would clearly take time, and in order that there should be no delay in launch- ing the Scheme, it was decided to proceed by means of agents responsible to the Government. The obvious choice was the United Africa Company, be- cause it had been so intimately connected with the project from the start, and because of its experience with large-scale plantations in Africa, and so, on November 6, 1946, at the invitation of the Minister of Food, the United Africa Company (Managing Agency) Ltd., took charge of the start of the enterprise. The plan was the plan contained in the report of the Mission, but which had been modified in certain respects by the Ministry of Food. Production costs re-assessed on rather less favourable assumptions about yield and prices, were now estimated at £17 18s. Od. per ton of shelled nuts f.o.b. an East African port, compared with the Mission's estimate of £14 5s. 6d. But with the price of groundnuts at around £40 per ton, this estimate presented an encouraging prospect. Moreover, the White Paper drew attention to the serious situation with which the native population of Africa were faced in maintaining even its existing meagre standard of living: unless some such project of large-scale development were initiated. The. plan could be expected to benefit both Africa and the United Kingdom alike.
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31. Immediately the Managing Agency was appointed, the task of obtaining the necessary equipment and securing the staff for the undertaking was put in hand. At the end of January, 1947, the advance party from the Managing Agency and the Contractors arrived in Dar-es-Salaam and the work began.
32. The original plan envisaged the clearing and planting of 150,000 acres. in 1947-48, provided that the necessary machinery was available on the site in February-March, 1947. Experience has shown that this target could. not have been achieved in the first year of the Scheme, even if the equipment. had been available. It may have been a possible target for the first year's clearing operations, on the assumption that before the clearing was started all the necessary engineering facilities for the maintenance and supply of the mechanised equipment had been provided, and that all the constructional work to provide homes, stores, and all the other provisions of a base for such a mechanised agricultural operation had been completed. Without any of these facilities, and with only inadequate supplies of second-hand equip- ment, it soon became apparent that the targets could not be reached. There were also technical obstacles which could not. have been foreseen.
Why Kongwa was a First Choice
33. The Kongwa area of the Central Province was selected by the Manag- ing Agents as the scene for the most intensive effort in preference to the Southern Province or Urambo since:
(a) the supply problems involved in the development of the Southern. Province rendered the large scale development of that area im- practicable until adequate port and rail facilities were established; (b) railway facilities were already available in the Central Province and Kongwa could be linked to the Central Railway Line by construct- ing a short spur railway joining the main line at Msagali, which. lies 16 miles south of Kongwa and 240 miles up the line from. the port of Dar-es-Salaam ;
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(c) although Urambo in the Western Province lies on the Central Rail- way line, the Government of Tanganyika advised the Wakefield Mission, in 1946, that it would not be advisable to begin opera- tions in the Urambo Region for a year or eighteen months; because the development of the Mpanda Lead Mine was planned,. and it was thought that all available labour would be absorbed. in extending the Central Railway Line to the Mine; Page 122 of 1097
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དྷ པཊྛོ