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There is one other point on which we could not get what Pagewb58 of 488ur troops in Greece, not Pagen 58 ofc4&tion forces would not be covered by the provisions of Article 6. We tried unsuccessfully to get the phrase changed to "armed forces".
7
On the whole we can be well satisfied with the results of the long negotiation which has taken place over this text; the Pact has teeth in it and will give strong grounds for encouragement to Europe.
At the same time, it is strictly a defensive pact and in harmony with the Charter of the United Nations. Its object is to reinforce but not to replace the security pro- vided by the Charter, and Article 7 specifically provides that it does not affect in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter or affect the primary respons- ibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of inter- national peace and security. The Pact is consequently based on Article 51 of the Charter, which safeguards "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member
until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
• •
If
We have been successful in avoiding any reference in the text of the Pact, or in the preamble, to Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, which refers to "Regional Arrangements", These regional arrangements were to be for the purpose of dealing with differences between parties in a certain region, and not between the regional group as a whole and some potential outside aggressor. Moreover, under the Charter, no enforcement action can be taken under a "Regional Arrangement" without the authorisation of the Security Council, which would have brought us back to where we started, faced with the right of veto. It is therefore important to stress, in any publicity regarding the Atlantic Pact, that it is firmly based upon Article 51 of the Charter.
As my colleagues know, I have always been very doubtful about the wisdom of associating Italy with the Pact, at any rate to begin with, though it has been clear all along that we should have to agree to this if the United States wanted it. As it turned out, the Soviet pressure on Norway made it impossible, once the Norwegian Government had decided to seek entry into the pact, to oppose her, immediate acceptance; and the French then insisted with the utmost vigour that Italy must be no less favourably treated. My main care has been to
see
(a)
(10)
that so far as possible all the Governments who are
to join the Pact apart from the original seven should be given equal status and equal treatment; and
that they are not given an opportunity to delay the
conclusion of the Pact itself.
These two objectives have, I think, been successfully secured.
Now that Italy is definitely to be associated with the Pact, it has become impossible to leave Turkey and Greece entirely out in the cold, and I have authorised our Ambassador to support a declaration on the lines of the draft annexed to C. P. (49) 37, to be issued at the moment of signature. If the United States Government desire it, this declaration will also cover Iran.
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