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CHAPTER II (D).
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7. With regard to (a), an enemy endeavouring to effect a lodgment on these hills, which must necessarily be his first objective, is confined to certain landing places and lines of approach. Experience locally gained proves that any landing on the seaboard which abuts on the open sea is only practicable in the very calmest weather, as there is generally so heavy a swell that the conveyance of troops in shallow-draught boats becomes a proceeding so hazardous as to render it unpracticable. An enemy would accordingly be obliged to bring his transports into the sheltered bays and to land bis troops therein. A landing having been effected, the broken precipitous country further restricts his advance to certain routes.
8. Under the conditions described above, viz., those that confine an enemy to a successful landing of his troops, and to lines of approach that are practicable, it becomes necessary to consider which routes, under these two conditions, are the most feasible and offer the best chances of success, and the dispositions the defence would have to make to meet his attack.
There are, then, three main lines of approach
(1.) A landing in Three Fathom Cove and an advance in the direction of Buffalo Pass against the right centre and the right flank of the position.
(2.) A landing in Hebe Haven and an advance via the Customs Pass against the right flank of the position, combined with a turning movement of the Devil's Peak position.
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(3.) A landing in Tolo Harbour in the direction of Tai-po-hu, and an advance by the Lead Mine Pass against the left flank of the position.
There is yet one more line of approach, which, although not so feasible as the three above mentioned, must not be lost sight of. It is a landing of troops, under cover of the Lantau and Chung Hue Islands, from the Stonecutters Batteries in Tsin Wan and Gindrinkers Bays, and a turning movement round the left flank of the position.
9. Considering each of these probable lines of advance in detail and the tactical dispositions that would have to be made to meet them :
With regard to (1). Buffalo Pass provides a very good artillery position for an enemy's guns, and one that he would doubtless endeavour to secure, as it would enable him to manoeuvre his infantry under cover of artillery fire up to the passes over the hills; Tate's Cairn, however, dominates it, and becomes, in conjunction with (2), a tactical point of vast importance, and, having good space on its summit, makes a most excellent gun position, covering a very wide field of fire. There is a police post at Saikung in telephonic communication with Hong Kong. An enemy advancing from Three Fathom "Cove would come under the cognizance of this police post, and the telephone would give timely warning of his advance; it would, in fact, be advisable to detach a small infantry outpost to this point to support the police and carry out scouting and patrol duties.
With regard to (2). The probable tactics of an enemy would be to quickly seize Buffalo Pass as an artillery position and the Hebe and Razor Hills with a view to forcing the passage of the Customs Pass and threatening the Devil's Peak position. To meet these, guns would have to be massed on the ridge running from Tate's Cairn to Kowloon Peak, and Kowloon Peak and Chin Lan Chun Hill held by infantry; an outpost on Razor Hill would give early intimation of an advance in this direction.
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(3.) The best way of dealing with an advance from the direction of Tai-po-hu would be to detach a movable column to Pine Apple Pass. There is at this point an admirable position on the western slopes of Needle Hill, and the eastern slopes of the opposite range which go to make the pass. Below it the road is so encircled with spurs jutting out from all directions that an enemy would find himself in a veritable trap. infantry detachment on Needle Hill itself would be sufficient, owing to the steepness of the peak, to provide against the risk of the position being turned from this side, while guns on the spur would prevent the position being turned from the left. There is a police post of importance at Tai-po-hu in telephonic communication with Hong Kong, which would give always ample warning of an enemy's intentions in this direction, in time to forestall him at this Pine Apple Pass.
An advance from Tsin Wan Bay could be met by advancing the left flank on to the hills to west of Lai-chi kok Pass, which dominate this line of approach; the left flank, resting as it does on the sea, becoines secure, and to effect an entrance on to the pass an enemy would be obliged to diverge on to the Tai-po-hu route. Even were he fortunate enough to effect a lodgment at this point, his further progress on to Kowloon would be prevented by the Stonecutters Batteries.
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