Page 92
Minister of Iraq, has from time to time worked for a federation or confederation of Iraq, Syria and Transjordan and possibly the Lebanon. These movements, particularly the Fertile Crescent Union, have obtained great impetus from the general disillusionment with the Arab League resulting from Palestine operations.
Israel
31. The Arab countries are united in their dislike and fear of Israel. Indeed they regard the creation of an independent state in Israel against the wishes of the majority of the former inhabitants as a major injustice and as an example of Western imperial colonisation on a grand scale. Whether stable and permanent relations can be established between Israel and her neighbours remains to be seen. Meanwhile the creation of Israel is tending to promote Arab unity. Although the United Kingdom is criticised as being largely responsible for the creation of Israel, none the less the Arab countries are, at least for the time being, turning towards the United Kingdom as being the only country likely to oppose indefinite Israeli expansion.
32. It is too early to assess the probable orientation of the policy of Israel. On the one hand there are strong leanings towards the United States, where 5 million out of the 10 million Jews in the world reside. There is gratitude to the United States for her support for the creation of Israel and the hope of con- tinued financial help. On the other hand, there are elements in Israel favourable to the Soviet Union. Finally, there is evidence of a strong tendency towards neutrality.
33. Israel would have considerable strategic importance in the event of war. For this and for other reasons, including the undesirability of Israel falling under Communist influence, it must be hoped that Israel will turn towards the West and not towards the Soviet Union and will have friendly relations both with the United States and with His Majesty's Government. In other words, we want the whole of the Middle East, including Israel, to be friendly towards us. If, however, we were to secure the friendship of Israel at the expense of the friendship of the Arab countries, we should lose economically and strategically more than we should gain. Our object must be, therefore, to endeavour to promote friendly relations with Israel, but not to the point of losing the friendship of the Arab world. Strategically facilities in Israel would be no substitute for facilities in Egypt and other Arab countries.
The French Position
34. The French attitude towards the Middle East is a combination of fear that the area may be given undue attention to the detriment of security arrange- ments in Western Europe; of desire to retain or partially recover France's interests largely cultural) and prestige, especially in the Levant States; and of concern for continued or increased supplies of Middle East oil. Finally France, largely in response to Catholic opinion, maintains an interest in the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The French blame British policy in 1942 and after for the loss of their position in the Levant States, and they regard with the highest suspicion ny positive move by the United Kingdom to co-operate with Syria or the Lebanon for security purposes. They are inclined to attribute to His Majesty's Govern- ment Machiavellian schemes to counter French influence and to absorb the Levant States into a British controlled Greater Syria. In order to combat these imaginary chemes, they are all too ready to intrigue against us and we must accept that Trance's policy is likely to be one of mistrust and covert opposition to us. There have been recent instances of this on the occasion of M. Bidault's visit to the Levant States, and over Persian oil. It is true to say, however, that while this mistrust continues to be a reality which it has not yet been possible to eliminate, t arises more from the feelings and interests of Frenchmen in the Middle East han from the policy of the French Government itself.
35. France is also preoccupied with the risk of the growth of Arab nationalism in North Africa, and consequently opposed to manifestations of Arab national unity in the Middle East, and in particular a revival of the Arab League the realisation of plans for Greater Syria or the Union of the Fertile Crescent.
36. His Majesty's Government have given a pledge that they do not seek to counter Frenchgame lingthe Middle East, and that they will endorf Fonce before concluding any direct agreements with the Levant States.
55
6
•
Possible Near East Pact
Bage 93rofin@untries in the Middle East, inpageidarf Gede, Turkey and possibly Persia, would like to see the conclusion of the Atlantic Pact followed by the conclusion of a Middle East Pact. From their point of view the essential attraction of such a pact would be the inclusion of the United States and the United Kingdom. The inclusion of France and Italy would probably not add to the attraction of the pact in the view of any of the countries concerned, and a number of them, might actively dislike their participation. France's attitude will be governed by factors set out in paragraphs 34-36 above.
38. The main advantage of such a pact would be the added confidence which it would afford to the member countries in maintaining their integrity and independence against communism.
39. There are indeed already signs that Greece and Turkey would not only welcome such a pact but may feel left out in the cold if they do not become members either of the Atlantic Pact or of a Middle East Pact.
40. From the point of view of His Majesty's Government, the commitments which the United States Government would undertake under such a pact (on the assumption that they would be identical with those of the Atlantic Pact) would have distinct advantages. On the other hand the association of the United States with the United Kingdom in the defence of the Middle East might be assured in other ways.
Membership
41. The possible membership of such a pact presents considerable problems. A pact limited to countries on the shores of the Mediterranean would make an arbitrary and artificial division among the Arab countries between the Lebanon, Syria and Egypt (who would be included) and Transjordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (who would be excluded). The exclusion of Persia would be a further and major disadvantage. Moreover it is difficult to envisage Egypt and the Lebanon being willing to enter a pact which included Israel, while excluding several of the Arab countries. Whether in fact Israel would herself be willing to enter such a pact it is impossible to say.
42. If, therefore, there were to be such a pact, it would be preferable for all the Middle East countries, including Persia, to be members. Here the problem of Israel would again arise. It is extremely doubtful whether any or all of the Arab countries would be willing, at least in the near future, to enter into a pact which included Israel. Whether Israel herself would agree to membership cannot yet be predicted. Nor can it yet be foreseen whether the United States would be willing to enter into a pact which included the Arab countries but did not include Israel (assuming that the United States were willing to enter into a Middle East Pact at all), Consideration might therefore be given to the possibility of starting with a pact to cover Greece, Turkey and Persia only, with the idea that this might subsequently be enlarged to include other Middle East countries. It is possible although not certain that it might be easier for the United States to become a member of such a pact, and the difficulties over Israel and the Arab countries would be avoided. On the other hand the conclusion of such a
pact would inevitably raise the difficulties over our existing Treaties with Egypt Transjordan and Iraq, which are considered in paragraph 47 below. On this, as on other points, we can for the moment only keep an open mind.
Afghanistan
!
43. Logically there would be much to be said for the inclusion Afghanistan in a Middle East Pact. But the geographical remoteness of the country and the difficulty of rendering her assistance, together with th uncertainty of persuading American and perhaps British public opinion of the importance of the security of Afghanistan, militate against this.
Pakistan
Ragephenf wood be considerable attraction iPage lafidf97 Pakistan an important Moslem country and a member of the Commonwealth.
7
45. On the other hand, inclusion of Pakistan withoupIndia would wise formidable difficulties. If for instance Pakistan and India were involved in hostilities, e.g., over Kashmir, His Majesty's Government might find themselves in the position of having obligations to assist one member of the Commonwealth against another. Moreover, both India and Pakistan would be desirable and probably essential members of any pact covering South-East Asia, and to include them in a Middle East Pact might cut across plans for some pact or agreement for South-East Asia and the Far East. Finally, many of the Middle East Countries might be unwilling to assume obligations towards Pakistan and rice versa.
46. On balance, therefore, the inclusion of Pakistan would probably be undesirable, at least until the Kashmir dispute has been relegated to the past and more normal conditions have been established.
Would a Middle East Pact Meet our Strategic Requirements?
47. There is the further consideration that the obligations to be assumed by members of a Middle East Pact would presumably be identical with, or would at least not exceed, those of the Atlantic Pact. But such obligations fall short of those under the Treaties of His Majesty's Government with Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan, and by the same token would fall short of the strategic commitments which we require from those and perhaps other countries in the Middle East. There might be a natural tendency for Middle East countries to say that the conclusion of a Middle East Pact rendered the maintenance of our existing Treaties unnecessary. Unless, therefore, the obligations of a Middle East Pact were supplemented by additional bilateral or multilateral defence arrangements between His Majesty's Government and a number of Middle East countries, the net result might be that our strategic position would be weakened rather than strengthened. The conclusion of such additional defence arrangements would therefore be an essential requirement.
Possibility of Defending the Middle East in the Event of War
48. A complicating factor is the uncertainty of the ability of American and British forces to hold any given line in the Middle East in the event of war.
49. This problem is at present under joint examination by the Americans and ourselves. The provisional thought is understood to be that in the event of war within the next year or two we should be very unlikely to be able to hold any areas north or east of Palestine. In the event of war at a later period we might hope to hold a more advanced line as far north as the Taurus.
50. There is, therefore, the risk that if a pact were concluded of which all Middle East countries were members, we should be misleading them by the false expectation which would no doubt be aroused that they might hope in the event of attack by Russia that all their territory would be defended.
51. On the other hand, it may be argued that in the event of war with Russia all the territory of all members of the Atlantic Pact could not be defended, and that therefore the expectations aroused by a Middle East Pact would be no more misleading than those aroused by the Atlantic Pact.
52. Secondly, we have to weigh the extent to which the existence of a Middle East Pact would strengthen the determination and confidence of Middle East countries in resisting Soviet pressure and Communist penetration in peace-time, and therefore make the occurrence of war less likely.
53. Finally, we must bear in mind that our decision to defend the Middle East in the event of war and the selection of the line which we may hope to hold will be determined irrespective of the conclusion or non-conclusion of a Middle East Pact; and will only be affected by the conclusion of a pact in so far as the existence of a pact would increase the goodwill towards us of the countries concerned, and increase their resolution in standing with us in peace or war.
Africa
54.
Dr. Malan has recently indicated that South Africa would be willing to join the Atlantic Pact if invited and has also made an alternative suggestion for an African Pat 94 whichghe United States, the United Kingdom4the Igiọn
56
8
of South Africa and European countries with possessions in Africa (presumably France, Belgium, Portugal and perhaps Italy) would be members. Whether he contemplates the fildon of Egypt is not clear. Page 95 of 1097
55. Since the Middle East is the shield of Africa it would be somewhat illogical to conclude an African Pact unless it were to be accompanied or followed by a Middle East Pact. But it is, of course, possible to contemplate an African Pact coupled with political and defence arrangements for the Middle East in a form other than a Middle East Pact. Dr. Malan's suggestion also points to the possibility of the inclusion of South Africa in a Middle East Pact, which might in fact take the form of a Middle East and African Pact. These ideas need further exploration.
Conclusions
56. The desirability of a Middle East Pact must be judged in the light of our objective of a strong, prosperous and friendly Middle East bound to us by adequate defence arrangements. This objective can be pursued, and, we may hope, obtained by a number of alternative means such as the promotion of economic co-operation, and defence or other negotiations with individual countries or groups. of countries. It is by no means clear whether the conclusion of a Middle East Pact would be the best means of promoting our objective, although in spite of the difficulties it might prove to be so. We ought to be able to judge of this better if and when the Atlantic Pact is passed by the United States Senate, and when, as we hope may happen in the near future, some general agreement is reached between Israel and her neighbours. Meanwhile, we should continue to pursue our objective by whatever individual negotiations we may find possible, maintaining an open mind about a Middle East Pact. We should, however, keep clearly in view the point that a Middle East Pact modelled on the Atlantic Pact would, to meet our requirements, have to be supplemented by additional bilateral or multilateral defence arrangements. We should also bear in mind the possibility either of an African Pact or of a Middle East Pact extended to include African countries.
Foreign Office, S.W. 1, 19th October, 1949.