# Appendix.
Report on the Island of Hong Kong.
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of capturing Hong Kong, for it would be valueless to them; and if mere glory were sought by the acquisition, they must be aware the fame would be of short continuance, as troops and ships from India, from Australia, and from all our stations eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, would soon recapture the place or starve out the garrison.
But Gibraltar is differently circumstanced; it effectually commands the narrow entrance to the Mediterranean, and, together with the fortresses and havens of Malta and Corfu, gives England a preponderating power in that great European sea, which is becoming daily of more and more value in her intercourse with the Anglo-Eastern empire. Moreover, Gibraltar is a valuable commercial entrepôt; at one period 1,000,000l. sterling of cotton goods were exported through Gibraltar into Spain.
As a fortress, Gibraltar is perfect; it is impregnable. The revenue of Gibraltar is fully adequate to its civil government, and averages upwards of 30,000l. per annum; the military expenses incurred by garrisoning Gibraltar saves the constant maintenance of a large fleet in the Mediterranean, preserves the balance of power, and materially helps to keep the peace of Europe. The remarks applicable to Gibraltar are also applicable to Malta and the Ionian Islands, both of which stations not only pay their whole civil expenditure, without one shilling charge on the British Exchequer, but also contribute a considerable sum annually towards military defences and protection. Both of these places are also entrepôts of a large trade. Every colony of the British empire pays for its own civil government, except small sums which are voted annually in part aid for the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Falkland Islands, St. Helena, and Heligoland; but all these places are intrinsically valuable: the Bahamas for the geographical position of their harbours; Bermuda as a strong fortress and dockyard in the Western Atlantic; the Falkland Islands for their important position and fisheries in the Great Southern Ocean, near Cape Horn; St. Helena as a strong fortress and recruiting station for our numerous ships doubling the Cape of Good Hope in their voyages to and from India, China, and Australasia; and in the event of war the possession of St. Helena would be of great value to our merchants, and save us a large fleet in the Atlantic. Heligoland, during the late European war, was a large commercial depôt for the Elbe and the northern parts of Europe. Its expense is only about 500l. a year. Numerous as are the colonies of the British empire, they are each of some utility to England; for their territorial extent as emigration fields to provide employment for a surplus population; for their productions of sugar, coffee, corn, cotton, silk, indigo, timber, oil, wool, &c.; as maritime positions or military posts; as trading emporiums or fishing stations. I have in vain sought one valuable quality in Hong Kong, for there are other good harbours around, and for 200 years we have not found the want of such. I can see no justification for the British Government spending one shilling on Hong Kong.
Religions and Social Influence.-The benefits derivable from our laws, institutions, and religion can never be conferred on the Chinese by our colonization of Hong Kong.
We are here, in fact, almost as much isolated from China, its people, and supreme government, as if we were located in the Eastern Archipelago. By the adroit policy adopted by the Chinese authorities, a "cordon sanitaire," if I may so express it, has been drawn around Hong Kong; no Chinaman is permitted to come here willingly, except he be a thief, a pirate, or a spy. No respectable Chinese, with their families, locate themselves in Hong Kong; if they did, their relations still remaining on the main land would probably be "squeezed," imprisoned, tortured, and considered as traitors to the Celestial Empire.
Hong Kong is viewed by the Chinese as a spot where adventurers and reckless characters may make something out of the English, and where burglars and robbers may resort with impunity, and live upon the profits of their villainy.
I am strongly of opinion, from circumstances that have come to my knowledge, that the mandarins view with indulgence all vagabonds who propose to quit their own country and proceed to Hong Kong; that in fact direct encouragement is afforded them to do so; it is therefore the height of improbability to suppose that the possession of Hong Kong will ever enable us to disseminate our religion, language, and institutions in the Chinese empire. For 200 years we have had extensive and profitable intercourse with Canton, without our missionaries and other good men ever producing the slightest effect on the people or government. The inhabitants of the southern districts are decidedly hostile to us, and are daily becoming more and more filled with a deadly animosity, which the possession of Hong Kong will not remove. No converts are made by our missionaries on this island, but were such the case no converts from Hong Kong would be favourably viewed by the respectable Chinese on the main land. The Christian converts would be considered as coming from an island of thieves and pirates; they would be received with a suspicion which would check rather than advance the progress of Christianity. The missionaries with whom I have conversed take this view of the subject; they consider it hopeless to attempt the spread of Christian doctrines in China by means of converts from Hong Kong, Thus, in a religious aspect, Hong Kong is as valueless as it is on financial and commercial grounds.
Were our colonial authority and establishment at some island or position to the north, near the central regions of China, we should most probably obtain considerable moral influence
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Appendix.
Report on the Island of Hong Kong.
influence over an intelligent and respectable class of Chinese, who would communicate their favourable ideas to other and distant parts of the empire, and by extending a knowledge of our language pave the way for the introduction of Christianity. An English city at Chusan, for example, surrounded by an extensive agricultural population (the best disposed and most orderly in China, as well as elsewhere), and evincing all the benefits of the science and skill of Europe, would have a remarkable effect on the Chinese, whose inquisitiveness and imitative powers would soon induce them to copy those things which would conduce to their physical, and ultimately to their moral and religious improvement.
In a Political Point of View.-Hong Kong was occupied by our troops and merchants in 1840-41, at a period when our trade was driven from Canton; when we were in hostility to the Chinese government, and when the Portuguese authorities at Macao had expressed their inability to permit, as usual, British residence and resort to that port. At this period the views of Captain Elliot were solely directed toward Canton. Hong Kong was then deemed the most eligible spot for British occupation, on political and military grounds; and so it proved, as long as the operations were being directed against Canton and we were excluded from China; but on our proceeding to the north, occupying Chusan, and ultimately making peace, and opening five ports, including Canton, for free commercial resort, English residence, and the establishment of a ship of war at each, the political and mercantile value of Hong Kong entirely ceased. The late war has shown us the vulnerable point of China, namely, the Yang-tze-kang river, which is aptly denominated by the Chinese, "the Girdle of the Empire." In the event of any future hostilities our force would be directed at once towards Nankin, and other places on the Yang-tze-Kang river, and not against Canton. It is by interrupting the supplies of grain and salt to Pekin, and cutting off the trade of the great artery, or grand canal, that we can with the least expenditure of blood or treasure terminate hostilities with China.
To accomplish this most desirable result Hong Kong is utterly valueless. Our position must be Chusan, from its contiguity to the scene of war, from its comparative salubrity, safe haven, and capability of supplying provisions, both from the resources of the island itself, and from the contiguous coasts. A fleet of ships of war and transports may rendezvous at Chusan, and select at will the most fitting period of the year for offensive operations. No attack need be apprehended from the Chinese. Coal is abundant in the Yang-tze-kang, for the use of steamers. Ships from Singapore and the southward can now, by reason of a greater knowledge of the winds and currents, reach Chusan, even against the Monsoon, in nearly the same time they would occupy in reaching Hong Kong; and finally the Chinese government, aware of our position, would be the less disposed to break the peace, and would cease to rely so much as they now do on the strength of the forts in the Canton river. The policy of the Chinese government is to keep foreigners at the extremity of the empire; but the sagacious reasons which dictate this policy ought to render us the more anxious to operate in a counter direction. There are now seven fortifications, very strong, and apparently well provided with artillery, at the Bogue. With Chinese gunners these forts would prove, even at present, formidable to an invading force; but well manned by European or American artillerymen, the Bogue might be made almost as impregnable as the Dardanelles.
On a review of the whole case, there are no assignable grounds for the political or military occupancy of Hong Kong, even if there were no expense attending that occupancy. The government of China is sufficiently civilized to respect the persons and property of British subjects at Canton, before any declaration of war took place, which, however, is an event of very remote probability for many years to come, if we retain Chusan; and as the treaty with China provides for the stationing of a ship of war at Wampoa or Canton, a better security is thus provided for any British residents at Canton than Hong Kong could afford. The climate of Hong Kong will not admit of the island being made a garrison for our troops; and in the event of another war with China, an invading army must proceed from India, unless we keep a small military and naval establishment at Chusan; but a very small effective force can be maintained here, unless at an enormous expense; and the impracticability of fortifying an island which is commanded by the hills around, and by any large battery erected on the opposite shore, is now generally acknowledged, and is in further corroboration of the inutility of Hong Kong.
On a review of the whole question, and examining the island in all respects, making every allowance for the newness of the settlement, and admitting, for argument sake, that ultimately there may be some trade at Hong Kong, it appears to me very advisable, if Hong Kong be retained as a British station or colony, that the civil establishment of the colony be cut down to a scale commensurate with the resources and wants of the island; and that the supernumerary officers be provided for in other colonies, as vacancies occur; that the European and Sepoy troops be removed, and a portion of the first Ceylon regiment (Malays) be kept at Hong Kong, in aid of the civil power; that a frigate or sloop of war be always stationed in the harbour, with an extra complement of marines, to be landed only in case of emergency; that the British, and other respectable inhabitants who are householders, be formed into a municipal body, with power to assess themselves for the police, lighting, drainage, and street-making, &c. of Victoria; that the harbour be a free port,
open