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on the termination of Martial Law, to indemnify parties who had acted in furtherance of it.
I have considered whether the cohesion of this Colony by the civil government is still insufficient to pursue the fear of imminent danger, and whether recourse might be had to the proclamation of military law.
It is initially objectionable to Jurisdiction in that an ordinance allowing the ordinary Courts to exercise jurisdiction to the extent to which they are competent. For the hint that this is worth my expedient, I have had it augmented by suggesting that it constitutes all the authorities not bringing Chipamen, and which the danger was operative & periling, it would fortify the office to furnish military Courts from being confused with Civil Courts only.
I transmit a copy of a despatch disliking the imposition of martial law in effect in Beyton in 1849, and also an ordinance passed on the jurisdiction of martial law, to indemnify parties who had acted in pursuance of it.