in Pay
8. The financial allotment would allow for no increase in the general rates of pay nor for any marked improvement in the general conditions within the Army. The crying need of the Army at the present is an increase in the number of Regulars. Without the necessary inducements, the Officers and men will not be forthcoming.
Provision of land forces for the defence of the Middle East and Western Europe
on the outbreak of war
9. Should war break out in the next three years it is probable that, in view of its world-wide deployment on Cold War commitments, no considerable portion of the Regular Army would be available to reinforce either the Middle East or Western Europe. It is, however, possible that the situation in Hong Kong would be such as to permit the removal from the Far East of up to one Infantry Division for service in one of these theatres.
The Regular Army is indeed so small that even if the intensity of the Cold War were to diminish considerably little more could be made available in the shape of an Expeditionary Force.
We are forced therefore to rely mainly on the four high priority divisions of RagTZ3tofil0rmy. By its very nature the Territorial my requires a precautionary period in which to get ready. We are doing our best to speed up
21
their rate of agsbilant owing to lack of equipment 34 Pfalming it
aged is doubtful whether any of these formations could be made available for the reinforcement of Western Europe in time to be of use. It also remains doubtful whether they could be got to the Middle East in time to save the situation unless considerable United States reinforcements were made available soon after the outbreak of war.
By the 1957 period these Territorial formations should have improved both in equipment and training, though the improvement will be slight unless the Cold War materially slackens or the Army budget is increased. No increase in the total number of formations available is foreseen, so that, in view of probable increased Russian preparedness, provision of land forces will still be dangerously inadequate for the rôle which we shall be expected to play.
APPENDIX III-R.A.F.
SERVICE ESTIMATES 1950-53
The provision of £233 million, £237 million and £244 million over the next three years would enable the R.A.F. to carry out the expansion of Fighter and Bomber Commands already announced in Parliament, to continue the replace- ment of obsolescent aircraft in Fighter Command and to start it in Bomber Command, and to maintain the front-line of other Commands at their present level, except that the transport force in the United Kingdom would have to be reduced by two-thirds. The R.A.F. (except Transport Command) could continue to play its present part in the Cold War; and our visible show of strength would be considerably increased.
2. We should not, however, be able to make any provision for the reserves which would be required to keep the force in operation if war broke out. The Air Force would be a shop-window Air Force, and in the event of war it could not survive more than about a month of intensive fighting.
3. The effect on the main components of the R.A.F. of the proposed allocations is described below. The enclosures show the front line during the period in question.
Bomber Command
4. The front-line medium bomber strength of Bomber Command could be expanded from 176 to 280 aircraft. Its main equipment throughout the period would continue to be the Lincoln, except that B.29 aircraft sufficient for a few squadrons may be obtained under the United States Military Aid Programme and the twin-jet Canberra should start coming into service in 1952.
5. Bomber Command would be able, by attacking enemy communications, airfields, troop concentrations, &c., to make a small but essential contribution to the battle for air supremacy which must be won if we are to have any chance either of reducing the scale of air attack on this country to bearable proportions or of holding the enemy in Europe. It could also help in a small measure to protect our sea communications by attacking coastal targets and by laying mines, and it would be capable of limited reinforcement of the Middle East in emergency. It would also be a nucleus on which an air striking force capable of mounting effective attacks against the heart of Russia could be developed when modern high performance bombers become available.
Fighter Command
6. The day fighter force is now equipped with Meteors and Vampires, which are as good as any fighters in the world. As announced in Parliament, this force is due to be doubled before the end of 1950.
7. It is also planned to increase the night fighter force from 48 aircraft to 120. It is at present equipped with Mosquito aircraft. Apart from their numerical inadequacy, the Mosquito night fighters should be good enough to deal with the majority of the types of bomber which the Russians now have in service, though they would be ineffective above 25,000 ft. against the B.29 type aircraft, of which the Plussrags already have a limited number. It Pabeped4bft1097t night fighter will come into service in 1952.
398
22
8.PaFight Command includes 32 long-range lighters foo fintruder and anti- shipping operations. These squadrons are equipped with the Hornet, and it is planned to increase their number to 64 during the period.
9. The control and reporting system in the Main Defended Area, which covers only the South-Eastern corner of England, could continue to be strengthened to some extent; and the system could be extended by 1952 to cover also the North of England, including the Liverpool and Clydeside areas. Air defence of the South-West, North-East and North-West Approaches to the country would be virtually non-existent.
Coastal Command
10. The small Maritime Air Forces would continue to keep alive the tech- nique of anti-submarine operations and of defending our shipping against attacks at sea, and to undertake photographic and meteorological reconnaissance. time of war they would be able to give only limited air cover to the sea approaches of the United Kingdom.
Transport Command
In
11. Transport Command would have to be abolished as a separate Command, and the transport force in the United Kingdom would have to be reduced from 120 to 40 aircraft, of which 8 would be allotted to keeping alive the technique of airborne support operations. The force would be able to
transport small loads of troops and equipment to overseas theatres if reinforcement at short notice became necessary, and it could carry out occasional exercises in air mobility.
B.A.F.O. (Germany) and Western Union Tactical Air Force
12. B.A.F.O. would continue to support B.A.O.R. in its occupational duties and, as our only existing Tactical Air Force, to keep alive the technique of Army support. This very small force has had to be depleted by two squadrons in order to reinforce Hong Kong and it is not known when they can be replaced.
Middle East Air Forces
13. Middle East Air Forces would be maintained at about their present size, and their re-equipment with modern types should be completed. The Command would be able to make some slight show of force against an attack on the Middle East, though it would be quite inadequate to overcome an attack in any strength.
Far East Air Forces
14. Far East Air Forces could continue to provide limited forces for such air operations as the continuance of the anti-bandit campaign in Malaya or for the defence of Hong Kong should that Colony be attacked.
Economies in Overheads
15. Substantial economies are being made in the training organisation, a number of development units and similar establishments are being abolished or reduced and overheads are being reduced in a variety of other ways. The large reductions in requirements of man-power which result from these measures will, with the help of the cut in Transport Command, counter-balance the demands of the expansion of Bomber and Fighter Command and the extension of the Control and Reporting System, and thus allow the total man-power of the force to remain roughly constant.