C. R. A..
TOP SECR 774 of 1097
[D.O. (49) 66
18th October, 1949.]
ANNEX A
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Page 774.
Copy No.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE: SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE ARMED FORCES 1950-53
MEMORANDUM BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE
Introductory
My colleagues will be aware that, ever since the institution of the Ministry of Defence in January 1947, an unremitting effort has been made with the advice of the Chiefs of Staff to elaborate for the approval of Ministers a comprehensive long-term plan for the three Services to which current expenditure could be related. I now present to my colleagues a 3-Service scheme covering the three years 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53-the full details of which will be found in the Reports by an Inter-Departmental Committee* and by the Chiefs of Staff.† The scheme contemplates an expenditure of £810 million‡ on defence in each of the three years to which it relates. Expenditure on the scale of £810 million per annum in our present financial state may seem a lot of money to spend on defence, and I must therefore at the outset explain some of the main reasons which lead me to propose such a sum, not merely as reasonable, but as the inescapable mini- mum consistent with the maintenance of our world position.
Basic Considerations--the Objective
2. Armed Forces are not an end in themselves. They represent the power, actual and potential, which a nation thinks it prudent and necessary to maintain to support its policy or policies. Since the War ended we have had three main policy objectives:
First. To provide security for our people against aggression-the first duty of any Government.
Second. To sustain our foreign policy, including the maintenance of adequate occupation forces in Germany and resistance to the onrush of Communist influence at the various points of contact-Greece, Trieste, Malaya, Hong Kong, &c; and
Third. To achieve the most rapid development practicable of our over- seas possessions, since without such Colonial development there can be no major improvement in the standard of living of our own people at home.
3. From the desire to achieve these ends derives the level and structure of the Armed Forces which have had to be maintained. I remind the Committee of how the Services have had over the past four years to conform to the shifts and chances of policy as it has developed. Coincident with the rapid demobilisa- tion of our forces-which was essential for economic recovery-the Foreign Secretary set himself to reach an understanding with our principal Allies which would have included the full development of the provisions of the United Nations Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations and the steady reduction of the burden of armaments. Patient and persistent efforts in this direction have met with repeated frustration. Four years from V.J. Day we have not peace, but the phenomenon known as the Cold-War. During that period the attitude of Russia has meant disturbance the world over, and we have been em- broiled at many points. Yet resistance to the spread of the influence of Moscow is a cardinal, if not the cardinal, feature of our policy and that of our friends at this time. In pursuit of this policy the Armed Forces have been obliged-des- pite all the disorganisation consequent on rapid demobilisation to spreadeagle themselves across the globe in order to hold many of the outposts of democracy.
† Annex C.
* Annex B.
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The gestimate was prepared before de-valuation. (See paragraphgl.774 of 1097
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The Ragssu7e5nfchof the three Services created Baghes Sunft conditions- producing in each its own particular problems-made it virtually impossible to reach any co-ordinated long-term plan for all three Services.
Some General Propositions
4. Before turning to the current proposals I should like to enunciate a number of general propositions which affect the preparation of Service plans and estimates at the present time, if only to dispel some of the misconceptions current about Armed Forces expenditure-not all of which are confined to our political opponents.
(a) The problem of "teeth and tail.”—It is a common habit for critics-the Leader of the Opposition among them-to point to pre-war Service expenditure and to imply that, even allowing for increased costs, much current expenditure on the Services must be wasteful, since the avail- able fighting units--regiments, ships, squadrons are markedly less numerous than before the war. This argument ignores the increasing complexity of modern equipment in all three Services which has led inevitably, not merely to increased manning requirements per equip- ment, but to a great increase in base establishments for servicing and maintenance and also for training personnel in its efficient use. Radar alone has introduced a new and very exacting requirement in the Services. The modern heavy bomber does not merely need a bigger crew to operate it, but also makes a very much heavier demand on the ground staff than its predecessor. The modern destroyer requires a crew about one-third stronger than her pre-war counterpart of comparable main armament. There is thus no valid comparison to be drawn on this basis with the forces provided for any given outlay of money. (b) Rising cost of equipment.-The cost of the provision of all this vastly more complicated equipment is also important. Current requirements can no longer be met from war-time stocks and we are confronted with the formidable problem of gradual re-equipment with modern weapons. The cost of both raw materials and finished products over the whole range of stores and equipment has risen sharply since the War. We cannot measure up to the potential enemy in number of men and we must offset this deficiency in the only way we can, namely by out- stripping him in the technique and performance of our equipment. It follows that it is of the highest importance that we should aim at equipping whatever forces we maintain at a high standard of technical quality. Since the War we have recognised this in the priority given to defence research.
(c) Increased pay allowances and costs of maintenance. The wage bill of the three Services has increased enormously since 1938 as a result of in- creases granted during the war, their consolidation into the New Pay Code of 1946 and subsequent further increases in line with the general rise in civilian wages since then. For example, the gross emoluments of a private soldier in 1938 were £153 per annum, they are £289 to- day, an increase of 89 per cent. Comparable figures for a lieutenant are £292 in 1938, £481 in 1949, an increase of 65 per cent. The cost of maintaining a man in the forces-his food, clothing and accommo- dation-have increased proportionately. The charges for personnel are a very heavy item in Service budgeting approximately one-third of the total and are not susceptible of reduction.
(d) The growing importance of the air arm. The rise of the R.A.F. to full stature beside the older Services adds another new element to costs. The disappearance of the traditional concept of an island protected by sea power alone which could always guarantee us the time in which to prepare for a land campaign after the outbreak of war is now generally accepted. What is less generally understood is that, for all its advances over the last, thirty years, air power, even as we know it to-day, is not only developing still greater responsibilities but also its ability to meet those responsibilities. The last war ended with the dropping of the atomic bomb and the introduction of the turbo- Page 775tong both of these will undoubtPagehave darlaching conse-
quences.
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(e) The Posse of th₤ndign Army. The effect on Araorganisafiqm of the granting of self-government to India and Pakistan is often over- looked. For here was a highly trained expandable reserve on which we could count in time of emergency or war. While the cost of this Army to the United Kingdom in peace was relatively small, it was a definite factor in our potential military strength.
(f) National Service Man-power. The National Service system, though essential in present circumstances, is, and must be, an expensive way of providing man-power to meet current needs. Of the total periog of service a substantial proportion is spent in training. Moreover, the fact that National Service men have to be used overseas, where their period of service must be short, increases transportation and similar overhead costs.
(g) The level of expenditure in relation to Western Union and the North Atlantic Pact.-Superficially there is ground for suggesting that the conclusion of these agreements with like-minded Powers should lead directly to some relief of our burdens. So they might, if we had entered into an association with fully armed States, but it is useless to burke the fact that, Canada and the United States apart, all our allies in these agreements are either painfully rebuilding their forces after the war or, like Portugal and Iceland, have a negligible military strength. In common with us they face the need to make good their economic recovery at the same time. Far from these agreements leading to a reduction of defence expenditure, therefore, they may even entail some increase in our outlay for some time to come. Quite apart from the specific Western Union programme, which is attracting assistance in cash and kind from the United States, it must be plain that these pacts entail moral obligations to our allies not to suffer a reduction in our capacity to contribute to the common defence. The pacts may be expected, as time goes on, to lead to some adjustment of expenditure by the participants in order to secure the best possible distribution of effort, and in so far as British types of equipment are standardised we may gain economically as well as in terms of war potential. But it would be quite wrong to look for any early net reduction of expenditure. We are seeking with our friends to establish in present world conditions a new concept-I might call it the Pax Atlantica. To do this we must ourselves do what we shall encourage others to do according to their resources-that is to take our proper part in an integrated international scheme of defence and contribute our fair share to the hard core in being" of the forces it demands. And if the price is heavy, how much more terrible for our people would be the price of failure not in terms of money alone but in the destruction of life and perhaps of our democratic society too. (h) The need for a greater effort by the self-governing Dominions. It is often tempting to think, when an effort is called for, that "the other fellow is not pulling his weight. So it is with the Dominions. We have given them and shall continue to give them every encouragement to develop their forces Australia with her five-year programme, New Zealand with her recent decision on conscription and Canada with her substantial research programme and air defence scheme have shown some signs of responding. But while we can encourage the free countries of the Commonwealth to develop their defence forces, we canot command them. We should not delude ourselves into thinking that we can transfer to them anything substantial of our present burdens.
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(j) Defence effort in relation to national income.--Probably the best com- parison which can be drawn, in view of the great change in money values and the structure of the national budget with the scale of effort pre-war, is the proportion of aggregate national income which is devoted to defence. In 1938 we devoted about 8 per cent. of our national income to defence and the figure is very much the same in 1949. There is no comparison which can be drawn on this basis with the years immediately after World War I; then there was no possible enengen Europe Who could in any way threaten age 77 One100ur
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