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two, viz., the Pokefulum Reservoir in the west and the Tytam Reservoir in the east of the island, will, when the enlargement of the latter is completed, be no more than sufficient for the consumption of the present population of Hong Kong in dry seasons. At such times no reliance can apparently be placed on obtaining water from the streams and wells to the north side of the main ridge. Colonial Defence Committee recognize the importance of protecting the Pokefulum and Tytam Reservoirs, but do not consider that this protection necessarily involves a distribution of the troops to resist landings as proposed in the Scheme.
With regard to the cables, it should be borne in mind that they can more easily and seriously be damaged at sea some distance from the landing places than at the landing places themselves. It would be an advantage if they could be given some protection by artillery fire, and the advisability of shifting the positions of the landing places with this end in view should be considered. The cables should, however, not be laid where they would be liable to damage from ships anchoring.
(iv.) This is not so important an advantage as might at first sight appear. In the first place, it is only partial, for no attempt is made to deny the southern promontories to a landing party. Again, the intention of this forward disposition of the defence is to protect the area south of the main ridge from being raided, but there is little opportunity for inflicting damage in this area except on the reservoirs. On the other hand, there is a grave disadvantage in dispersing the garrison in what would promise to be a vain endeavour to resist a landing at all points. The front is roughly 10 miles, and to occupy this barely 1,200 combatants are available. The sectional troops are too weak to offer a serious resistance at any point to a strong landing party, and are liable to be isolated and beaten in detail, while the howitzers, owing to the difficulty of moving them, would have to be abandoned along with the advanced position to the enemy. It may also be observed that these howitzers, H 1, H2, H3, can hardly be considered out of the reach of the fire from ships as claimed for them.
From the foregoing considerations, it seems desirable that the distribution of the garrison should be reconsidered with a view to removing the over-exten- sion introduced by the present Scheme.
3. It seems to the Committee that no attempt should be made to directly oppose a landing with the limited number of troops available, and that it is sufficient to employ small look-out posts in such positions as will enable early information to be obtained of any intention on the part of the enemy to attempt a landing. An important consideration in connection with this suggestion is the elaboration of a system whereby the G.O.C. may be in close communication with all of these posts.
The Committee are of opinion that the land defence should be arranged merely so as to hold the higher passes over the main ridge at Victoria Gap, Magazine Gap, Wanchai Gap, and Quarry Bay Gap by small infantry guards and machine-guns, arrangements being made for obstructing the roads leading up to them on the south at the most difficult points; to occupy more strongly, and with the assistance of the howitzers and field-guns, the three lower gaps of Sandy Bay, Wang Nei-chong, and Shankiwan; and to concentrate the bulk of the mobile force under the G.O.C. at some central position, from which it would be possible to take vigorous offensive action in any direction by which an enemy could advance.
Considering the indirect defence thus afforded by the force at the lower gaps to the higher passes; that the movement of troops by the latter must be mainly confined to the actual roads; that the infantry on the higher passes would be fresh, intimately acquainted with the ground, and advantageously posted in comparison with the enemy, who would be advancing up the steep hill and under fire; considering also that the posts at the three gaps on Victoria Ridge are laterally connected by a good road, it would appear that the strength of the guards for these posts need be but moderate.
As regards Aberdeen Bay, Deep Water Bay, and Tytam Tuk, it is worthy of consideration whether the provision of a few lines of boat-mines would not be desirable. They would delay a landing there sufficiently to prevent any attempt of the nature of a surprise.
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