PAGE CHONGKONG TELEGRAPH
Continuing the remarkable BANSE Revelations
BELOW is a further chapter from the German muntary text-book by Pro- fessor Ewald Binse, who changed Germany's. famous Schliffen plan to meet modern conditions.
Events in France and Belgium this week were planned in accordance with the Banse formula, and previous chapters in this absorbing series have already told why Holland and Belgium have been in- vaded and how the Nazis intend to drive through France.
In the chapter below, Professor Banse tells Ger- many what pitfalls she must avoid if she is not to meet with disaster in the
war,
WHEN one examines the German plan of compaign in the last war from the point of view of military-go- graphy it was all settled as early as 1898 and not al- tered in the manner here to be indicated-one. feels that
It took no, or too little, ac- count of England.
the
It reckoned with the French army and even with England's little expeditionary force, but not with England as mainstay of a protracted war, the organiser of the blockade. which starved us out, the fountain head of supplies.
This was hardly to be expected of Schilleffen himself considering the situation in his time, but his successor ought to have been awake to these things.
Our right flunit ought not only to have besieged Antwerp-we had plenty of men in Alsace Lorraine, where they were talling over each other, in fact-
t-but should have made straight for the cost and occupied-tho-Belgian and still more the Channel ports, the bases of the British expeditionary force, as far us Boulogne or beller still Abbe ville which would have been quite casy to do.
Nobody thought of this, because the purely load minded Germans tool-no-account-of-the-scound. Indeed, it is a question sen power. whether it was not a bad mistake in milliary geography to content ourselves with marching through
Instead Belgium
of occupying neutral Holland, also, equally a and our kinsman to boot.
The disadvantage of this pro ceeding, namely, the fact that it involved second viointion
of
neutrality, was as nothing com- pared with the first violation; but the advantage was incalculable, for it would have put the whole opposite const of England within our range; given our fleet a much longer and stronger base; which would certainly have preserved it from innetivity.
Finally, it would have made the possibility of an invasion of the south-eastern coast of England so immediate that the
with practically English,
110 army, would probably have con. claded reasonable peace with all speed rather than have their -country——-overran by German
soldiers.
The military occupation Holland, the lame of a race of German traders and peasants thinking entirely in terms commercial advantage, mot mili tary honour, would have present- en no difficulties.
Made Mess Of
Pre-War Plan
ol
ot
It is not too much to say that the world war became an economic. war, a war of starvation, and lost the herole character of earlier wars, because the Germans failed to grasp the strategic significance of the coast of Holland, Begium and northern France, and made a mess of the Schlieffen plan. We can only hope that more comprehensive
In this chapter Professor Banse frankly
admits Germany will lose if Blitzkrieg fails
NAZI CHOICE:
TOTAL WAR
OR DEFEAT.
the
In addition to that, it destroys
army's mubliity, it turns soldier into a householder, who ends by being unwilling to leave a neighbourhood to which he has grown accustomed, and even deve- topeda-certain-uttachment, for fear of exchanging it for a worse.. The warrior becomes bourgeois- ined,
becomes the active spirit physive, the conqueror tirns pro- perty owner,
"An Immobilised army is forced into lines of thought which have no connection with its real fune-
of
peace los; It begins to think rather
than war. and Anally
of insubordination rather than abidlence; or it fecis the inccm- petence of its commanders from the fact that operations have come to
standstill.
[
For us the worst thing about the entrenched war was that a well- fortified and well defended front like the French and the English was practically Impregnable with the offensive weapons then avail- able.
at
From this point of view it mude no difference whether it consisted of strong trenches hastily construct- ed for each occasion or, as we dis- covered to our great surprise Anus, merely a deep network-of- 'craters and machine-gun posts.
Massed Tanks
Best Weapon
A small number of highly trained, resolute and strong nerved men, machine guns and. gun emplacements, well hidden from the observation of bal- loons and aeroplanes, could hald up. whole armies.
Massed tanks were the only things for which this form of defence, was, the វាន apparently, inadequate.. English break through near Com bral in November 1917 showed.
thinking will tome day-lead-to-ment-this-ild destroy the enemy's wiser decisions, k
With Hindenburg and Luden dorf at the head of affairs, post- tional warfare would never have started. MARAT
The catabilahment of the western front meant, the probability, ol u alow and lingering defeat for us, ob a while it dangled·· visiona gradually approaching victory bow fore the eyes of the enemy.
the Trench warfare meant abandonment or renunciation of the war of motion, and therewith... of the hope of a rapid, fighting Bulbrand the decision became a matter of gradual attrition, ea &
Trench warfare has dineicht eneer from open warfare
Boldler; it.
italyds on the mind of the
£
very
him Ume to collect his thought and reflect, make him wonder about all sorts of things and raises doubts
In his mind which would never
The oldest and most elementary procedure for dislodging the enemy. was prolonged arillery bombard- position, but it gave him warning and enabled him to bring up suff elent reserve with which to meet the onslaught and counter attack himself; the most obvious examples are the Somme In 1915 and Flan- dera in 1017.
the
It was the results of position - warfare ---- prolongation of
struggle, moral d'aintegration, In- ...feriority in material, resources, hunger, decrease of man power, the growth of revoinilonary menil- ment-combined with the lack of
I
we the
ruined a safe position in the Kattegat,
from which could have threatened left flank of the English battle feet, by strewing mines all over-the-Belts
The advantageousness of the Eng- lish coast extends to the smallest detail thus its straightness makes il much easier to determine the whereabouts of a wirelessing Ger- from manghip by Batening in several points on it than it is to listen in to English ships from the ie-entrant German coast.
The English Admiralty was thus always excellently informed regard ing the position and directions of our warships, quite apart from the fact that the great god Chance, In the guise of dead signaller from the sunk Magdeburg washed up an the Baltic coast of Russia in Sep- put the secret code and tember
1014, signalling manuals of the German navy in the way of the English, who henceforth deciphered every wiro- less message from German naval headquarters and were able to take steps accordingly a terrible blow which
showed that fate was de- finitely against us; wherever the German fleet. showed itself it was confronted with supe- Immediately flor British forces.
Unfortunately Germany took the same sort of line on sea as on land, or even a worse one.
The reasons were: (1) the desire to annoy of the Chancellor not England, which showed his ignor- ance of national psychology; for nothing makes any impression on the English except the mailed fist: (2) lack of confidence in our navy la certain responsible naval circles. where it was considered no match for the British; it was the battle of Jullund on May 31, 1916, which first showed that Tirpitz and his suppor ters who considered it at least equal to the British, were right; (3) in Irigues which led to the cold shouldering of the creator and only proper commander of the fent
Tirpitz; (4) the High Admiral idea of emerging from the War with, the fleet intact.
yon
"the
In consequence of these things tilgh sens fleet was kept in its har- baurs and every avenue of approach to us from the North Sea was closed.
mines.
by
the sen on But mine warfare means exactly the same as french warfare on land, namely, the bank- ruptcy of all strategy and the end of all mobility,
The fact that U-boats from the beglaning showed good results.in
enterprise which estod us to slipertain capes does not come. Inlo
tight from the autumn of 1914 to
themooorint: it was an unexpect-
the spring of 1918 without at-hedly agreeable extra; and even so,
tempting an offeralvo Iri the west,' s istnally let ux the War ontbe western front; ;
Mistakes In
Sea Warfareb
grave mistake that we ourselves immediately:
(havo iíme to, grow up'in 'opez-work-rel
are with It copalant ruin of new aventa.
US-A VARK - Dumibillies were not, understood, or st any irala not ex-s plolted,
Germany Played
England's Game
to point to the similar be- haviour of the English naval authorities as an excuse.
England also kept her high seas feet back; but in the first place, as her entire political and economic existence-depended on her navy. there was no point in her risking it on the always doubtful issue of a big naval battle; and secondly, the security of her trude did not de- mand that she should use her fleet but merely that the German fleet should be shut up.
Our buckwardness thus suited
WIX and England's book
really playing her game.
The English principle of the "Neet in being" was as completely sound for England as it was wrong for
Lis,
Our Admiralty failed to realise this til at fenst the spring of 1916 and thus deprived us of the service of one of our most effective arms. When it was finally gingered up, it was too late to try to beat the British navy, for by then the Eng- Ish had strewn the whole North Sea with mines, increased and im- short, proved their fleet and, in overhauled their whole naval de-
fences.
The crippling of the German fleet responsible for: (1) the British blockade, which so curtailed raw our supplies of food and materials that we were unable to meet the increased demands of the War: (2) In contrast to that, the undisturbed continuation of British trade, which supplied England and France with everything they need- ed: (3) Englund's undisturbed com- ips munications with her army France; (4) the almost complete submission of the neutrals to Eng- Ush dictation; (5) America's In- support of the creasingly open
then. by Allies, first by economie. diplomatie and finally by military support; and (B) the Infection of the personnel of our navy with the Red bacilius us a result of their en forced inactivity.
In
The great god Chance, gave us the ono more opportunity U-boats, which had proved their usefulness, to the great surprise of everyone, at the very beginning of the War. But even of this op- portunity full advantage was not taken by our Admiralty. We ought at once to have built U-boat after U-boat, not battleships.
"
THIS photograph (just re- edived by air mail from Lon- don) of a. hospital in shows Elvorum, Norway, what total warfare, Ox- pounded by Professor Banso as Germany's only hope of victory, really_mearu.
exceeded the estimate); for it completely overlooked national psychology
England saw that she was ori the brink of the abyss end at once acted in
in the
most energetic man- she ruthlessly requisitioned neutral shipping, and even German shipping in neutral harbours, de- veloped an increasingly effective
of defence against system of U-boats and, had the unique plea- sure, which was at the same time
a long deferred victory for her diplomacy of seeing America abandon her reserve and declare war on the German Empire, which at once put many tons of German shipping at the disposal of Allies.
sidered
the
Even though U-boat warfare con- in itself was in no sense a fallure, the building of new ton-
noge, together with the requisi- tioned neutral and German ships, kept pace with the losses, which 1917 amounted to 9,000,000 tons by mines and submarines.
in
Our whole conduct of the War ca-once more, alas, proves the. z's old contention truth of Tirpitz's
"Om.
that the German people had not understood the scuit it is really permissible to attribute the defects
small
minority
In power to the whole nation.
of a
A more resolute and better con- sidered use of the fleet against the British-if possible hand in hand with the occupation of Holland and the landing of troops in the south east of England before they had learnt the lessons of the War and overhauled their naval policy, was calculated, if not to bring England to her knees, at any rate to make the question of supplies an acute one for her and to render the blockade Impossible.
In those circumstances the whole War would have taken a different which heroism would turn in have counted for more than eco- tomica.
Germany's Chief
Military Mistakes
Our chief military mistakes
were
1-Fallure to develop our poten- thalities fully before the War, and even during it, with the result that we could not make good our heavy initial losses quickly enough, and were from the beginning unequal to the enormous demands of a war on two fronts.
2. The baneful influence of the Cabinet on the choice of the commander-in-chief of the army and of the navy, resulting in the loss of the battle of the Marne (van Moltke) and subsequently in the scheme, fatal to us in our isola- tlon, of a slow war of attrition which culminated in the blood-bath of Verdun, was persisted in for two years (von Falkenhayn) and
paralysed the fleet (von Mully
In consequence of Falkenhayn's ideas the year 1018 especially was very largely wasted; having lost west, we ought the initiative in the at least to have undertaken a big offensive, in the cost which would crush Russia's war spirit, so that we might have both hands free in with England 1016 for the struggle and France,
3.Our failure to occupy Hol land and invade the south-east England, at the same time coast of
as fleet and building up our Then, .too the Admiralty's fore-highing an aggressive use of the
fleet. U-boat call for the unrestricted submarino resolved finally wartore which was
4-The fact that no attempt was 1817,
under made to raise the English blockade upon In February
from
Hindenbrug and
and so shorten the War. pressure Ludendroff at G.H.Q, was fareizal.
drawn up on
Allowing Allied troops to re-
This forecast reckoned: the main at Balorilica, when they ought.
cember 22, 1916,
England would give in after a mere Aivo months of unrestricted U-boat sinking 600,000 tons per
to have been driven off the Bal kans in 1915-10, they were respon sible for the defection of Bulgaria In Autumn
1918 and, to some ex
Caravanditenench="again" her-mendant 11,67054-Hungary.es alNO.
In judging these appalling mistakes. it is not permissible.
chant shipping, and that two-fifths yot neutral shipping should be frightened off coming to Englander,
Considered from the point of
left
rear uncovered. starting unrestricted U-boat warfare too late and on baile of totally inadequate estimates,
German
Cylerer shukry (KR006 11:WAR Woaving too many 10
Sram uniconzoniation (in weiter of
the fact läpi, the stakings, grosily
troops (a million) in Ruzala dur- in the 1918 Offensive in Franco
Tuesday, MAY 21, 1940.
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and not using them, and Austro- Hungarians one too, on the west- ern Front (the latter it possible only as labour battalions).
8-Under estimation of tanks.. although they have proved their value at Cambrai in 1917.
In the latter part the War
of -lot admit this frankly-the fear
In the
the minds of many of our soldiers that they would be killed
US
of
at the last moment and not live to see the longed-for dawn peace: this, however, meant the beginning of the break up of the army, which was completed by the poison of Marxism.
of a single 10 The absence supreme command, vested in Ger- man G.11.Q., over the German, Austro-Hungarian, Turkish and Bulgarian armies, which made it
the
whole Imposible to brlog,
Central Powers forces of the,
Into simultaneous action, thus reducing their striking power,flug
here was the Aus- The
Conrad. jealousy generally. (The Alllos finally the ideal of united com- mand over all operations against Germany on April 3, 1918; this, by materially increasing the enemy's striking power, we
was a turning point in the War).
trion
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