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ANNEX C
REPORT FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE TO THE REPUBLIC
Dear Secretary of State,
OF IRELAND
19th May, 1949 The Partition agitation has developed considerably in the last few days and I think you may care to have my own analysis of the position.
2. Inevitably, Partition has always been a source of political grievance, and there has been always a strong and real desire in Southern Irish hearts to see it ended. But I do not believe that, until the introduction of the Ireland Bill in the House of Commons, there was any effectively active feeling in this country about it. Mr. de Valera had, during his sixteen years of office, registered periodical protests against it. Its use by the Costello Government as a reason for Eire's remaining outside the Atlantic Pact had carried little conviction in the country. I am doubtful, despite the assertions of the Government spokesmen to the contrary, whether there is even now any strong current of active feeling about it. But the agitation which has been started consequent on the introduction of the Ireland Bill and which has been deliberately fomented by the anti-Partition Committee, on which Mr. Costello and Members of his Government and Mr. de Valera all sit, is beginning to have a slight effect. And if it is kept up the public may well come to believe that there is real justification for it, and the emotions of the younger, less stable, and more left wing elements may be worked on in a way that will lead to some incident, in itself of relatively small importance, but the consequences of which might be great.
3. His Majesty's Government have done their best to help the Irish Govern- ment to keep things quiet if they so wished. The reply to the Irish Note of 7th May was conciliatory. The Debate on the introduction of the Ireland Bill was restrained and friendly. But the response from the Irish Governmental side was disappointing. Mr. Costello's speeches in the Dail (immediately after receipt of the reply to the Irish Note), and at the protest meeting on 13th May, were intemperate in tone, and designed to work up feeling through the country. They ignored the case on the United Kingdom and the Northern Ireland side. On both occasions His Majesty's Government were subjected to much criticism, and while Mr. Costello's speeches have referred to the need for restraint, they have done so in terms calculated rather to familiarise their readers with the idea of reprisals than to dissuade them from action. Mr. de Valera's utterances have shown greater dignity and balance than those of the Taoiseach. Mr. MacBride, Mr. Norton and Mr. Dillon have been relatively moderate. In no case has there been any effort to deal with the case on merits. That is perhaps understandable since all parties have their eye on the internal political battle and the next elections. But great risks have been taken, and much damage done to those good relations between United Kingdom and Ireland which were so promising.
4. As regards the tone of Mr. Costello's speeches, he had, I understand, a considerable practice at the Bar, and particularly in jury cases. I am told that his technique in the speeches that he has made is completely reminiscent of his behaviour in court. His petulance, his refusal to see the arguments for the other side, his readiness to appeal to prejudice, his disposition to labour a weak point, his anxiety to play on the feelings of his audience, are all, it is said, part of his normal court manner. But, in court, when his duty to his client has been satisfied and the brief disposed of, that is the end of the business. If the explana- tion which I have just given is correct Mr. Costello fails to recognise the difference between the tactics and the phrases than can properly been adopted by an advocate anxious to move the feelings of a jury, and those appropriate to a Prime Minister with a sense of responsibility handling before a public audience a great political issue. I feel no doubt that he and his colleagues realise the value to the Irish Republic of good relations with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. In personal discussion of political issues he is reasonable, fairminded, and ready to take a point in a friendly and understanding manner. It is the more to be regretted that on the platform his attitude should be so different.
5Page I write the Government have aligned themselves on the Bartition issue with Mr. de Valera. They have committed themselves to an uncompromising
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attitude; theagha1820fe366ch, by their speeches and theiPagden8quo ft36бise feeling in the Press and in the country, to spoil the good atmosphere that was developing between Ireland and the United Kingdom; if the agitation persists after the Bill passes into law, they risk not only making the North still more intractable, but stimulating incidents on the border, or against individuals in the South.
6. To what is the attitude of the Irish Government and its apparent dis- regard of consequences to be attributed?
7. The short answer appears to be that the Government are not confident that on any major political issue such as the repeal of the External Relations Act or Partition they can hold their own if Mr. de Valera starts a campaign. They have, therefore, tried to protect themselves by taking the initiative. Over the External Relations Act thy did so at the cost of a breach of their election pledges a breach which has been ill seen by a considerable number of their supporters, and which has tarnished Mr. Costello's reputation for political integrity. From their proposal to repeal the External Relations Act a step which Mr. de Valera when in power had not taken, and which from the Opposition benches he had not advocated-there flowed immediately the Northern demand for a guarantee. But for the uncertainty as to the future resulting from the proposed repeal of the Act, linked as it was in Dublin with declarations that the ending of Partition was the next step, there could have been no justification for a Northern demand for a guarantee and had it been put forward it is difficult to believe that it could have been taken seriously.
8. In the course of the debates on the repeal of the External Relations Act the Government committed themselves to Partition as the next step. The months that followed were marked by the setting-up of the All-Party anti-Partition Com- mittee, and the collection of subscriptions designed to influence the elections in the North. At a later stage the failure to end Partition was put forwards as the pretext for Ireland's refusal to joint the Atlantic Pact. During these months members of the Government repeatedly expressed themselves as confident that the end of Partition was nearer than it had ever been.
9. The Government had thus increasingly committed themselves on the issue of Partition. When the moment came for His Majesty's Government to take legislative notice of the guarantee promised to Northern Ireland by the Prime Minister in October and November, 1948, they had therefore no choice but to go at least as far as Mr. de Valera in their protests against the guarantee, and to asso- ciate themselves with his attitude in the fullest and most emphatic manner, regardless of the consequences. Any endeavour to take a more reasonable line, to damp down public feeling and agitation, to deal with the issue on merits, or to weigh the considerations of which His Majesty's Government had to take account, would at once expose them to the charge of being bad Irishmen, and worse patriots than the Opposition. The resultant increase of prestige to Mr. de Valera might well have disintegrated Mr. Costello's not too tightly-knit Coalition. The damage to its reputation in terms of the next election would have been most grave. The Government's decision not to join the Atlantic Pact had proved unpopular and hard to defend in a country so Catholic, and it was important for them to urge that it was solely because of Partition. Finally, the need to concentrate all energies on settling the Partition issue was and is a useful answer to critics of delays in the implementing of the Government's social services programme, or its inability or failure to pursue other schemes of economic or social improvement. It was, I believe, in these circumstances that they took the line that they have taken.
10. It remains to be seen whether they will even so be able to hold their own against the leader of the Opposition. The All-Party anti-Partition Committee is reported to meet frequently. It may be assumed that whatever emerges from it has Mr. de Valera's full approval and that he finds himself in effect in a position to set the pace for the Government in the Committee. Mr. de Valera will get his full share, and perhaps more than it, of the credit for any success that the anti-Partition campaign may produce. But if that campaign fails, or has to be abandoned, the Government is likely to get the discredit. In that event we may hear more of the unwisdom of a policy which by repealing the External Relations Act in sharp contrast to Mr. de Valera's cautious retention of it pre- cipitated the British guarantee to Ulster, and by leaving age bomb wealth
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