ANNEX C
Page 784
[C.O.S. (49) 313 (Final)]
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE ARMED FORCES OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS
Report
We have considered, as instructed by the Minister of Defence, the question of the security of this country in relation to an annual allocation of funds for Defence purposes amounting to an average of £810 million over the next three We have first considered the nature of the threat which we must be ready
years. to meet.
2. We have two enemies-Communism and Russia. We are already at war with Soviet Communism, but not yet with Russia. If Communism wins the Cold War which it is now waging, the Western powers will have been defeated without Russia having to resort to force at all. If the Western powers win the Cold War, Russia may start a shooting war in desperation or, quite possibly, find us so strong that she dare not attack. Our first political and strategic object, therefore, is to win the Cold War; our second is to make ourselves as strong as possible to meet the possibility of a shooting war with Russia.
The Cold War
3. All three services must play their part in the Cold War by :-
(a) Holding our present possessions and influence against attacks, internal
or external, which fall short of Major War.
(b) Encouraging other nations to resist Communism.
Offensive action in the Cold War is largely a political matter but its implementa- tion requires the backing of the Armed Services.
4. In the Cold War, the major weight falls, of necessity, on the Army. The greater part of its fighting units are already deployed overseas to meet Cold War commitments. There is little prospect of these commitments being reduced-the tendency is for them to increase-and if they are to continue to be met, there can be no reduction in the major units of the regular Army nor, unless regular recruiting greatly improves, in the length of National Service. Unfortunately, the demands of the Cold War are, as far as the Army is concerned, largely antagonistic to preparation for a Major War. The Army, on any possible Budget, cannot effectively bear the burden of the Cold War and at the same time prepare fully for a Major War. One must have preference; this should be the Cold War.
5. Fortunately, neither in the Navy nor in the Royal Air Force is there, to the same extent, this direct conflict between the needs of the Cold War and a Major War. Where conflict does occur in these services, we consider that the requirements for a Major War should take precedence.
6. For the Cold War, the highest scale of equipment is not so vitally necessary as for a Major War. It follows that the Army will incline more to trained man-power at the expense of equipment, while the other two Services will have, to some extent, to sacrifice man-power to equipment.
A Major War
7. In war, our strategy has three main pillars-the United Kingdom, our sea communications and our position in the Middle East. The Defence services should therefore organised in peace to cover the requiremege of the Cold War and, in co-operation with our allies in war, to secure these three pillars.
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Page T&5 Rifs, besides subsidiary offensives Reageers, frd 01kely to direct their main efforts to:-
(a) A land and air offensive into Western Europe. (b) An air attack on the United Kingdom.
(c) An
An extensive mining campaign against our ports and harbour
approaches.
(d) A combined submarine and air attack on our sea communications.
A land and air offensive in the Middle East.
9. The odds against the Western Powers and the risk of defeat are greatest on land and least at sea, but the risks of defeat to this country are most immediate in the air, less sudden on sea and longest delayed on land. If our air strength was inadequate we could lose the air war in a very short time and, having lost it, no other operation on sea or land in our defence could succeed. If we avoid defeat in the air, but are unable to maintain our sea communications, we should be denied vital supplies which could lead to our defeat in a few months. If, however, we avoid defeat in the air war and preserve our vital sea communications, the loss of Western Europe and the Middle East would not necessarily be decisive. These factors must be taken into acount when considering our preparations for a major war.
Priorities
10. On this basis, we can place our requirements functionally in the follow- ing order of urgency :-
(a) Success in the Cold War.
(b) The defence of the United Kingdom against air attack.
(c) The security of sea communications vital to the United Kingdom, and of
the approaches to our ports and harbours against mining attack.
(d) The retention of the Middle East.
(e) The provision of forces for Western Europe.
The general build-up for an ultimate offensive.
Air Defence of Great Britain
11. The major burden of the air defence of Great Britain falls on the R.A.F. and requires both defensive and offensive forces. While fighter aircraft, A.A. weapons and an adequate Control and Reporting System are absolutely essential to enable a heavy toll to be taken of enemy aircraft attacking this country, we cannot rely for our security on local defence alone. An air striking force to take offensive action against the immediate sources of the enemy air threat is also necessary, and in any event is our only means of combating attacks by V2 weapons. Long-range
air bombardment must be left to the Americans, at least until British long-range bombers with adequate performance are available for this purpose, but in the meantime we must maintain a medium bomber force as a complement to Fighter Command for the air defence of this country. Consequently, the strength and equipment of the air forces required for the defence of this country, together with A.A. Command of the Army, must be our first priority in preparation for
war.
Security of Sea Communications
12. This is almost entirely the responsibility of the Navy and the R.A.F. The forces required to combat the threat of the submarine, the mine and the aero- plane against sea communications should have equal preference. Full advantage. should be taken of American Naval and Air assistance in dealing with the submarine and air attack on the high seas.
Middle East-
13. It appears at present that no American land forces will be available for the defence of the Middle East in the early stages of a Major War. We shall, therefore, have to hold this area with our own resources aided by such formations as the other members of the Commonwealth can make available. The smallest reinforcement that can have any effect in this theatre is two British divisions with supporting troops. These should be provided, but it is unlikely that they would be suseient to hthe Middle East without considengde further and reinforce- ments and Tactical Air Forces.
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Western Eurorege 786 of 1097