14. A promise of British reinforcement for Western Europe, sooner or later, is probably a political necessity if Western Union is to develop effectively. Two divisions should be held against this eventuality. If Western Union collapsed militarily before they were ready to embark, it would then be for consideration whether they should be sent to the Middle East.
Allocation of Funds
15. Against this background we have considered what naval, land and air forces will be required to perform the tasks allotted to the three services, and how the suggested sum of money should be sub-allotted. This difficult and com- plicated problem has been studied by a working party set up by the Ministry of Defence and we have had the benefit of their advice in reaching our conclusions. We have only been able to make reasonable proposals for the security of this Country, within the financial limit now suggested, on the assumption that:- (a) There will be a period of warning before war breaks out which will enable
our re-armament programme to be greatly accelerated.
16.
(b) Our plans are fully integrated with those of our Allies, notably the
United States.
(c) Provision will be made for the carry over of any unexpended balance in
one year to the following year.
(d) Our production potential will be maintained by some means outside the Service Estimates, e.g., by placing orders now for aircraft and army equipment for ready sale to other members of the Commonwealth and to certain Foreign countries.
17. On this basis we recommend the following sub-allocation of funds :-
1950-51
£ Million 1951-52 1952-53 Average
Admiralty
201
201
201
201
War Office
307
304
302
3041
Air Ministry
233
237
244
238
...
Unrequited. expenditure on
Western Union air equipment
7/1
4/1/2
Balance (Ministry of Supply and
Ministry of Defence
62/1/2
621/1
62/1/
62/1/
Total
811
809
810
810
Effect of these Proposals
18. This allocation of money will enable the Services to maintain the forces and to carry out the tasks shown in the Appendices* to this paper.
19. The broad effect on the priority requirements enumerated in para- graph 10 above would be as follows during the three years in question:—
(a) Cold War.--We can provide forces throughout the world needed to resist Russia's Cold War Tactics on their present scale but these forces would be insufficient if the tempo of the Cold War should increase. (b) Air Defence. We can make some continuous provision for the defence of the United Kingdom against air attack but a considerable warning period would be necessary to enable the requisite air forces to be built up to the strength they must attain by the outbreak of war. There will be no war reserve of fighter or bomber aircraft and, without this period of warning needed to build up such a reserve, our air defence forces could not survive more than about a month of intensive fighting.
(c) Sea Communications.-Allowing for 50 per cent. participation by the United States in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, and for sup- port by the Commonwealth countries and our other Allies, we can provide the bare minimum of naval forces needed to maintain control
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Page 786 Appendices I-III.
394
14
Pageof87fe0communications in the face Baghe7estimated Soviet threat. The speed at which the Fleet can be mobilised will be slow and our Maritime air forces would be able to give only limited air cover to the sea approaches of the United Kingdom.
(d) Middle East. The land forces available for the defence of the Middle East will be dangerously inadequate. We are relying on United States participation in the Air Defence of this theatre and of our line of communication through the Mediterranean. Our ability to defend Egypt will depend partly on the extent to which Anglo-United States air attack on the vulnerable Russian lines of communication delays the advance of their land forces and partly on the rate at which reinforcements can reach this theatre. (e) Western Europe.-Present Government Policy is to accept no commitment to send land reinforcement to Western Europe on outbreak of war. Moreover no such forces will be available during the next few years in time to take part in the initial battle, beyond a small increase in Tactical Air Forces and in supporting units for B.A.O.R. As noted above, however, two divisions can be earmarked for possible despatch to Western Europe on decisions made nearer the time.
General
20. No provision can be made at present for the reserves that would be necessary in war to keep our forces in action during the period in which our industry is switching to a war basis. This lack of reserves will very seriously curtail the period for which our forces could fight with what they have got in the event of a sudden emergency. This is an inescapable risk under an annual defence budget not exceeding £810 million. Readiness for war in the long term will depend on increased budgets in future years.
Conclusion
21. Any substantial reduction in the suggested annual allocation of £810 million can only result in unacceptable defence risks, or in our inability to meet some of our present commitments with the political consequences that this would entail. There are no appreciable savings to be made by marginal economies.
22. We are unanimously agreed that—
(a) The plan evolved is the best that can be made on the basis of the financial restrictions imposed, and represents a great advance on the proposals contained in the Harwood Report.
(b) The sum of £810 million a year for the next three years is, in our opinion, not sufficient to ensure the security of this country either against surprise attack or if American aid were to be delayed or limited. (c) The risks run under this plan, particularly in the quantity rather than the quality of the R.A.F., are considerable and they are only acceptable because of the reliance placed on the assistance we expect to receive from American forces and in the expectation that the strategic air offensive to be undertaken by the Americans will reduce to some extent the full force of the Russian offensive.
(d) The plan cannot be implemented on any less sum.
(e) Provision must be made for the carry over of any unexpended balance
in one year to the following year.
(f) Readiness for war in the long term will depend on increased budgets in
future years.
Ministry of Defence, S. W. 1,
27th September, 1949.