Page 444 10. It is clear from the talks which I had in Washington with Mr. Acheson and M. Schuman that the United States are not in favour of early de jure recogni- tion and that France, because of her position in Indo-China, is afraid of the consequences of such recognition. The attitude of the State Department is influenced by the attacks in Congress upon its China policy. In an effort to meet these attacks the State Department published on 30th July a voluminous White Paper on China which, however, failed to stifle the critics and indeed provided them with further ammunition. In the circumstances it must be recognised that the State Department will be influenced in its attitude more by internal American politics than by the realities of the situation in China. The French are influenced by the views of their High Commissioner in Indo-China, who appears to believe that de jure recognition of the Communist Government will endanger the constitutional structure which has recently been set up under the Emperor Bao Dai. This view is not shared by the French Ambassador in China, but it is never- theless likely to influence the French Government in the direction of deferring de jure recognition.
11. Of the other foreign Powers with whom we have been in consultation, the Dutch may conceivably hesitate to recognise the Chinese Communist Govern- ment in view of the Indonesian situation, though this is not certain. The other European Powers may be expected to follow our lead.
12. Of the other Commonwealth Powers, Canada may be reluctant to take a line unpalatable to the United States. Her interests in China are not extensive, and she may feel that in the circumstances she can afford to be out of step with the rest of the Commonwealth. Australia and India are believed to be in favour of early recognition. The other members of the Commonwealth have no direct representation in China, but will probably keep in line with the United Kingdom.
13. It will be necessary to consult both with other Commonwealth countries and other friendly foreign Powers before reaching a decision to recognise the Chinese Communist Government. Other Commonwealth Governments might be invited to instruct their High Commissioners in London to confer with me, thus affording evidence of the principle of Commonwealth consultation.
II. CHINESE NATIONALIST MOTION IN UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY
14. There is the related question of the Nationalist Government's complaint to the United Nations Assembly. They have secured time in the First Committee to invite attention to the infringements by the Soviet Union of the terms and spirit of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1945. The question may come up for debate about mid-November. It is extremely doubtful if the Chinese can make a case against the U.S.S.R., and the move can only have for object a vain and belated attempt to make political capital. We have told the Chinese that we would consider supporting their case if they can make one. The United States Government were initially rather more forthcoming, but have since realised the weakness of their position. Their White Paper on China has unfortunately provided abundant material to show the extent of American intervention in China and the rottenness and corruption which have led to the defeat of the Nationalist Government and to the assumption of power by the Communists. The State Department now realise that the Soviet Union is likely to take full advantage of the opportunity thus provided, and it may be expected that there will be a violent attack upon the status of the Nationalist Government and its claim to represent China in the United Nations Organisation.
15. If we hold the views outlined in Section I of this paper and in conse- quence propose eventually to recognise the Communist Government, it follows that we should no longer support in any degree this Chinese resolution. Anything we say, however anodyne, can hardly fail to be embarrassing vis-à-vis the new régime, while our support of the Nationalist Government could not fail to make us ridiculous in the face of the available evidence. Our best course would therefore seem to be to instruct the United Kingdom representative to take no part whatever in the debate and to abstain from voting. We should explain our intentions and our reasons to Commonwealth Governments and other friendly Powers in advance.
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III. TIMING OF RECOGNITION Page 445 of 1097
Page 445 It is clear from the preceding paragraphs that we cannot take a decision as to the date when de jure recognition should be accorded to the Chinese Communist Government until we have consulted with other Powers. We have also to consider the impact of recognition upon United Kingdom interests in the Far East. There is to be a conference at Singapore from 2nd-4th November under the chairmanship of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, which will be attended by all His Majesty's Representatives in the Far East, including His Majesty's Ambassador to China, and also by the three Far Eastern Commanders-in-Chief. This will afford a suitable opportunity to discuss the implications of recognition,
and it is desirable therefore to await the outcome of this conference before reaching a decision.
RECOMMENDATIONS
17. I invite my colleagues to agree that—
(1) I should consult with the United States and other friendly Powers on the
basis of this paper;
(2) our views be communicated to other Commonwealth Governments and that they be invited to instruct their High Commissioners in London to confer with me on the question of recognition;
(3) no decision as to the date of recognition be taken until the results of these consultations are known and until a report is received on the outcome of the Singapore conference.
Foreign Office, S. W. 1,
24th October, 1949.