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The Committee feel some doubt as to the exact meaning to be attached to the statement in this letter that "it must be remembered that the temporary loss to Great Britain of the command of the China seas, owing to possible combinations of other Powers, or the possible concentration in these seas of a much larger proportion of the naval forces of some Powers than the strategic situation of this country would allow us to send to any one point of danger so far off as China, is a contingency which might have to be faced." They are, however, in complete agreement as to its important bearing on the question of the sufficiency of the garrison if it be construed in the sense in which it is understood prima facie by some of the Committee, and apparently also by the War Office. This construction is that Hong Kong must in future be prepared to resist, in addition to naval attack on the sea defences, not merely a hurried raid by landing parties from a few vessels, but the deliberate attack of a fleet enjoying local maritime supremacy and accompanied by a large landing force.
On this assumption the strategic situation of Hong Kong would not differ in kind from that of Malta, that is to say, it would be liable to be attacked by a large military force, having for its object the capture of the fortress during the period when no British squadron might be in a condition to operate in neighbouring waters. chief factors determining the strength of the garrison of Hong Kong would then be the extent of front to be held in order to cover the naval station from deliberate attack, and the limitations on the strength of the attacking force due to defective communications with centres of military strength of possibly hostile Powers. The positions that would have to be held against an attack from the mainland or from the numerous landing places on the island of Hong Kong are extensive, while the internal communications for the movements of the garrison are difficult. As regards the strength of the military forces which could be concentrated for an expedition against Hong Kong, it must be observed that the local military strength of a possible combination of France and Russia has recently largely increased, and that an expeditionary force of at least 10,000 to 15,000 men could, if their sea communications were secure, be directed against Hong Kong under existing conditions. These numbers are likely to be increased in the near future when Russian communications across the continent of Asia have been perfected, and when the facilities for maritime transport in the China seas have been developed. Morcover, as the Committee pointed out in the extract quoted in paragraph 3 above, no practicable increase to the garrison of Hong Kong would protect it from Japan if, and while, her navy was supreme in Eastern waters.
6. The consequences of this interpretation of the Admiralty statement are so far- reaching that the Committee hesitate without further instructions to make recom- mendations based upon it. The Naval member of the Committee represents that this construction is not justified by the circumstances in which the letter was written, viz., for the purpose of requesting the Secretary of State for War to take into immediate consideration the question of completing the mounting of the revised armament at a date considerably earlier than that anticipated. He suggests that if the Admiralty had intended to convey that Hong Kong must be prepared to resist the deliberate attack of a fleet accompanied by a large landing force their Lordships would have raised directly a point involving so considerable a departure from the policy set forth in the Colonial Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 57 M, dated the 19th May, 1896, on Colonial Defence, and accepted by the Admiralty. The essential points of this Memorandum, as quoted by the Duke of Devonshire at a meeting of the British Empire League in December 1896, and also in the Committee's Memorandum No. 230 M, dated the 9th September, 1900, on the Hong Kong Defences, in which the consequences of departing from that policy were set forth, are as follows :---
"The maintenance of sea supremacy has been assumed as the basis of the system of Imperial defence against attack from over the sea. This is the determining factor in shaping the whole defensive policy of the Empire, and is fully recognized by the Admiralty, who have accepted the responsibility of protecting all British territory abroad against organized invasion from the sea. To fulfil this great charge, they claim the absolute power of disposing of their forces in the manner they consider most certain to secure success, and object to limit the action of any part of them to the immediate neighbourhood of places which they consider may be more effectively protected by operations at a distance.
"It is recognized, however, that Her Majesty's ships, engaged in hunting out and destroying the squadrons of an enemy, may not be in a position to prevent the predatory raids of hostile cruisers on British ports. The strength of such an attack will vary in the different parts of the world, according to the strengths of possibly hostile navies, the proximity of their bases,
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