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Japan has proved her capability of sending a military expedition of over 60,000 men across the seas. She has ample means of transport and good bases. Nagasaki is 2,400 miles from Singapore, and 1,050 from Hong Kong, while the new advanced base of Formosa is distant 1,680 and 475 miles respectively from these places. The safety of the two British ports against Japan, whether acting singly or in conjunction with another Power, must depend on British naval superiority. No practicable increase to their garrisons could protect them from Japan if, and while, her navy is supreme in Eastern waters. When the Siberian Railway is completed and in efficient working order, which may be expected early in the twentieth century, the military strength of Russia in the Far East will be materially increased. It is not thought, however, that Russia, either acting by herself or in combination with France, could at present furnish men for a military expedition against Singapore or Hong Kong; but her increased Eastern navy, if acting from French bases, could much facilitate the transport of a French expeditionary force from Indo-China. The French garrison in that Colony consists, in round numbers, of 6,000 Europeans and 15,000 natives. It is widely scattered, in small detachments, over an extensive area, of which the population is to a great extent hostile. It has been calculated that the largest force that could be put into the field for offensive operations would not be more than 4,400 infantry (European and native) and four mountain batteries. Saigon, 600 miles from Singapore and 900 from Hong Kong, is a fair harbour, and is protected by the difficulties of navigation. Under the circumstances above recited, it is considered that there should be some increase to the garrison formerly recommended for Singapore. A slight increase would suffice to the garrison of Hong Kong, provided the danger which at present exists, owing to the north shore of the Lyemun Pass being under Chinese jurisdiction, be removed."
The Committee added that there were other reasons which made the acquisition of additional territory at Hong Kong a question of vital importance, and they strongly urged that action should be taken in the matter. They recommended a considerable increase in the artillery garrison in order to meet the manning requirements for the armament, but proposed no alteration in the infantry garrison.
In a further Memorandum, No. 173 M, dated the 7th March, 1899, the Committee recommended that the head-quarters and four companies of a native battalion of the Indian army should be maintained at Hong Kong to replace two British Companies which they had recommended to be detached to Wei-hai Wei; and in their Remarks, No. 247 R, dated the 9th September, 1900, they urged that in view of events in China, a whole native Indian battalion instead of this half-battalion, and in addition to the specially recruited Indian battalion known as the Hong Kong Regiment, should be stationed at Hong Kong.
These various recommendations for modifications in the approved garrison were carried out, and it was also decided to substitute a native battalion of the Indian army for the Hong Kong Regiment. It should be noted that this substitution involved a loss of 214 all ranks, the difference between the establishment (1,014) of the Hong Kong Regiment and the numbers which, after leaving a depôt in India for recruiting purposes, an Indian battalion is able to maintain in a Colonial garrison, viz., 800.
4. It may be useful to add that the above recommendations regarding the garrison required for Hong Kong have not been affected by the acquisition of the new territory.
This was explained by the Committee in their Memorandum No. 198 M, dated the 28th October, 1899, on the Strength of Garrison of Hong Kong, and although the survey of the new territory is as yet incomplete and the revised Defence Scheme discussing the mode of occupying the high ground to the north of Kowloon and Lyemun has not yet reached the Committee, there is reason to believe that the ground, which is exceedingly difficult, will prove to be entirely in favour of the defence, and that the problem of protecting the western and eastern approaches to the harbour has been materially facilitated by the extension of territory. No increased responsibility is thrown on the garrison which continues to be maintained solely for the defence of the essential parts of the naval port, the dockyard and the military and naval establishments. It is even possible that the armed police employed in maintaining order in the new territory may eventually be able to render assistance to the garrison in certain contingencies and so contribute to some extent to the security of the naval station.
5. The attention of the Colonial Defence Committee has been directed to an Admiralty letter, dated the 10th October, 1900, and addressed to the War Office, which is printed in full as Appendix II to this Memorandum.
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