Page 12
Page 12
9
Island. This constitutes a distinct danger to the Stonecutter Forts, being open to chance shots fired at the forts at too long a range, and, if exploded, would probably do immense damage to the forts and guns on the island.
A proposal has been made to remove it to the eastern face of the knoll at the eastern end of the island, which it is very desirable should be adopted.
A blockade would not be thoroughly effective unless the land communica- tion with the interior of China by Kowloon were cut off. This might probably be effected by the enemy's landing in Mirs Bay and occupying the narrow neck of land (about 8 miles) which separates it from Deep Bay on the western coast.
General Outline of Defence.
The general plan of defence is as follows:
1. To trust to the batteries and submarine mines to prevent the entrance of ships into the harbour at either end, and to repel by the same means, aided by infantry, the landing of a force in the neighbourhood of the batteries.
2. To cover the passes and protect the reservoirs and shore ends of cables by means of infantry and the movable armament as follows:----
(a.) On the west and south by disposing the troops with a view to repel a landing in the event of an overwhelming attack, or to resist in a second line the further advance of the force which has landed.
(b.) On the south-east and east-where the coast is too distant and extended for such a defence by meeting in prepared positions inland, out of the fire of ships' guns, but below the general fog level, a force which may have already landed in the eastern bays.
(c.) On the north by occupying a defensive position on the hills which command the Kowloon Forts, to prevent the occupation of those hills by an enemy who may have landed on the Chinese coast.
3. To trust in all these operations to receive more or less assistance from the navy, according to the means which may be at disposal.
[658]
Page 12
D
8-
Page 12
Page 12