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himself and the Commander, Hong Kong, as to the necessity for, or execution of, any security measures, the views of the latter should prevail. Formal instruc- tions to Phire effestofpoved by the Prime Minister, Preached 3mef in Singapore, and on arrival in Hong Kong I made it my first business to acquaint the Governor with the nature of the instructions of which I was the bearer.
4. After dinner, on the evening of my arrival, I had two hours' private discussion with the Governor, Sir Alexander Grantham. He had received a warning telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and I found him most approachable and in general responsive and understanding.. I made it clear to Sir Alexander that we had a full appreciation of his experience and great capacity in Colonial administration and his special local knowledge of the problems of Hong Kong, but that the possibilities arising from the rapid advance of the Chinese Communist Forces made it imperative to ensure that any military or security measures could be taken without delays which would go far to render them ineffective, and might lead to disaster in circumstances which would gravely affect the whole of the position in South-East Asia. I indicated that it was felt that the cost in man-power and money of the additional reinforcements, which His Majesty's Government had approved in principle, would be the subject of heavy criticism, and would indeed be unjustified if not supported in time by adequate security and intelligence provisions on the spot. It was difficult to reconcile in the minds of outside observers the complaints that the Government statement of 5th May had proved to be inadequate in re-establishment of reason- able feelings of confidence in the Colony, with the hesitancy to adopt such measures as overall registration, improvement of intelligence as to existing cells of Communist activity (and their potential expansion with continuing infiltration), and plans for comprehensive immigration control. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government wished to obtain a machinery which, whilst retaining to the fullest possible extent the powers of the Governor and the advantage of his knowledge and experience, would prevent the ultimate defeat of military defensive measures by subversive activities known to have been so successful elsewhere. In the plan set out in the instructions which I handed to him, the intention was to provide him with a Military Commander over all military defence forces in the Colony, including local naval defence forces, of the required status and knowledge to obtain adequate discussion and agreed decisions to meet the problems projected. For that purpose General Festing had been selected. I felt confident that, with loyal co-operation from both sides, this could be made to work effectively. Having read the instructions the Governor at once indicated that he would be quite willing to do his very best to make the plan work, but pointed out that, if he were to do so, it would in his judgment be essential that, if on any matter which he considered to be of great importance to the welfare of the Colony there was disagreement, he should have a right of appeal to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. I said that obviously there could be no intention of preventing his normal free access to the Secretary of State, provided that there was no delay in matters of urgent military necessity. There was also the question of the possibility of reference to the British Defence Co-ordination Committee. Our discussion then ranged over a wide area in complete frankness, and I found the Governor's attitude to be generally most helpful. He asked to sleep on the question of appeal, and indicated that it was the one point in the whole matter which might otherwise produce a situation in which he would have no alternative but to resign. When he met me again at 9 a.m. on 7th June, Sir Alexander repeated that he was anxious to co-operate but submitted a form of words to be inserted in the instructions to safeguard his right of appeal to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
He readily agreed to adjust the wording to meet points which I raised. I therefore wired at once to the Prime Minister for authority to accept this addition to the instructions. When I informed the Commanders-in-Chief of the action I had taken I found they fully agreed.
5. The Prime Minister replied favourably to my signal subject only to adding a requirement that the Governor should inform the British Defence Co- ordination Committee in any case in which he exercised his right of appeal. I was thus in a position on the morning of my departure, 9th June, to transmit formally to the Governor, on behalf of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the instPago263e0fbed at Annex II.
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Registration of the Population
Page 264.
6. As indicated in the Governor's signal No. 15 already referred to, regis- tration of the population was one of the obvious military security steps about which he was apprehensive in relation to the peculiar circumstances of Hong Kong. Once on the spot I was able to appreciate much better the kind of pressures, and conflicting influences, to which the local authorities are subject. That there is much local anxiety about security was evident at the press conference which I held, and from many enquiries made to me by prominent citizens. We had direct evidence of the pull the other way in Nanking telegram No. 789 of 7th June, together with the Shanghai telegrams to which it relates, in which it appeared that the British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, holding the view that Hong Kong could be rendered untenable by means of a boycott and internal unrest, repre- sented that the sending of reinforcements to the Colony had been given undesirable publicity of a defiant, and provocative nature. This was a good example of pressure from commercial interests, not in Hong Kong alone but on the China Coast generally, which the Governor of the Colony cannot ignore.
7. I had, however, had the advantage on the journey from Singapore to Hong Kong of being able to read Sir Henry Gurney's despatch No. 5 of 30th May, setting out the experience gained in operations in Malaya, for the guidance of other Colonial Governments. An extract from this despatch on the subject of registration is at Annex III. What Sir Henry Gurney had to say strengthened me in the view that an improvement in internal security in Hong Kong would only be obtained by introducing registration at once as a preliminary step to instituting, at whatever date proved to be necessary, a comprehensive control of immigration. Such control could only be introduced when registration had been completed, or at least well advanced. The Governor was prepared to go ahead with registration, but warned me that not more than 250,000 cases could be dealt with in a month, and that it would therefore require five months to break the back of the problem by registering 1,250,000; it would be eight months before the whole of Hong Kong's 2 million people could be registered. In this context I had a discussion with the Commissioner of Police, who considered that it would be virtually impossible to improve on this estimate of time since registration must involve photographing and thumb printing every individual. American apparatus is required, which I think might have been ordered earlier, but the Governor promised to see this was ordered at once. I still think steps should be taken to speed up the tempo of registration and I pressed this on the Governor just before leaving.
Trading Position of the Colony
8. Hong Kong lives by its trade, and the question how far it can stand a siege is a subject of intense local interest. On the statistics available to me it would seem that in 1948 almost four-fifths of Hong Kong's trade, both imports and exports, was with countries other than China. The problem is, therefore, how far this entrepôt business could be maintained if faced with an actively hostile mainland and a boycott. In discussion with the Governor, I found that it would not be satisfactory to accept the published trade statistics as a basis for a final judgment on this issue. There is a large tonnage of unrecorded trade and merchandise of all kinds which comes across the land frontier which never appears in trade returns. A large part of this tonnage is food, and its cessation due to blockade would be a serious matter. I saw for myself the kind of thing that goes on when inspecting the frontier area. On a peak in Chinese territory we saw a lookout and below him a number of cattle and some, to all appearances, inoffensive peasants. On our side of the boundary armed members of the Hong Kong Police Force had them covered with rifles. The arrival of myself, the G.O.C.-in-C. and the G.O.C. in jeeps was obviously an unexpected factor in the situation, but it was explained to me that the men on the Chinese side were only waiting their opportunity to smuggle the cattle over the border under cover of darkness. There would be little chance of preventing this. Further along the frontier we came to the village which has grown up on both sides of the boundary stone and the frontier police demonstrated to me the immense difficulties that would attend any attempt to impose strict control at this point.
9. But, quite apart from the question of frontier control, it is evident that the attitudage 24066be commercial interests in HongPage 64lb foga gnue to be one of the most intractable factors in planning its defence. The business.
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people want the best of both worlds. They want adequate defence provided for their interests and persons, but nothing said about it, and 1988 on mile the making money ofnaffferent t8 the questions of principle which arise. Yet, Shanghai Chamber of Commerce was complaining of publicity about reinforce- ments, I am informed that during my visit to Hong Kong the cross rate of exchange in Canton for the Hong Kong dollar against the pound sterling improved by 1.50 dollars to 14 30. I was assured that my visit to Hong Kong was the principal element in this improvement. Yet no successful defence of Hong Kong can be conducted which does not have regard to the dominating position of the trading interests in the Colony. The Governor is very willing to examine ways and means of expanding Hong Kong's trade with countries other than China, and I believe that this is one of the most important things that the civil authorities can do to help prepare Hong Kong to meet the Communist challenge. Governor will, however, require further expert advice for this purpose and I should like to see suitable appointments to his staff made as quickly as possible.
The Executive Council and the Local Defence Committee
The
10. During my visit the Governor arranged for me to meet both these bodies. My meeting with the Executive Council on 7th June was most satisfactory. I made them a short speech reminding them of the policy of His Majesty's Government which I had announced in the House on 5th May and of the fact that the reinforcements we were sending provided solid evidence of our firmness and determination. I was careful to avoid even hinting at the possibility of reinforcements additional to those already announced. There seemed to be no disposition on the part of the members of the Council to adopt an attitude critical of His Majesty's Government apart from one of the Chinese members. I had a discussion with the Local Defence Committee on the following day which was attended by the Commanders-in-Chief.
The Military Situation
11. I held discussions with the Military Commanders on the spot, and each Commander outlined to me the rôle which he envisaged his forces would play in the defence of the Colony. The Army Commander made it clear that at the present time, with existing forces available (three battalions), the whole force would have to be deployed forward in the New Territories in defence of the frontier. leaving only the Hong Kong Defence Force and certain administrative and specialist troops to look after the internal security of the Cities and Port. As the Hong Kong Defence Force is at present virtually non-effective the G.O.C. has decided to make use of the first reinforcements to arrive (The Leicestershire Regiment) to ensure the security of the base.
12. On the arrival of the 27th Brigade in July, there will be available for defence of the frontier one full brigade plus supporting artillery, leaving a brigade available for internal security in the cities and as a reserve for counter-attack. When in September the garrison is increased to a Division plus a Brigade by the arrival of the 28th Infantry Brigade from the United Kingdom and the Royal Marine Commando Brigade from Malta, the G.O.C. intends to deploy two Brigades forward for the defence of the frontier, with one in reserve. This force will be supported by artillery and tanks. This will leave one Brigade available for ensuring internal security in the cities and for beach defence, exclusive of the Guards Brigade in Malaya, earmarked for reinforcing Hong Kong if required.
13. As regards the Royal Navy, the main tasks envisaged are―
(a) To support the Army by bombardment and by bringing supplies if
required;
(b) to prevent an influx of refugees by sea.
At the present time (b) above is the responsibility of the Water Police, and the Navy are making arrangements for additional craft manned by Naval personnel to be available. If the situation becomes serious, the Royal Navy intends taking over responsibility for the operation of all Coastal Patrol craft.
·
14. The present R.A.F. strength in the Colony consists of the Flying-Boat Squadron for sea reconnaissance in co-operation with the Navy, and a Spitfire Squadron 2065 nirez fircraft, which is due to be increased 25 sixteen by the end
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Days 6-8
Page7266th Joe-In Hong Kong.
Day 9
10th June-Back in Singapore.