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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
SECRET
Page Aated for the Cabinet. Augus! 16 427 of 662
204
Cópy No. 31
CUP. (40) 177
18th August, 1949
CABINET
HỒNG KONG
MRMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES
On 2ärd June (C.M. (49) 42nd Conclusions, Minute 5) the Cabinet invited sa to submit proposals on long-term policy in respect of Hong Kong, As our colleagues are aware, the United States authorities have asked us for information about our policy towards Hong Kong (telegram No. 113 of 8th June from the United Kingdom Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris, at Amxes 4). There is also outstanding a considered reply to the telegram No. 235 of 1st June (st. Annex B) from the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Australia outlining the attitude of the Australian Prime Minister towards The situation in Hong Kong.
2. At Annex C wo give wome factual information about Hong Kong, was notas on the value to ourselves, to the local inhabitants, and indeed to China itself, of the maintenance of the British connexion, and on our ability to maintain our position there in the face of Chiness hostility. Annex D is a maminky of assurances given by His Majesty's Government since 1948 about the future of Hong Kong; and a map of the Colony is also nanexed.
3. Our consideration of the problem of Hong Kong has led us to the coseltason that, since it is not possible to predict with any certainty how the situation will develop in China, it is not si present either possible or desirable to attempt to determine a long-term policy for the future of Hong Kong, In sump respinta the situation we are faced with in Hong Kong is similar to that which faced namand to vote extant still farea in Forlin." Just as we cannot forasse with certainty how the future of Berlin will develop but are stuvinoed of the monuity of regaatsing there, en we are impelled to sain in Hong Kong rithout any clear indication of the extent or duration of the military commitment involved. To both enges the thest of Bustian and Communist 'expansioniam mwversitasas kolding what we bays and not withdrawing.
4. In the case of Hong Kong there ure fover and above our seat lockdo legal right to be there) other cogens reasons for our remaining. These reasons are summarised in paragraph 3 öf Annax C.
The weakness of our future position in Hong Kong arima from the fact. Hicks we met mengst, that both Nationalism and Contemmniss in China are Hikaly to have so their miss the eventual recovery by one mass or another not only of the Land Territories bat also of the ceded arms of the Colony. Such recovery could be attempted by the threat or actual use of forov; by preannm, or by pesovžu!
tåreel metaliation.
Vareas or Actual Use of Fores
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6. We have already taken steps to meet the threat or actual use of foren. parition being the infoguarded, it may well be found that no threat will develop. Wedava Perliested@charly that we are not prepared to nike inter- ference by the Chitons Communists in our own territories, and this indication of
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policy has strengthened local morale. Were we, however, to withdraw our forces, and thus allow it to be implied that we are not prepared to stand our ground, the results throughout South-East Asia would be disastrous. There is no doubt that the successes of the Chinese Communists have already had a profound effect in this region. where there are very large Chinese populations. It is characteristic of Chinese, wherever they may be, to come to terms with the Government in being in China proper. There are already signs, for example in Siam, that this process has begun. Unless it is made unmistakably clear that the Governments of South-East Asia territories are firmly determined to fulfil their obligations and to suppress Chine Communist interference in their affairs, there is a very real danger that Chiness communities in these areas will support the Communist canse, not so much from conviction as from a traditional tendency to give way to the inevitable.
7. We cannot afford to allow South-East Asia to becozsa dominated by Com- munism. Apart from our historical obligations towards Malaya and the fact that it is our most important dollar earner, South-East Asia is à provider of food- atnis and raw materials which are essential to the economy of the West as z whole. From the economic point of view alone, the loss of this region would be a disaster. Politically and strategically the consequences would be equally grave.
8. The fact that Asian peoples tend as a rule to swing in the direction of greater power makes it essential that we should not weaken at Hong Kong. For weaknew there would be interpreted without any doubt as the beginning of a general retreat, and the Asian peoples would immediately begin to turn their Thoughts towards making terms with the new power of Communism as the only visible alternativo.
9. It can be argued that in our straitened circumstances we cannot afford to remain so extended so far from the centre of our own activities and couumit- gents in Europe and the Middle East. But the preceding paragraphs provide gvidence that we cannot afford to abandon our position in South-East Asia. Nor shall we be entirely alone and without support if we decide to stay. The United States Secretary of State is reported as having said at a recent press conference that, if any action were taken against Hong Kong which the United States con- sidered a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, then the United States would fully meet its obligations under the Charter. If support of our position in Hong Kong is to be maintained, it is important to explain it fully to our friends and in particular to the other members of the British Commonwealth and the United States.
The Use of Pressure
10. The same considerations as those mentioned above apply to attempts by the Chinese Communists to render our position in Hong Kong untenable by stirring up internal unrest, strikes, &c. Only the evidence that we are prepared to deal with these attempts will convince the Chinese population of Hong Kong that stable government under British segis will continue. Given that conviction, they will prefer British law and order to Chinese chaos and disorder, even though they will not admit this in public; if they lack, that conviction they will come to terms with the Communists even though they may fear and dislike them.
Peaceful Negotiation
"
11. There remains to be considered an attempt by a Chinese Government to recover Hong Kong through peaceful negotiation. The Chinese Government of the day raised the question of the termination of the lease of the New Territories at the time of the surrender of our extra-territorial rights in China in January 1943. They were told that in the view of His Majesty's Government it was a matter for consideration "after victory was won. The Hong Kong problem was raised again by Chiang Kai-shek in 1946 and also by Dr. Wellington Koo, then Chinese Ambassador in London, but it was not pressed. It is hardly a live
any longer with the National Government of China.
Page 428mmunist Central Government of
tral Goverment of China is set up, it agend when a
428 PfrGana is conceivable that they may seek to initiate discussions with the United Kingdom about the future of Hong Kong. This presupposes that we, together with other Powers, have entered into diplomatic relations with the new Government. For
issue &
12.
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our part, however, we must postulate that in addition we should not be prej to discuss the future of Hong Kong with the new Government unless it friendly, democrhting staple and in Gohtal of 44 9nited China.
13. We cannot agres to negotiate about Hong Kong with a Goveri which is unfriendly, since we should be negotiating under duress. We s equally refuse to discuss the future of Hong Kong with a Government wh undemocratic, since we should not be prepared to hand the people of Hong over to a Communist / na. Finally, we should be unwilling to discuss Kong with a China which is not united, because its future would be lik become a pawn in the contest between ponflicting factions. Unless there v stable Government we could not rely on it to preserve Hong Kong as a secur port and place of exchange between China and the rest of the world.
v
14. On the basis of present information a Communist Government of ( when it is set up, is unlikely to fulfil any of the conditions enumerated i preceding paragraph. The question of discussing the future of Hong K therefore likely to be academic for some time to come, and no useful pi would be served at this stage by trying to estimate how we should meet thetical situation.
15. The lease of the New Territories is due to expire ia 1997. It do seem likely that when that time comes any Chinees Government will be pry to renew the lease. Without these territories Hong Kong would be untensh it is therefore probable that before 1997 the United Kingdom Government day will have to consider the status of Hong Kong. But we are surely not je some two generations in advance of the event in attempting to lay do principles which should govern any arrangement which it may be pass reach with China at that time. In the intervening years there will be d ments of one kind or another in China, and it is upon these developmen the willingness or otherwise of the United Kingdon Government of the reach an accommodation will probably depend.
Conclusion
16. The conclusion which we reach is therefore that, while we slu prepared to discuss the future of Hong Kong with a friendly and dem and stable Government of a unified China, the conditions under whic discussions could be undertaken do not exist at present and are unlikely 1 in the foreseeable future. Until conditions change, we intend to rea Hong Kong, and should so inform other Commonwealth Governments a United States, while refraining in public from pronopnicements which exa our relations with China.
Recommendations
17. We recommend-
(i) that the Foreign Secretary be authorized to commmmácate to the States Secretary of State for his confidential information t clusion of this paper and the reasons which have led to it, a he should seek the support of the United States Government; (ii) that the Lord Privy Seal should similarly inform other Comma
Governments.
The people of Hong Kong are very sensitive to the slightest suggesti His Majesty's Government might be contemplating negotiations with Chir Hong Kong and the merest hint at present that this possibility was bei considered, let alone discussed with other Governments, would destroy 1 fidence which it has taken considerable military reinforcements to ba Every precaution should therefore be taken to guard against any leakage importance of this should be stressed in the approaches to other Governm
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' part, however, we must postulata that in addition we should not be prepared dinates the fatum of 152wal of a united China.
with the new Government une i were endly, democralit, stable and in Satrol
18. We cannot agree to negotiate shout Hong Kong with a Government ich is untriazoly, almon we should be negotiating under duress. We should nally refres de deces the future of Hong Kong with a Government which is decentratio, since we should not be prepared to hand the people of Hong Kong or to a Communist rétine. Finally, we should be unwilling to diecas Hong my with a Chine which is not unlied, because Ito futuro would be likely to posto a paws in the contest betemen conilleting factions. Unless there were a ible Government we could not rely on it to pretres Hong Kong so a secure fro rt and place of exchange between China and the rest of the world.
14 ka kesin of present information & Communist Government of China, hen it is sat up, is unlikely to fuifl sny of the conditions enumerated in the eceding paragraph. The question of discussing the future of Hong Kong is erefore likely to be academic for some time to come, and no useful purpose ould be served at this stage by trying to estimate how we should meet a bypo- etical situation.
15. The leans of the New Territories is due to expire in 1997. It does not em likely that when that zimo comtes any Chinese Government will be prepared ‣ renew the lane. Without these territories Hong Kong would be untenable, and is therefore probable that before 1907 the United Kingdom Government of the zy will have to consider the status of Hong Kong. But we are surely not justified kine two generations in advance of the event in attempting to lay down the rinciples which should govern any arrangement which it may be possible to ach with China at that time. In the intervening years there will be develop- ents of one kind or another in China, and it is upon these developments that we willingness or otherwise of the United Kingdom Government of the day to rach an accommodation will probably depend.
Conclusion
16. The conclusion which we reach is therefore that, while we should be repared to discuss the future of Hong Kong with a friendly and democratic nd stable Government of a unified China, the conditions under which such iscussions could be undertaken do not exist at present and are unlikely to exist n the foreseeable future. Until conditions change, we intend to remain in Hong Kong, and should so inform other Commonwealth Governments and the Jnited States, while refraining in public from pronouncements which exacerbate ur relations with China.
Recommendations
17. We recommend--
(i) that the Foreign Secretary be authorised to communicate to the United States Secretary of State for his confidential information the con- clusion of this paper and the reasons which have led to it, and that he should seek the support of the United States Government; (ii) that the Lord Privy Seal should similarly inform other Commonwealth.
Governments.
The people of Hong Kong are very sensitive to the slightest suggestion that His Majesty's Government might be contemplating negotiations with China about Hong Kong and the merest hint at present that this possibility was being even considered, let alone discussed with other. Governments, would destroy the con- fidence which it has taken considerable military reinforcements to build up... Every precaution should therefore be taken to guard against any leakage and the importance of this should be stressed in the approaches to other Governments.
E. B.
A. C. J.
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