Saturday,
HONGKONG TELEGRAPH
Sixth Article in this Important
Series
RIDDLES OF 1941
What Are
Stalin's Plans?
N
O decision has
been so difficult By Prof. Harold Laski
for the working-class since 1918 as the deter- mination of its attitude to the Soviet Union.
Great Britain after Munich.
(2) He did not, after the destruction of Czecho- slovakia, believe that. Mr Chamberlain would fight under any circumstances.
(3) Knowing, the im- mense strength of Ger- many he believed that it was essential to stave off attack by her as long as he could,
There has been Moscow's sudden transformation from being the leader of the forces opposed to Fascism to the position of something like a semi-ally; the inde- fensible attack on Finland in the manner, and almost with the accent, of Fascist aggression; the cold re- pudiation of all overtures from Britain; the emphatic absorption of the three Bal- think, the essential key to the Treaty of August 23, 1939.
tie. States.
All this has made the un- derstanding of Soviet policy
to anyone who does not
Fear of Germany was, I
Fear Prompted Him
a matter of grave difficulty It was that fear which start from the dogma that prompted the attack on Fin- whatever the Soviet Govern- land; its purpose was strate- ment does is necessarily gic defence of Leningrad from attack through Fin- right.
land by Germany.
He knows that "Soviet security depends upon a British victory
The essence of Bolshevism in planned production for com- munity consumption; and I be lieve that its association with dictatorship is an historical cir- cumstance, partly due to the special character of Russian history, and partly due to in- ability of the Soviet Union to attain confidence in the security of its international position.
It was the search for that security which led Stalin to the German-Soviet alliance,
I suspect that he believed that German demands on Po- land would lead to a super- Munich, and that he was insur- ing himself against its possible
consequences.
It was a grievous misjudg- ment, only intelligible beenuse he had no grasp of what Demio- cratic politics imply, and be- cause he had little real insight into the depth of British 'un- willingness to see the European continent dominated by a Power like Fascist Germany.
His treatý, though I do not think he realised it, was the effective occasion for the out- break of war. It was the signal to Hitler that he might embark upon his tremendous gamble.
Since September 3, 1939, Stalin, I am confident, has many times congratulated himself that, thereby, he deflected the weight of Nazi power to the West in- stead of the East.
Last summer, as he watched the fall of France, he must have been convinced that the demo- cracies were in a helpless posi
tion.
Changed Attitude
I suggest that the motiva-
The same motive prompt tige of the Communist Party in tion of Soviet policy becomes
ed the seizure of what is the Soviet Union. clear if we build our ex-
On the assumption of a Ger- Now, I believe, he feels less planation of its 'shifts and now Soviet Poland,
man victory, he has at least won certain. British triumphs in phases upon the single prin- The same motive underlay time to mobilise his maximum the air, the vigour of our own, and the Greek blows at Italy, ciple of fear of Hitlerite the successful demands on resources. Germany, intensified, in- Rumania for the return of telligibly enough, by fear of Bessarabia. Fascist Japan.
Ever since 1917 the Soviet
On the assumption of a Brit- the growing aid of America to ish victory, he is freed from the Britain, must have been ade- fear of German attack, and can guate already to make him feel In the interval between assist at a peace conference in that a German victory is at least
which security in the Balkansa dubious matter. the treaty of August, 1989, (and therefore Soviet security) He is not prepared, as yet, to Union has expected an at- and to-day, I am confident, will be a major issue of discus- build upon the certainty of a tack from the capitalist the main implications of sion.
German, defeat. Until he sees Powers. Her memory of
this prospect, he will sit uncasily the Intervention is still pound the fear of German Warding Off Danger on his fence to either comba-
tant.
strong.
ness to Moscow, was a re- markable one.
Why He Did It
Soviet policy have been built
2.
strength, prompted by the I believe, therefore, that the But he must be growingly The contrast, in the period immense victories the Soviet character of Soviet policy in aware that a German Victory of appeasement, between British cultivation of Berlin Union has watched Ger- 1941 will be quite precisely de- would be a grave threat to the
termined by the degree of suc- Soviet Union. -and-Rome,-and-British cold- many win.
cess which attends British arms. He knows--none better-the Each of those victories is Moscow will be responsible for inner and ultimate hate of the a contingent threat to Mos- just those gestures to Berlin Axis for Soviet purposes; and he must be aware of the char- cow. Each of them has per- adequate to ward off danger.
There will be trade discus- acter of its propaganda--that suaded Stalin that the longer sions, visits triumphantly pro- of Father Odo, for example, he can maintain an armed claimed as important by the among Catholic populations. Mr Chamberlain's re- pudiation of every effort at neutrality, the stronger he Nazis, with careful repudiation, will be for the accounting on Moscow's part, of anything collective security which
Union accepts, explicitly or im- He cannot, either, share the came from Moscow in the that, as he must know, will which implies that the Soviet
plicitly, the new "European fantastic illusions of Communist Litvinov period must have one day come.
outside sympathisers
Russia Stalin knows that Ger- Order.' reinforced the conviction
As British victories increase, nhout Russian impregnability. there that the well-adver- many is in a position to
Soviet security depends upon cow far more attentive to Sir a British victory. We make tised hatred of Hitler for strike a staggering blow at believe that we shall find Mos-
the Soviet Union.
Stafford Cripps" efforts.
possible, and we alone make Bolshevism, the possibility
Until they have reached the possible, the continuance of its that he would seek con-
For a considerable time,
quests at the expense of the at least, our own power to Soviet Union, were regarded render him effective aid will in London with equanimity..
be small.
I
Realistic Policy
March 8, 1941.
"This is all wrong!
HIB
But- H.B.'s all right!”
"BRITAIN DELIVERS THE GOODS"
WE CARRY THE STOCKS DO YOUR PART
SPECIFY
point where the overthrow of experiment in social reorg ALL BRITISH BUILDING SUPPLIES
litlerista is at least a reason- tion.
able calculation, I am confident And the clearer the chance of that the main effort of Moscow that victory, the swifter will be
His own position in transport will be to evade being involved, the move of the Soviet Union to My own view is clear that is bad: he is far from certant on either side, to such a degree proclaim its beneficence. Stalin turned to Hitler for how well Soviet industries would as to suggest a Soviet commnlt- three reasons:
stand up to the strain of war; ment of n definite kind. and he does not know what ef (1) He saw no chance feet a major invasion would of an understanding with have upon the power and pres-
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"The Saturdays.
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It's Tragic, but .
For the character of Fascism makes it the ultimate enemy of working-class. hopes. Upon this realisation depends the survival, because the security, of the
It is, of course, a tragic thing Soviet Union. for Socialists to see the U.S.S.R., And its realisation of this which stood so bravely, under fact, in its turn, depends upon Litvinov, in the van of re- the overwhelming defeat of Hit- sistance to Fascist aggression, ler and 'Mussolini. now preserving a cold silence To aid in the defeat is the Jabout its implications.
primary obligation of any So- Britain has, let us remember, cialist who hopes for the success no small responsibility for this of the Moscow experiment. change.
Our own responsibility apart, Lwo there are really only theorics between which to choose. There is the view of fear, which I have here accepted; and there is the view, which 1 emphatically reject, that Nazian and Bolshevism are simply twin aspects of Dictatorship.
I reject that view becausę, with all its follies and crimes, the under-lying principles of Bolshevism seem to me to have nothing in common with the Nasi cread.
The latter, in its essence, is the pursuit of power for its own sako by anti-rational outlaws whose whole outlook and habits. proclaim them the enemies of· civilised living.
* **
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