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[819
ONESDAY, JUNE 19TH. 1918.
SIR D. HAIG'S FINAL
DESPATCH. "... FEATURES OF THE WAR.
SINGLE GREAT BATTLE.
In this my final despatch-says Sir Douglas Haig-T think it desirable to comment briefly upon certain general fea tuces which concern the whole series of: oparations "carried out under my com mand. I am urged thereto hy the convic tion that neither the contse of the way itself j bor the military lessons to be drawn there- from can properly be camprehended unless the long succession of battles commenced, on the. Samme in 19te and ended in No- varuber of last year on the Sambre aze viewed as forming part of oue great and continuous engagement.
To direct attention to any single phase of that stupendous and incessant struggle and seek in it the explanation of our suc oss, to the exclusion or neglect of other phases possibly less striking in their im mediate or obvious consequences, Is. in my opinion, to risk the formation of sound doctrines regarding the character and requirements modern war.
sequence the full wap power of the Em- pire was never developed in the field at any period of the war.
As regards material, it was not until midsummer, 1918, that the artillery situation became oven approximately adequate to the conduct of major opera
tions.
been ingaired on the Western Front, where the bulk of the German forces were concentrated and the hardest fighting took place. In view of the fact, however, thas" the number of German prisoners is de- finitely known to be considerably under stated, these Rgures must be accepted with Throughout the Somme Battis serve. The losses of Austria-Hungary the expenditure of artillery ammunition in killed, missing, and prisoners are given ' had to be watched with the greatest care. I as approximately two and three-quarter During the Batiles of 1817 ammunition) millions: (2,779,000). An estimate of was plentiful but the gun situation was wounded would give a total of over four a source of constant anxiety. Only in and a half millions. 1919 was it possible to conduct artillery operations independently of any limit
ing consideration other than that of transport.
our
The extent of our casualties, like the duration of the war, was dependent on certain definite factors which can be. stated shortly. In the first place, the The second consequence of our unpre paredness was that our Armies were un military situation compelled us, partión- able to intervete, either at the outset of larly during the first portion of the war, the war or until nearly two years had to make great efforts before we had de elapsed, in suficient strength adequatelyveloped our fail strength in the field or to assist our Allies. The enemy was able properly equipped and brained to gain a notable initial advantage by
Armies. These efforts were wasteful of establishing himself in Belgium and men, but in the circumstances they could Northern France, and throughout the not be avoided. The only alternative was early stages of the war was free to con- overwhelmed by the enemy's superior · to do nothing 'and see our French Allies. centrate an undue proportion of his offer tives against France and sia.
numbers. The If the operations of the past four and excessive burden thrown upon the gallant a half years are regarded as a single con Army of France during this period caused tinuous campaign there can be recognised them losses the effect of which has been in them the same general features and the felt all through the war and directly in sane necessary stages which between forges duenced its length. Just as at no time. of approximately equal strength have were we as an empire able to put our own marked all the conclusive battles of his full strength into the field, so at no time tory. There is in the first instance the were the Allies as a whole able completely preliminary stage of the campaign, in to develop and obtain the full effect from which the opposing forces seek to deploy their greatly superior man-power. What and manœuvre for position, endeavouring,
خار
attack.
י.
It is interesting to note that in previ- ous campaigns the side which has been fully prepared for war has almost invari ably gained a rapid and complete success over its less well prepared opponent. In 1888 and 1879, Austris and then France were overwhelmed at the outset by means
to
Duringthe second half of the war, and that part embracing the critical' and tostly period of the wearing-out battle, the losses previously suffered by. our Allies laid upon the British Armies ". in France an increasing share in the burden of attack. From the opening of the Somme Battle in 1916 to the ter mination of hostilities the British. Armies were subjected to a strain of the atmost severity which never censed, and consequently bad little or no oppor- tunity for the rest and training they so greatly needed,
In addition to these particular consid- erations, certain general factors peculia
modern, war made for the inflation of losses. The great strength of modern field defences and the power and precision of modern weapons, the multiplication of mashine guns, trench mortars and artil
cry of all natures, "the employment of gai and the rapid developpant of the of superior preparation. The initial aderoplane as a formidable agent of de struction against both men and material, vantages derived therefrom wers followed all combined to increase the price to bo up by such vigorous and ruthless action. paid for victory:
the
nations, were at stake.
while doing so to gain some early, advant might have been the effect of British in age which might be pushed home to quick tervention on a larger scale in the earlier decision. This phase came to an end in stages of the war is shown by what was the present war with the creation of con- actually achieved by our original Ex- tinous treach lines from the Swiss fran-peditionary Force, tier to the seh.
Battle having been joined, there follows the period of real struggle in which the main forces of the two belligerent armies are pitted against each other in close and costly combat. Each commander socks to wear down the power of resistance of his opponent and to pin him to his posi tion, while preserving or accumulating ing his own bands a powerful reserve force regardless of loss, that there was no time If only for these reasons, ne compari with which he can maneuvre, and, when to recover from the first stunning blows
sons can usefully be made between the signs of the enemy becoming
relative losses incurred in this war and and physically weakened are observed. The German plan of
present war was undoubtedly
based on deliver
decisive the
any previous war. There is, however, the Similar The reatest possible pressure against the the GPrinciples. The margin by which Further consideration that the issues in- onrush in 1914 was stemmed volved in this stupendous struggle were anemy's whole front must be maintained, was so narrow and the subsequent strug far greater than those concerned in any especially when the crisis of the battle gle so severe that the word miraculous spproaches. Then every man, horse, and is hardly too strong a term to describe ence as an Empire and civilisation itself, other war in recent history. Our exist gun is required to co-operate, so as to the recovery and ultimate victory of these it is understood by the free Western complete the enemy's overthrow and ex
nd ex- Allies.
Men fought as plore succes. In the stage of the wearing. A further cause adversely influencing they have never fought before in masses. out struggle losses will necessarily heary on both sides, for in it the price the duration of of victory is paid if the opposing forces and one following indirectly from that it is satisfactory to note that, as the re Western front during its later stages, pad the for own particular handicaps. the foregoing general.considerations, are approximately equal in numbers, courage,
in moral, and in equipment there just stated, was the sitnation in other salt of the
and the high level is no of
way
ལན། sia broke down in 1913 at a critical price or of eliminating this phase of the when, had she been able to
period leadership generally maintained, our Btruggle...
CITY out
her losses even in attack over the whole period In former
of this the might
battle compare with Biet has race plates this stage of the con- been shortened by Sean was a later date those inflicted on our favourably
The the military situation in Italy in the an and has often been completed in a
approximate total of our battle casual- few hours. When armies of millions are en
the tumn of 1917
bransfer of ties in all arms, and including Overseas from France to Italy troops, from the commencement of the
Somme gaged, with the routers of stunt, er.
Battle in 1916 to the conclusion. pires behind them, will inevitably be at a time when their
have had their presence in Frante long It will include
effects. of the armistice is 2,140,000. violent crises of might have
The calcula losses 15 obviously a mat fighting which when viewed separately in their task, and and apart
general perspective.
by the inherent thereby tax of great, difficulty. It is estimated difficulties that the number of casualties inflicted on will appear individually, as great indoor lengthened sive battles. To this stage belong the great action of
always
associated with the combined the enemy by British troops during the 17: which wors
armies of engagements of 1918 and 1917; 1
separate nationali period exceeds two and a half
It is of interest, moreover, down the
in the strength of
differing temperament, the German armies, and not least, important, in mixtasy, or light of the paragraph next following, that Finally, whether from the superior
ability and leadership of ane belligerents, as the result of greater resources for tenacity, or by reas
reason of higher moral, or from a combination of all these causes, the time will come when the other ide
will begin ta
fo: Weaken and the climax of the battle is reached. Then
the
the war on? the
Avoiding payment of the theatres. The military strength of Hus of our and and determina
are "en ve British divinated.
Thirdly, the Alfta ere handicappedition of German
mil.
more than half the total casualties in ofanipment, and supply.
ue indicated in the opening occasioned during the five months, March- curred by us in the 5ghting of 1918 were paragraph of this
part of my despatch, the huge numbers of men engaged on either July, when our armies were on the defen- was rapidly, established from Switzerland WHY WE ATTACKED WHENEVER POSSIBLE. side, whereby a continuous battlefrantsiva
sea, outBanking was made impos Closely connected with the question of
dificult, nece
tow the sible and manzuvre very
the commander of the weaker side must fated the delivery of frontal attacks, casualties is that of the relative values of choose whether be will break off the enThis factor,
combined with the
attack and defence. It in a view often expressed that attack is more expen-
gagement, if he can, while there is yet of the defensive under mode.ve than defence. This is only a half.
time, or stake on a supreme effort
reserves remain to him.
The launch
sarves, at Waterloo was a minutes.
matter
rendered a protracted wearing-dut
tie of the beleaguered German armies, approximateforces are at the outset expensive than defence, particularly if
BR.. EXTENT OF OUR CASUALTIES.
and destruction of reunavoidable before the enemy's power of statement of the truth.
resistance could be overcome. So long successful attack is generally more In this world war the great the
equal in numbers and the attack is pressed home with courage commenced on March Est, 1918, lasted for, and there are no flanks to turn sind resolution. On the other hand, fazz, months, yet it represents a corras able.
a long struggle for supremacy is inevit attack so pressed home, if skilfully-con- stage in a single coloanal battle.
ducted, is rarely unsuccessful whereas, in effort will igual for the c
down of such a
its later stages especially, unsuccessful Obviously, the greater the length of a fence is far more costly than attack. of the Allel side to do
his war the higher is likely to be the number Moreover, the object of all war is greatest strength and seek to turn to im of casualties incurred in it on either victory, and a purely defensive attitude mediate account the loss in material and side. The same causes, therefore, which can never bring about a successful deci
which their failure mast inevitably served to
the recent struggle, are sion, either in a battle or in a campaign. In largely in for the extent of our The idea that a'war can be won by stand-
There C&P..
be no question that
ing on the defensive and waiting for the
Cased as decided in the
among his opponent's troops In
Cours | Chaualties.
of few days or hours: there is no risk to our general, angreparedness must be enemy to attack is a dangerous fallacy, that the lay observer will seek to dis attributed the loss of many thousands of which owes its inception to the desire to
men whose, sacrince we deeply de
evade the price of victory. It is an axiom
tinguish the
which victory
น
and beate die we regard their splendid gal.
from
gratitude.
thai preceding stager by which it has been natry and self-devotion with unstinted that decisive success in battle can_be made possible and determined.
gained only by a vigorous offensive. The however, the military situation Principle here stated has long been recog
1914, our total loses nised as being fundamental, and is based in August, zotan were on the universal teaching of military
are
whole operations of the present the regarded in correct perspective the vio
tories of the summer and autumn of 1918 in the war have will be seen to be as directly dependent be
upon the two years of stubborn Aghing to lavorate Neither do they compare history in all ages. The course try with those of any other of present war has proved it to be cor- that preceded them.
so far as figures rect.
To pass for a moment from the generali
THE LENGTH OF THE WAR.'
the
which co to the "particular, and consider the
be made. The total British
heigth of the scent on determined the all theatres of war, killeds
contest are ing, and
in the light of the accepted principles of troops, are
oan
in
light of the present war the facts upon
音
ustive
war it will be seen that the duration of (3,070,888) which this axiom is based. A defensive
the
total, some tiro and role sobeer or later brings-about-a-dis (2,568,834) were incurred tanet Towering of the moral of the troops. direct relation to certain deanite factori on the Western Front. The total French who imagine that the enemy must be the
struggle was governed by and bore 41 a half millions
hich
afe enumerated below. In the first loss, killed,
place, we were...I
angrepared for war or exclusive of
and prisoners, but better man, or at least more nuzteralis. have been given better equipped with and better served
at any rate for a war of such magnitude. omaly4831,000 by artillery or other mechanical aids to
And
is
added,
the victory. Once the mass of the defending
We were deficient in both trained men and an estimate for military material, and, what was more total
portant, had no machinery ready by mal dan tentely be less than 6,800,000, infantry become possessed of such ideas which either men or material could be pro-lat over lour milliods were incurred the battle in as good as lost, An
Western Front. The published Squees standard of discipline is high, may main quisite quantities. The consequences were
Firstly, the necessary machinery olusive of prisoners, amount to 1, 500,00% rod is the hope that victory may b for killed and wounded only extain a successful defence, for a protracted 12 of improvised hurriedly, and im-of-which practically, the whole provisation is never economical and urges have also been published 1
in the Western ***L Figures
daced in anything approaching the re the four milians were incurred on fighting on enemy, soil, especially if its
seldom satisfactory.
·
for weaken in his resolution and
ined elsewhere or that the enemy may
In this casq, the high-water mark of Germany and Austria. The total German accept & compromise. The reistance al Tolz.fighting strength in infantry was casualties killed, wounder, missing, and the German armies was undoubtedly pro only reached after two and a half years prisoners, are given at spokorinktaly six: lönged in this fashion, bat in the end the of conflict by which time heavy ensual and half millions (6,483,000), which persistence of our troops had its nati sien had already been incurred." In son.* the vastly greater proportion múất have, oflocía-