Printed for the Cabinet October 1949

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SECRET

C.P. (49) 204

24th October, 1949

CABINET

Copy No.31

COUNCIL OF EUROPE

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In C.P. (49) 200 of 10th October I gave an account of developments in the Council of Europe during its first session at Strasbourg in August and September last and a summary of the recommendations and resolutions which resulted from the work of the Consultative Assembly. I explained that these recommendations and resolutions would come before the Committee of Ministers early in November and I undertook to put forward in a separate paper my suggestion as to the line. I might be authorised to adopt in the Committee on that occasion.

2. I now circulate as an Annex to this paper a summary of the main conclusions from the briefs which have been prepared by various Government Departments on individual items in the Assembly's recommendations. These conclusions have for the most part not received ministerial approval and I should like to know that my colleagues now approve them. In order, however, to enable

my now a proper judgment to be formed on these individual matters it is necessary to review in somewhat general terms the nature and functions of the Council of Europe

ope as it has emerged from its first session, and to see where His Majesty's Government stand in regard to it. After this review it may be possible to agree on certain broad principles which should guide us in our dealings both with the Committee of Ministers and with the Assembly and which may also be relevant in the case of other European organisations in which His Majesty's Government participate.................

3. I do not expect that at their meeting on 3rd November the Committee of Ministers will be called upon to accept or reject any of the more far reaching of the Assembly's proposals. Most of these proposals, and particularly those which involve degrees of surrender of sovereignty to a European authority or of financial and economic integration between the participating countries, will clearly require a great deal of careful study, and the natural thing for the Committee of Ministers to do will be either to refer them back to the Assembly for further elucidation or to set up some working party or sub-committee of their own to examine them. There are, however, certain important questions on which an early decision will be required and on which it is desirable that the views of His Majesty's Govern- ment should be made clear at the outset. These fall broadly into two parts:-

(1) Questions affecting the character and functions of the Council of Europe itself, including amendments to the Statute and requests for additional sessions, standing committees, &c.; and

(2) New accessions, including notably the question of German accession. No clear view can be reached on these questions until the broad lines of policy in regard to our relations with the Council of Europe have been clarified.

Summary of Recommendations

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4. The following are the recommendations which I ask my colleagues to approve in connection with the forthcoming meeting of the Committee of

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Ministe Bagahey afetive from the general conclusionBase 49tolthe7later para- graphs of this paper:-

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(a) His Majesty's Government should continue to support the Council of

Europe and to play an active part in its development.

(b) Under existing policy, however, we cannot agree to any proposals which mean our getting involved in the economic affairs of Europe beyond the point at which we could, if we wished, disengage ourselves. There are no grounds for abandoning this policy.

(c) Any surrender of political sovereignty in matters of vital importance would jeopardise our ability to maintain the policy at (b). We must therefore maintain a very strict reserve in regard to schemes for the pooling of sovereignty or the establishment of European supra-national machinery.

(d) Subject to (b) and (c) above, we should adopt a positive attitude towards proposals for co-operation in the political, social and cultural fields and should welcome the development of the Consultative Assembly into a responsible quasi-parliamentary body in which European points of views are advocated. We need not object to amendments to the Statute designed to give the Assembly greater independence or to increase its. efficiency and prestige, so long as they do not enable it to stray beyond its consultative function. (This would mean opposing the proposal that the Assembly should have a veto on new accessions.) By the same token we should agree to the provision of finance for the Standing Committee, the General Affairs Committee and (until its work is finished) the Committee on Rules of Procedure; but should not provide for the permanent maintenance of the other committees which the Assembly have set up.

(e) We should not support the proposal for a Special Session early in

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(f) In order to maintain the principle that the elaboration of agreement between Governments is the business of the Committee of Ministers rather than of the Assembly, we should support where necessary the establishment of sub-committees of the Committee of Ministers for the purpose of studying proposals submitted by the Assembly and of preparing texts for agreement between Governments.

(g) Wherever it is clear that proposals under discussion at Strasbourg can more effectively and economically be dealt with in the context of O.E.E.C. or other European international organs we should support their reference to those bodies. We should bear in mind at all stages. the strain placed upon national administrations by the multiplication of international organisations.

(h) In the cultural and social fields we should support the widest practicable degree of co-operation between Members. In particular we should advocate the extension of some of the non-military work of the Brussels Treaty into the wider field of the Council of Europe; and we should look favourably in principle upon the conclusion of a Convention of Human Rights.

(i) We should endeavour to get the Committee of Ministers to issue a state- ment to the effect that if the German Federal Republic desires to be invited to join as an Associate Member and accepts the principles of the Statute, an invitation will be issued to it. If necessary in order to secure French agreement to this we could agree to the admission of the Saar as an Associate Member at the same time. The question of Austria should be left over until the results of the Peace Treaty negotiations are clearer.

General Discussion

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5. His Majesty's Government are committed by Treaty to support the Council of Europe and its aims as defined in the preamble to the Statute, which include the achievement of "a greater unity between its Members

Apart from this general and paper obligation the Government are committed, if only by the Pragenenbandeffective rôle which Ministers Blaged in and fitical opening

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session this yearg to encourage the development of the Consultative Assembly as a serious quasi-parliamentary institution, independent of Governments, but having the duty of advocating European points of view on all matters within its competence.

6. Judged as an experimen

in European parliamentary association and within the limits which were set, the Consultative Assembly can be said to have made a successful start. Many of the fears felt beforehand as to what might emerge from an Assembly consisting of delegates not responsible to their Govern- ments were falsified in the event, and on the whole the Assembly steered its way successfully between empty talk on the one side and excessive ambition on the other. For this success the British Delegation had a large responsibility. The very success of the experiment from the point of view of organisation and publicity, however, may increase our difficulties in dealing with the practical implications. It is inevitable and natural that any body of this kind should tend to favour the creation of supra-national machinery which would in effect increase its own powers; and by its very existence it will constitute a form of pressure in favour of speedier and more radical unification in Europe than Governments are willing to accept. There will therefore be a growing possibility of conflict between the Governments and the Assembly.

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7. The Council of Europe is an important element in the structure which we have been building up in Europe with the object of creating a feeling of confidence and unity amongst the Western nations. Together with the Brussels Treaty, the O.E.E.C., and the Atlantic Pact, it is one of the major weapons in the cold war. Whatever, therefore, may be our opinion as to the ultimate relation- ship between this country and the Continent, or between the continental nations, solidarity and co-

we should do nothing now to undermine the general hopes nations,

operation which the Council of Europe has aroused in Europe. Stated in purely strategical terms, the most immediate task is to prevent war by the double method of deterring an aggressor and encouraging a mood of resistance in our Allies. Therefore the cold war" and the building up of Western European morale must have a high priority in our

thinking. Any ostentatious weakening of British support for the Council of Europe might have disastrous effects on opinion in France, Italy, the Benelux countries and elsewhere. It might also destroy all hope of bringing Germany into close political association with the West.

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8. Account must also be taken of American views. It is difficult to estimate what United States public opinion or Congress think about economic union in Europe and the position of the United Kingdom in regard to it, as the balance of opinion is apt to shift from time to time. There is a strong body of public feeling in the United States which expects Europe, with or without the United Kingdom, to get together politically and economically as a price for the continuance of United States aid. This school of thought has in particular many adherents in the Economic Co-operation Administration. Any appearance on our part of sabotaging such enterprises as the Council of Europe would certainly have serious results on American opinion. The truth is probably that most Americans do not expect this country to enter into any exclusive political or economic association with continental countries, and current American official policy is against it. But we should still be attacked in the United States if we could be shown to be preventing European unification by what might be represented as a selfish attitude.

9. It is clear that His Majesty's Government must maintain certain basic reserves in regard to the Council of Europe. The careful phraseology of the Statute and the obvious caution of the Governments in their approach to it cannot conceal the fact that the Assembly provides a forum where His Majesty's Government will be exposed to continuous pressure, not only from the representa- tives of the other counties but also from British enthusiasts for European union, to undertake measures of unification beyond what they consider desirable or acceptable to the British people. Already the Assembly have declared (para- graph IV (1) of the enclosure to M. Spaak's letter of 9th September reproduced as Appendix A to the report annexed to C.P.(49) 200) that they regard one of their aims and objects as being the establishment of a European political authority with limited functions but real powers." We cannot accept such a

C.C.

doctrine as pa aim of British policy. On the economic side ge parterlyyour

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existing policy, which is set out in E.P.C. (49) 6 of 25th January 1949, lays down that, though we may make considerable sacrifices for the sake of European eco- nomic co-operation, we should not run risks which would jeopardise our own chances of survival if the attempt to restore Western Europe should fail, and that we should not involve ourselves in the economic affairs of Europe beyond the point at which we could, if we wished, disengage ourselves. I know of nothing which should lead us to modify this policy; in fact the recent Conference of Commonwealth Finance Ministers and the Washington conversations point rather the other way. The economic implications and justification of this policy lie outside the scope of this paper. towards

It seems clear that our generaude the economic resolution of the Assembly should be one of great caution; but for tactical purposes it may well be best, during the forthcoming meeting of the Committee of Ministers, that I should endeavour to induce my colleagues to show their hands first. Otherwise the tendency of the Committee of Ministers will undoubtedly be to try to fasten on the United Kingdom all the blame for their inability to proceed with European economic unity on the lines which the Assembly obviously desires.

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with the rest of the Commonwealth and, almost equally import relationship

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10. It is clear therefore that there exists a potential conflict between a policy of full participation in the Council of Europe and the wider interests which His Majesty's Government are always obliged to keep in mind. Our relationship our new relationship with the United States ensure that we must remain, as we have always been in the past, different in character from other European nations and fundamentally incapable of wholehearted integration with them. How soon or how sharply this conflict may come to light in Strasbourg or elsewhere is hard to say. One of the principal disadvantages of the Council of Europe from the point of view of His Majesty's Government is that by its nature it brings such issues under the glare of public discussion, where it is much more difficult than it would be in an ordinary governmental context to sustain the traditional non- committal and two-way facing policy of this country. Much will depend on the extent to which other European Governments, as distinct from their representa- tives in the Assembly, desire to press for the acceptance of proposals involving political or economic integration. It is not likely that such pressure will arise at once. Even in the Assembly there was not a majority in favour of schemes for immediate economic or political union and it was, I understand, largely fortuitous that the economic recommendations were not remitted for further study to a Standing Committee, as were the various proposals for political union. None of the Governments has declared itself to be in favour of schemes of this kind and if we show a certain caution we shall certainly not be alone. It is also worth noting that there is now a divergence of opinion in the Opposition on this subject, and that as a purely internal, political proposition the campaign for European Union, as conducted by Mr. Sandys and the European Movement, is unlikely to commend itself in its extreme form to any party in the House of

Commons.

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It should, in my view, be our object to postpone as long as possible being faced with a choice between, on the one hand, overstepping the limits of safety in integration with Europe and, on the other, appearing to abandon the ideas of the Council of Europe. To this end it will be necessary for us to balance our caution in the matter of economic and political integration with a policy of encouragement and support for co-operation in other fields. There are, I think, three ways in which we can do this. First we can support the requests of the Assembly in regard to its own independence and activities so long as these stay within the limits of a consultative body. We can agree to the amendments proposed in the Statute for giving the Assembly complete control over its agenda. I do not believe that it is practicable or worth while to oppose the wishes of the Assembly on these issues. The control which the Statute gives the Committee of Ministers over the Assembly's agenda is impossible to exercise in practice, and any self-respecting body of parliamentarians would be bound to resist it. We should, of course, retain the ban on any discussion relating to defence. We could also well allow the Assembly to abolish substitutes and increase (but not double) the number of representatives, and we could agree to the appointment of an additPage Deputy Secretary-General to serve the APsembly of think the Com- mittee of Ministers should approve and provide finance for the Standing Committee and the General Affairs Committee which the Assembly has set up,

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because it is only natural that an Assembly which can only mees once a year should require some comfnuing machinery to prepare its work and represent Its interests. In addition, it is reasonable to allow the Committee on Rules of Procedure to meet out of Session until it has drawn up revised Rules of Procedure for the Assembly. I do not think, however, that we should agree to finance the operation, between Sessions, of the other Committees which the Assembly has set up. To do so would be to make the Assembly to all intents and purposes an all-the-year- round institution, contrary to the intentions of the Statute. We must also strongly oppose the suggestion that the Assembly should be given the right of veto over candidates for membership that have been approved by the Committee of Ministers. To give the Assembly such a right would undoubtedly diminish the power of Governments to take decisions in the field of foreign affairs. After all, the Assembly consists of individual parliamentarians who only represent themselves, and it seems to follow that Governments cannot possibly divest themselves of any of their responsibilities in favour of an Assembly constituted in this way.

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12. Secondly, we should endeavour to be as forthcoming as possible in regard to all proposals which do not involve committing His Majesty's Government to political and economic union. In particular we should look favourably upon the idea of a Convention of Human Rights and, in principle, upon the social and cultural resolutions. In these fields the five Brussels Treaty Powers have a particular contribution to make and I propose to recommend that they should submit a full report to the Committee of Ministers on the work so far achieved by them, together with sons as to how this could be expanded to cover the

of Europe.

twelve Members of the C

13. Thirdly, I think we should do well in the Committee of Ministers to make arrangements for setting up suitable intergovernmental bodies to examine the majority of the recommendations which the Assembly has made. These inter governmental Committees might meet at intervals at Strasbourg during the coming year for the purpose of investigating such matters as human rights, social security and so on, and their very existence should, I think, do something to discourage the Assembly from insisting on the establishment of too many Committees on its own account, and at the same time give it the impression that its recommendations are at any rate being taken seriously by the Governments concerned.

New Accessions

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14. Since the Council of Europe is a focus for European co-operation, it follows that, if we are to implement our promise to incorporate Germany into the Western system, she must sooner or later be admitted to the organisation. If, as it must, the United Kingdom is going to have to contract out of any close economic union, one effect may be gradually to diminish the attraction which a Western orientation would otherwise have for Germany. It is therefore important that the German Federal Republic.should be brought in at the earliest possible date with our support and encouragement, so that the process of recon- ciliation between France and Germany, so essential for the building up of Europe, may be begun with our sponsorship and within this wide European framework. The experience of this year shows that the delegations in the Assembly tend naturally to divide on party and other special lines and not to form national blocs. This makes the Assembly a particularly suitable forum for the Germans to make their début in European association. There is at present a strong desire in Western Germany to join, and it would be most unfortunate if this were allowed to dissipate. Moreover, both we and the French have declared that one of the principal adavantages of the Council of Europe is that it will permit of German participation.

15. If Germany is to join at all she could either join as an Associate Member, under Article 5 of the Statute (i.e., with seats in the Assembly), or as a full Member. I do not think that in present circumstances there could really be any question of Germany joining as a full Member. She does not as yet control her own foreign policy, thoughage purse she will do so to an increasing degPagesime goes7on. Moreover, I have information to the effect that at the moment the German Chan-. cellor would be perfectly happy if Germany were invited to join as an Associate Member. In any case, whatever reasons there may be for suggesting that Germany

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shouldejain cafs lagull Member, it is extremely improbable that the French would agree to any such thing. Indeed we may well have difficulties with the French as regards Germany's admission as an Associate Member. As against this it must be recognised that the longer a decision to invite Germany as an Associate Member is postponed the greater the clamour in some quarters will become for her admission as a full Member.

16. Though this is not mentioned specifically in any Assembly resolution or recommendation, the fact remains that the Assembly thought that if the Committee of Ministers admitted Germany as an Associate Member this year it would be highly desirable to have a Special Session of the Assembly in March or April of next year so that Germany (who would be debarred from attending the Committee of Ministers) would at any rate be able to take a definite part in the Council of Europe at a fairly early date. It was also thought that certain other matters might be dealt with at this Special Session. I am, however, myself opposed to the idea of a Special Session of the Assembly in the spring for reasons which I think my colleagues will readily appreciate.

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17. A final difficulty as regards Germany is that it may well be that the French will only agree to Germany being invited to join as an Associate Member if a similar invitation is offered at the same time to the Saar. Provided, however, that we are successful in inducing the French to say that, just as in the case of Germany, they would have no objection to the Saar eventually joining as a full Member, I should be disposed to agree to this proposal. For if the Saar ever should join as a full Member, it will be clear that as an independent State it would possess the inherent right of eventually choosing between remaining independent, or, alternatively, joining up with either Germany or France. If this position were made clear to the Germans, they for their part should not raise any objection to the Saar joining the Council of Europe as an Associate Member. Much, however, will clearly depend on the attitude of the French.

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As regards new admissions generally, therefore, I believe that we should endeavour to get the Committee of Ministers to agree as follows:-

(1) To make a declaration that if the German Federal Republic desires to accede as an Associate Member of the Council of Europe and is pre- pared to subscribe to the provisions of Article 3 of the Statute, the Governments concerned will at once issue an invitation to it under Article 5.

(2) To make a similar declaration in respect of the Saar on the assumption that such action would be necessary in order to induce the French Government to agree to (1). (The position of Austria cannot be decided until the fate of the Peace Treaty negotiations is more clear.)

Foreign Office,

24th October, 1949. .

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