Page 200
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functions would hold clear-cut party views in the sense of being a consistent supported agfe the entire programme of one party, Page it on dhe hole his sympathies Tay with it.
40. This impartiality is never questioned by Ministers, by the public, or by other civil servants. In present conditions a Minister coming into a Depart- ment is able to rely on entirely loyal service to his ideas from all civil servants alike. He has no reason even to consider whether any particular civil servant is, or is not, in sympathy with his political views. He is indeed able to assume that, whatever the civil servant's sympathies, they would not affect his advice on the facts in any given case. The disadvantages of departing from this position are obvious.
41. Only a very small proportion of the Service is, however, in close contact with Ministers. Those who are responsible for advising Ministers amongst a variety of other duties are to be found mainly among the higher Adminis- trative ranks. The whole Administrative Class numbers only about 3,500 men and women, most of whom are stationed in Headquarters Departments in the Whitehall area. The Departments in which these Administrative staffs work are, however, composed of civil servants organised in divisions or branches, and made up of members of the various classes-Professional, Executive, Clerical and Typing-who work together as teams. All of them are, in differing ways appropriate to the responsibilities of their rank, engaged at different stages on the same blocks of work, and each contributes in varying degree according to his status towards the decisions made by the Administrative officers or towards the submissions made to Ministers. requirements of the work demand this grouping, and a real sense of unity exists amongst the members of these different grades who work together as part of a single organisation; we are satisfied that the same basic principles apply to all of them alike.
The
42. Outside the Whitehall Ministries the Civil Service is a very large and widely spread body of men and women who are engaged not in advising Ministers but in the conduct of practical business. They are employed in various Headquarter branches, such as those of the Admiralty at Bath and the Ministry of National Insurance at Newcastle-on-Tyne, and in regional and local offices all over the country. In the latter, to a greater degree than in Whitehall, the work brings all ranks down to quite junior officials into intimate relationship with every section of the community. The duties performed by them are broadly of three types, although each merges into the other:--
(a) duties involving the exercise of a large measure of discretion;
(b) duties which, while requiring powers of interpretation in given circumstances, are closely governed by Acts of Parliament, regulations or departmental instructions;
(c) duties of a partially or wholly routine character.
4
In these cases, the essential factor is the relation of civil servants with the public rather than their relations with the Minister. First the work of these civil servants must in fact be completely impartial. Secondly, the public as a whole and the Press must be satisfied in their own minds that no suggestion of political bias enters into their treatment of individuals. Public opinion is a sensitive barometer reacting sharply to any breaches of the traditional impartiality of the Civil Service. The importance of these considerations can hardly be exaggerated today when vital decisions on claims for social benefits, assessment to tax, liability to various formsf gf6gational service, entitlement to certain rationed commodities, and many other aspects of daily life are being taken by officials often of humble rank. Whether we
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consider the man-in-the-street seeking employment, the professional man applying e 2 applementary allowance of petrolger the member of the business community dealing with the various economic controls now operated by the Civil Service, the life of every citizen is being directly and acutely affected by all grades of the hierarchy. In these circumstances, public faith in the non-political and impartial attitude of the Civil Service as a whole would be quickly shaken if individual civil servants were known or even suspected, rightly or wrongly, to be not in fact detached from party allegiance. 43. There is finally to be considered the harmful effect upon the Service itself if the political allegiance of individual civil servants became generally known to their superior officers and colleagues. If a Minister began to consider whether A, on account of his party views, might be more capable of carrying out his policy than B, the usefulness of B would be limited and the opportunities of A would be unfairly improved. This would become known, and a tendency to trim the sails to the prevailing wind would be one consequence. Another would be a cynicism about the reasons for promotion very damaging to morale. If it be thought that we have exagger- ated this risk, we would point to the experience of those countries which are suffering from the consequences of taking a course different from our own. The danger is, we believe, a real one. It may result from only small beginnings, but, once begun, it produces a snowball effect, which is difficult, if not impossible, to check. Once a doubt is cast upon the loyalty of certain individuals or upon the equity of the promotion-machinery, an atmosphere of distrust may rapidly pervade an office and affect the arrange- ment of the work and damage the efficiency of the organisation.
44. For all these reasons we are in complete agreement with the views expressed in paragraphs 10-11 of Ch. 11 of the Report of the MacDonnell Commission, 1914. We consider that their remarks are as true today as when they were written:-
"In the first place, we have little doubt that complete liberty of political action for all officials alike would inevitably result in frequent conflicts between the desires and interests of the officer as a citizen and his duty as an official, and that such conflicts could not fail to have a disastrous effect on the morale of the public service. . .
It would, we think, be disastrous if the feeling should arise that the effectiveness of a legislative policy were in any degree dependent upon the political bias of those administering it.
Speaking generally, we think that if restrictions on the political activities of public servants were withdrawn two results would probably follow. The public might cease to believe, as we think they do now with reason believe, in the impartiality of the permanent Civil Service; and Ministers might cease to feel the well-merited confidence which they possess at present in the loyal and faithful support of their official subordinates; indeed they might be led to scrutinise the utterances or writings of such subordinates, and to select for positions of confidence only those whose sentiments were known to be in political sympathy with their own.
If this were so, the system of recruitment by open competition would prove but a frail barrier against Ministerial patronage in all but the earlier years of service; the Civil Service would cease to be in fact an impartial, non-political body, capable of loyal service to all Ministers and parties alike; the change would soon affect the public estimation of the Service, and the result would be destructive of what undoubtedly is at present one of the greatest ofvtages of our administrating system and one of the most honourable traditions of our public life.
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45. It follows, in our opinion, that the principle hitherto observed in the Civil Servilagtha03 ofvi6ervant maintains a cage 23rof political matters and does not put himself forward prominently on one side or the other, is plainly right for that part of the Service popularly associated with the phrase "white collar workers." The practice of reticence in public is necessary to the maintenance of this attitude. Nothing crystallizes views like the expression of them in controversy, and it would be harder ever afterwards for a civil servant to advise his Minister or his senior officers in a sense contrary to the party line if he had once publicly declared his adhesion to party doctrine. He must regard his powers as an advocate as being always at the service not of a party doctrine but of an administrative ideal. There is, of course, also the consideration that, even if he could keep his party views absolutely separate from his judgment of a particular ques- tion, as some contend he can, it would be almost impossible for him to convince other people that he had done so.
46. We have considered the argument advanced by the Staff Side that civil servants themselves can be trusted to exercise political rights in a way not detrimental to the public interest. This might seem an attractive sug- gestion, but in our view it relies too much on the traditional Civil Service attitude to public affairs which has been formed by decades of training and experience under the present convention. It does not follow that if the convention were modified civil servants would act and speak with the same reticence and wariness which they show at present. An announce- ment that civil servants were free to engage in political activity would fundamentally alter the point of view of the Service, at all events of its younger members.
It would undoubtedly be a shock to public opinion, accustomed as it is to the tradition of a non-political Service. The Staff Side themselves appear to realise the risks inherent in such a change, as they do not exclude the possibility that individual civil servants, if allowed complete freedom, might create an intolerable situation for their Depart- ments and become liable to disciplinary action. A few bad cases which attracted public attention would reduce public confidence in the Service as a whole. But in our view it would be inequitable to penalise an officer who erred in ignorance, and difficult for a Department to take disciplinary measures against him if he used his discretion unwisely. It seems to us that it is in the interests of the individual as well as the Department that there should be some protection against the creation of an intolerable situation, both by a general code of behaviour and, where the need arises, by explicit prohibitions. We see nothing derogatory in the existence of such rules. Moreover, if no rules existed, departmental case law would be bound to grow up out of decisions on individual cases; such decisions would often have to be sought by the staff themselves. We think that many civil servants would welcome some guidance in advance.
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CC
47. We have also considered the argument that a feeling of frustration may arise among civil servants whose work is of a general routine character, and that this feeling of frustration might be overcome if opportunity were given them to embark upon a political life without abandoning the Civil Service. We reject this argument. Admitting that there must be misfits in all professions, we do not think that this difficulty in the case of the Civil Service could best be rectified by an attempt to allow members of it to pursue simultaneously both a political and a Civil Service career. It is better that such misfits should leave the Service altogether. A number of our witnesses Page, howeverzinted out that the lospafcension fugte present superannuation arrangements may impose a severe penalty on the older
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civil servant who wishes to make a change of career. They have drawn attention Page2f4tothathe cases in which a cinngervant fighбwish to resign in order to take up politics would be very few, and that the transition would be made easier by the introduction of a system of proportionate pensions. This suggestion raises issues wider than the scope of our inquiry. We think it right to state, however, that in our view there could be no reasonable sense of grievance except possibly in the case of the sacrifice of pension in respect of long years of service. Such cases of difficulty will be largely met if the Government's present proposals become law, for, following . an agreement reached between the Official and Staff Sides of the National Whitley Council, they have introduced a Bill for the improvement of the existing Superannuation Code. Under the proposed reforms, a civil servant will be able to retire voluntarily at any time after reaching the age of 50 without sacrificing accrued pension rights; in all cases other than those of retirement on compassionate grounds, the accrued pension and additional allowance will be payable at the normal minimum retiring age-usually 60. The escape to politics or other fields will thus to this extent be facilitated in future for those who desire to make the break.
48. Our general conclusion is that to preserve the attitude of detachment in all civil servants in whom its absence might adversely affect the public service is so important as easily to outweigh any hardship felt by individuals who are deprived of the freedom to propagate political views among their fellow citizens. It will certainly justify maintaining the deprivation in some cases in which the risk is only slight. The public service should, in our view, consistently be given the benefit of any doubt. Any weakening of the existing tradition of political impartiality would be the first step towards the creation of a "political" Civil Service. As will be seen from Appendices 1 and 2, we have informed ourselves carefully of the effects of such trends in other countries (and in this country in the past), and nothing in this evidence encourages us to favour any step, however small, in that direction. Even the smallest move down that slope might eventually lead to the evils of the spoils system. Though it is impossible to measure accurately the possible effects of changes in the present system in this country, we are convinced that any such change would be fraught with dangerous possibilities, and that it would be a retrograde step, detrimental to both the public interest and the interest of the Civil Service itself. The British Civil Service with its great reputation and power has a substantial bone in its mouth; the reflection in the water, even if it suggests a political flavour, is only a reflection, after all.
VI. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES
49. We now turn to consider how far the general principles which we have enunciated are applicable to the various classes of the Civil Service.
50. It has been argued before us that, since the functions and respon- sibilities of civil servants vary greatly, different rules can, and indeed should, be imposed upon them according to the nature of the duties which they perform. The principle of political impartiality, runs this argument, does not apply to all parts of the Civil Service, because there are clearly staffs who exert no influence on policy and whose political activities can have no effect upon the reputation and efficient working of the Service. We have
endeavouredge determine how far this line of argument can be followed.
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51. Two possible approaches have presented themselves:
of 366
@ Fraght has been suggested that it would be desirable to 205
(i) Firstoft
15 diferentiate between various Departments, allowing those more closely concerned with policy matters less political freedom than the others.
(ii) Secondly, it has been argued that a distinction should be drawn between senior officers on the one hand and subordinate grades on the other on the ground that in the case of the latter a far greater measure of freedom could be allowed without danger to the public interest.
52. We have examined the first proposition and have reached the con- clusion that, so far as national politics are concerned, no such simple method of differentiation would be workable, even if it were thought desirable.
53. On the other hand, we have come to the conclusion that it is both possible and necessary to draw a horizontal line of demarcation through the whole Service, putting above the line those who, because of the nature of their work, must be excluded from party-political activity, and putting below it those to whom freedom to engage in political activities could be granted without prejudicial consequences. Even this form of differentiation cannot be applied entirely without exceptions, to which we shall refer later, but we regard this approach to the problem as the most satisfactory. We shall describe the two parts of the Service as that above the line and that " below the line.'
99
66
99
54. For the purpose of this method of treatment, we have analysed the Civil Service into the following main groups on the basis of their approxi- mate numbers in January, 1949:—
Administrative, Professional, Scientific, Executive, Clerical and Typing Grades...
Technical,
451,000
56,000
...
220,000
408,000
Minor and Manipulative grades excluding the Post Office Post Office Manipulative grades
Industrials
(i) Industrials
...
...
55. Looking broadly at the above groups, we think that we can at once. divide off the Industrial Civil Service from the Non-industrial. The industrial grades are composed of more than 400,000 men and women engaged on all kinds of industrial processes: 280,000 of them work in Royal Naval Dock- yards, Depots and Factories, in War Department workshops, repair shops, and storage and similar establishments, in R.A.F. Maintenance Units, in the Royal Aircraft Establishment and in Royal Ordnance Factories. Of the remainder, half are employed in the Engineering, Factories and Store Departments of the Post Office, and most of the rest are labourers under the Ministry of Works and the Forestry Commission. They do not differ from the industrial population of the country as a whole and belong to the same Trade Unions as their fellow-workers in outside industry. The public would, we believe, regard it as somewhat artificial to consider this large body of workers as forming part of that Civil Service in the sense in which the term is commonly accepted. From the point of view of political activi- ties, we think it will be generally agreed that they present no real difficulty, and we propose therefore to deal with their position first, turning after- wards Pathe much more difficult problem of the rest of the Strieg, and examining how far, if at all, it may be treated on similar fines.
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56. All industrial civil servants are already completely free from restric- tions on political activities, other than Parliamentary candidature,
employees in predominantly industrial establishments under 36ndustrial
Departments can stand for Parliament without resigning, but have to resign if elected. We consider that industrials employed in establishments trans- ferred to the Ministry of Supply should have their position in this respect formally regularised by bringing them into line with the Service Depart- ments, and we think that the existing distinction between establishments certified under the 1927 Order in Council and uncertified establishments might be abolished. The objections felt by members of the Blanesburgh Committee to extending the same rights to all industrials seem to us to have lost their force now that industrial staffs are more highly organised and now that Departmental industrials have probably greater cohesion with industrial employees in other Departments than with other grades in their own Department. We therefore recommend that all industrials be allowed to stand for Parliament without resigning, unless and until elected. We consider that special leave should be granted for a period of one month prior to the date of the election.
57. A number of witnesses have urged that a necessary corollary to this proposal would be the guarantee of reinstatement to a successful candidate who is subsequently defeated at a later election. They have also pointed out that the grant of established status to a far larger proportion of industrials than was the case in the past is an important new factor in the situation. Whilst we recognise that a measure of reinstatement would be reasonable we do not think that it should be automatic, since there might be cases where an industrial had given only a short period of service before entering Parliament, or where his absence had been so long that he had lost his skill and could not be readily fitted in to the cadre of his establishment. We therefore recommend that, in the case of permanent employees, there should be a right to reinstatement where a man has had ten years' service prior to his election and has not been absent in Parliament for more than five years.
In all other cases, sympathetic consideration should be given, wherever possible, to applications for permission to return to employment in the Service.
(ii) Minor and Manipulative Grades (other than those employed by the
Post Office)
58. We have next considered whether any groups of civil servants at present classified as non-industrial may be treated for the purposes of political activity in the same way as the Industrial Civil Service. This leads us naturally to consider the Minor and Manipulative grades, and we shall deal first, for convenience, with those employed outside the Post Office. These number about 56,000. The majority are messengers, porters and cleaners, and there are smaller numbers of Ordnance Survey mapping staff, progress- men and other non-industrial supervisory staff in the Royal Ordnance Factories, clerks of works, storeholders and barrack- and station-wardens, museum attendants, park-keepers, launch-crews, and other miscellaneous grades listed in Appendix 3. Their duties are roughly described by their nomenclature and there is little which is discretionary in their work. many ways they are closer to the industrial grades than to the non-industrial, and there would be very little, if any, scope for damage to the public interest if they were allowed to be active in support of one or other of the political parties. The evidence which we have heard has established to our satisfætion 208f for assimilating all these grades (with certain small but important exceptions mentioned below) to the position which industrials
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now enjoy in the sphere of political activities generally and which we have recommePageth07ɓgd6all enjoy in future in rage 20 Pofliamentary
candidature.
59. We do not advise, however, that this recommendation should extend to the Constabularies employed by the Service Departments. They differ from other Minor and Manipulative grades in forming a disciplined as well as a uniformed force, and, although not so intimately concerned with public order as the ordinary civil Police, they are, as far as concerns our enquiry, in much the same position. The possible effect on the confidence placed in them if they were allowed to take an active part in politics is obvious; it would not be long before the suspicion arose that political affinities were affecting their judgment in the discharge of their duties. We do not, there- fore, think that this body of men should be excepted from the generally recognised rule that a policeman should play no part in politics.
(iii) Post Office Manipulative Grades
60. The largest numbers of Manipulative civil servants are to be found in the Post Office who employ approximately 220,000 men and women in these grades. Apart from some 13,000 messengers, paperkeepers, and cleaners who correspond with the general grades employed elsewhere, the great majority are classified in grades peculiar to the Post Office-telegraphists, telephonists, postmen and sorters. Most of them are performing duties similar to those of the Minor grades in other Departments and their work is largely manipulative in the literal sense. For political purposes they cannot be dis- tinguished from the preceding category.
61. There are however among them some 20,000 Counter Clerks whose duties are in some respects not far removed in character from those of Clerical Assistants elsewhere or from those of some of the officers dealing with the public in Food Offices and Employment Exchanges. Were it not for the following considerations (1) that there is considerable intermixture of genuinely manipulative duties with the minor clerical work; (2) that the Post Office staff are engaged in business transactions with the public rather than with the discretionary administration of regulations; (3) that the classification of all these staffs together as Minor and Manipulative is of very long standing, we should have felt that a line had to be drawn through the class leaving above the line those whose duties approach the clerical. As it is, we are of opinion that the position of Post Office Manipulative staff, with the exception of the supervisory grades mentioned below, should be assimilated to the position of industrials. We are aware that this conclusion may appear doubtful in the light of the experience of certain countries in which the postal services have tended to become part of a spoils system. The widespread character of the service and the continual contact between some of its staff and the public make it attractive from the point of view of those who may wish to reward supporters of their party. In this country, however, we feel that reliance can be placed upon the strong position of the Civil Service Commission, the well established tradition of non-political appointment and promotion and the attitude of the Unions, to prevent any development of this kind.
62. The supervising staff referred to in the preceding paragraph number about 8,000 on the postal and telegraph side and 4,000 on the telephone side. The evidence submitted by the Post Office was to the effect that it would be difficult both in logic and in practice to distinguish between these supervisors and the rank and file, since, under Post Office practice, a number of the latter are Bage abwofc36for doing part-time superPiane doties fan there
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is a regular system of substitution (known as "acting up ") by which members of the basic Manipulative grades from time to time cover temporary vacancies in one Page 208vef 3 Post Office thereforPage8df6only Head Postmasters (who are classed as Executives), and Postmasters and Assistant Postmasters (who are classed as Minor and Manipulatives) should be placed above the line.
63. If this suggestion were followed, all the remaining supervisors in the Post Office Minor and Manipulative grades would be given the benefit of the relaxation proposed for Minor and Manipulative staff generally. We agree that the three senior grades referred to by the Post Office should be excluded, but we see some difficulty in adopting the rest of their proposal. The other supervisory grades include such ranks as Chief Superintendents, Superintendents and Higher Grade Supervisors in charge of telegraph and cable rooms, of wireless establishments and of telephone exchanges, and of Counter and Writing staffs, and inspectors in control of sorting offices. Although these are described in the Civil Service Staff Record as Minor and Manipulative grades, we do not accept the term as a proper description of their duties. These higher supervisory grades exercise considerable responsi- bility, often of a managerial kind, and the importance of their duties is reflected in their salary scales, many of which range above £500 a year and some of which exceed £800 at the maximum. Although we all wish to grant political freedom wherever it can be given without detriment to the public interest, we have not been able to reach unanimous agreement that all these officers should be placed below our line of demarcation. The majority of us feel that it would be anomalous to treat them in the same way as the rank and file and that to do so would provoke the risk of repercussions upon other grades elsewhere in the Service. The rest of us, favouring as simple a line as possible, consider the Post Office as sui generis and think that a compara- tively small anomaly in this case would be unlikely to cause difficulties in other Departments. We have not attempted to draw a line through this group other than that proposed by the Post Office, but it may be that one drawn immediately above the first-line supervisory grades would, if practicable, offer a reasonable solution to the problem.
64. If our proposals are accepted, all Minor and Manipulative civil servants (apart from the exceptions referred to above) will be put into precisely the same position as industrials. They will enjoy the freedom already possessed by industrials to engage in all forms of political activity, national and local, and they will receive in addition the concessions which we have recommended for all industrials. They will thus be at liberty henceforth to stand for Parliament without prior resignation and will be given the opportunity of reinstatement, after serving in Parliament, on the same terms as we have proposed for industrials in paragraph 57.
(iv) The Rest of the Civil Service
65. We are now left with those classes which correspond with most people's idea of the Civil Service-the Administrative, Executive, Professional, Scien- tific, Technical, Clerical and Typing. All these, after much examination, we have included in that part of the Civil Service above our line of demar- cation. We have considered whether a line can be drawn through this upper group, those below it being given more freedom than those above it. It may be admitted that there is great difference between the various duties of all these
and that many individuals within them such as, for ortant dous or clerks
selenic staff working in reseat of
instance
employed in offices remote from policy-making) could perhaps be safely
22
allowed more political liberty. We have, however, met very formidable difficulties tryinggo fly any such distinctions, weavf 3 im- pressed by the following arguments which have been put before us:-
(i) All these grades from Administrative to Typing form an entity. Their members work together in each office as part of a single organisation. It would be quite unrealistic today to think of Executive Officers and Clerks merely as carrying out the orders of Administrative staff; it would be equally artificial to distinguish between clerical and typing staff because their duties tend to be less differentiated than in the past and their pay- scales are closely interlocked. An avenue of promotion exists through all these grades. All form an integral part of a homogeneous whole, and to draw a line through them would be arbitrary and would create a false distinction. Moreover, the team-spirit amongst them is strong, and such a line would be contrary to the traditions of the Service and, we believe, to the wishes of the Staff Side and the staff themselves alike.
(ii) The increasing interchange of staff between Departments would make it difficult to give exceptional treatment to staff employed for the time being on routine duties remote from politics.
(iii) Promotion might bring an individual into a position in which he would have to relinquish political activity which might previously have been unexceptionable and, though such renunciation might be perfectly feasible, the individual's past associations might well continue to be remembered.
(iv) From the point of view of public confidence, no clear distinction could be drawn between different grades, since the public might attach importance to the views of even a very junior official especially one employed in a Whitehall Department.
(v) Large numbers of quite junior staff (especially in the clerical grades) have now frequent contact with the public and are taking decisions, with a greater or less degree of discretionary power, which intimately affect the lives of the average citizen.
66. We have accordingly reached the conclusion that, if exceptions were made in certain cases, though they might benefit a few individuals, they would have a wholly disproportionate effect upon public confidence, and the possible damage done to the public service would be immensely greater than any corresponding gain which could accrue. For these reasons we do not think that any distinction should be made between the Administrative, Executive, Professional, Scientific, Technical, Clerical and Typing Classes on the basis of their grading or duties, and we recommend that all, without exception, should be placed above the line of demarcation.
67. We now propose to consider under the following headings the nature of the limitations which must continue to be imposed upon all those grades above the line of demarcation which we have suggested:
(A) Parliamentary candidature and service.
(B) Other political activities in the national field.
(C) Public affairs of a non-party character.
(D) Activities as members of staff associations.
(E) Participation in local government.