THE
WAR.
[THROUGH REUTERS AGENCY.):
THE HONGKONG DAILY PRESS, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST óræ, 1914.
STATEMENT BY SIR E. GREY.
(VERBATIM REPORT}
BRITAIN SUPPORTS FRANCE IF HER SHIPPING OR
NORTHERN COASTS ARE ATTACKED.
ALSO IF BELGIUM IS INVADED BY GERMANY.
SCENE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.
LORDON, August 3rd. The scene in the House of Commons to-day was one unparalleled
in British history.
The most intense but subdued excitement prevailed. Chairs were placed along the floor of the Houss to accommodate members.
Sir Edward Grey looked noticeably older.
There were denue crowds outside who cheered Ministers as.
entered the House,
they
Inside and outside the House Conservatives cheered Mr. Churchill. Mr. Asquith was also greeted with an ovation."
Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who the following was loudly cheered, made the promised statement in
terms:-
"Last week I stated that we were working for peare not only in Great Britain, but to preserve the peace of Europe. Events to-day move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state the actual position of affairs. It is clear that peace in Europe cannot be preserved; Russia and Germany have declared war on each other. Before giving 'the position of the Government, I would like to clear the ground, so that the House may realise exactly under what obligations the Government or the House is in coming to a decision.
"Let me say very shortly that we persistently worked with all the earnestness in our power to preserve peace, (Cheers.) The House may be satisfied on that point. Through the Balkan crisis we worked for peace The co-operation of the Great Powers was successful then. It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulties in adjusting their points of view, and took much time and labour in discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured because poace was their maink object. They were willing to give their time and trouble rather than accentuate the differences.
"In the present crisis, unhappily, it had not been possible to secure perca in Europe because there had been little time, and there had“ been a disposition in some quarters to force things rapidly to an issue, to the great risk of peace. The result we now know. The policy of peace, as far as I and the Powers generally are concerned, has failed. I do not desire to dwell on this, nor to say where the blame seems to lie, because I would like the Houso to approach the crisis from the point of view of British interests and British honour-(loud cheers) and British obliga tions (renewed cheers)-free from all passion. (Cheers.)
"As to why peace has not been preserved, we shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week, when we were working for peace, and when the papers are published I have no doubt that they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our own efforts for peace were (cheers)-and they will enable the people to form their own judgment as to the forces operating against peace.
..
"I come now to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House that if any crisis arose we could come before the House of Commons and be able to say it was free to decide what the British attitude should be bear, hear)-and that we would have no secret engagement.
(Cheers)
"There had been ja Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. The latter was not an alliance, it was a diplomatic group, The House will remember that in 1608 there was a crisis originating in connection with the annexation of Bosnia and Berzegovina. The Russian Minister happened to come to London, and I told him definitely that, it being a Balken affair, I did not consider that. public opinion would justify us in promising anything. More was never asked, more was never given, and more was never promised, and up till yesterday wo had given no promise more than diplomatic support.
I must make this question of obligation clear to the House, and must go back to the Morocco crisis of 1906. The time of the Algeciras a general Conference was a very difficult time for the Government, as election was in progress. I was asked whether, if that crisis developed into a war between France and Germany we would give armed support. I said I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless I was subso- quently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here when the occasion arose. (Ministerial Cheurs.) I said
id that my opinion was that if war was forced upon Franes on the question of Morocco, which had just been the subject of an agreement with Britain and France, public Opinion in England would be rallied to the support of France. (Cheers.)
(THROUGH REUTER'S AGENCY]
I made no promise and used no threat, but expressed that opinion, and the position was accepted by the French Government. But they said at the time If you think it possible that pablic opinion in Great Britain might, when a sudden crisis arose, justify you in giving France your armed support, which you cannot promise in advance, unless between Military and Naval experts some conversations have taken place, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish, when the time There was force in that, and I agreed to it, and anthurised. those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing that passed between the experts' should bind either Government.
comes.
"The Agadir crisis came, and throughout that I took precisely the same line is in 1906 Subsequently, in 1919, it was decided that we ought. to have a definite understanding in writing that these conversations were not binding on either Government, and on the 22nd November I wrote a letter to the French Ambassador and received from him a reply. That letter will be shown to the public now as a record that whatever took wero not binding. place between the Military and Naval experts, they engagements on the Government. The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as in the Morocco question. The latter was primarily a dispute which concerned France. It was a dispute which was fastened upon France out of an agreement existing between us and France under which we engaged to give France diplomatic support, and there is no doubt that we were pledged to nothing but diplomatic support. But we were pledged by a definite and published agreement. The present crisis originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco; it b
nut originated as regards anything about which we have a special agreement with France, and it has notoriginated with anything primarily concerning France. It originated in the dispute between Austria and Servia, and no Government and no country had a less desire to be involved in a war or dispute with Austria and Servis than the Government and country of France (Loud cheers). They became involved because of their obligation and honour (Cheers) under a definite alliance with Russia. That obligation cannot apply in the same
way to us. We are not parties
to the Franco-Russian alliance; we do not even know, the terms of the
Alliance.
Now I come to what we think the situation requires. Wo have had many years of long-standing friendship with France (Cheers). I re- member well, when the agreement was made, the warm and crdial feeling. resulting from the fact that these two nations had cleared away their por- petual differences and become friends. And it has been a friendship between How far does that two nations (Cheers) ratified by the nations. friendship entail obligation f Let every man look into his own heart and his own feelings and construe the extent of such an obligation to himself (Cheers).
the
Speaking for myself, I may say that the French Fleet is now in the Mediterranean and that the northern and
western coeats are absolutely undefended. With the French Fleet concentrated in the Mediterranean the situation is very different from what it used to be before the friendship which grew between the two countries gave them a sense of security. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought and in which she was not the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could hot
with stand aside (Loud and prolonged cheers) thing going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately and doing nothing- And I believe that to be the feeling of this country (Cheers). There are times when one's own individual feeling makes one feel that if the circumstances actually did arise it would be the feeling which would spread with irresistable force to others, in face of the thing which is happening. But I want to look at the thing also without sentiment-from the point of view of British interests. It is on this that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediter- ranean? She leaves it there with no statement from us as to what we shall
as to who do. She sees her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended and at the mercy of the German Fleet coming down the Channel, to do as it please in a war which is a war of life and death. To her we say nothing, it may be, and the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration. Can anybody set the limits to the consequences which might ariso out of it? ~ Just, assum to day that we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality saying, No we cannot engage to help either party in this conflict, and let us suppose that the French fest is withdrawn from the Meditor- ranean. Let us assume that out of that came consequences unforseen which make necessary, at a sudden moment, that in defence of vital British interests wo should go to war. And let us assume, what is quite possible, that Italy, which is now neatral and legitimately consulting her own interests, may depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced to fight ourselves. What would be the nosition in the Mediter ranean then It might be that these consequences would be forced upon us at some critical moment when the trade routes if the Mediterranean might be vital to this country. (Cheers.) Nobody car say that, in h course of the next few weeks, there is any particular trade route, the opening of which might not be vital to this country. What is sour position
then We have not kept in the Mediterranean a fleet which is equal to deal alone with a combination of other feets there. That would be the very moment when we could not detach mors ships for the Mediterranean and we might have. exposed this country, through our negative attitude at the present moment, to a most appalling risk. (Cheers.) I say that from the point of view of British interests. Well, we felt strongly that France vsa entitled to know at once (Chears) whether or not in the event
[THROUGH REUTERS AGENCY,
of an attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could dopend upon British support. Under there compelling circumstances, the following yesterday afternoon I gave the French Ambassador
statement:
I am authorised to give the assurance that if the German Fleet comes into the Channel, or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts and shipping, the British.. Fleet will give all the protection in its power. (Loud cheers.) This assurance is subject to the support of Parliament, and must not, be taken as binding upon the Government until the contingency of action. by the German Fleet takes place.
Things move so rapidly that I canno
this except informally, but I understand the German Government is prepared it we pledge neu- trality to agree that the German Flect shall not attack the northern coast. of France. I only heard that shortlybefore I came to the House. But it is far too narrow an engagement for us(Lond cheers.) And thore is a more serious consideration which is becoming more serious every hour-the question of the neutrality of Belgium (Cheers.) The governing factor was the Treaty of 1839, and in 1870 Bismarck gavo an assurance of the neutrality of Belgium which was a valuable recognition on Germany's part of the sacredness of treaty rights.
The Treaty is an old treaty, and honour and interest are as strong to-day as in 1870. We cannot take a less serious view of our obliga- tions than did Mr. Gladstone's Government of 1870. When mobolisation was beginning last-week I know that this question would be a must import ant element in our policy. I telegraphed to Paris and Berlin saying that it was essential that we should know whether the French and Germant Governments were prepared to undertake an engagement with respect to. the neutrality of Belgium. The French Government replied that it was resolved to respect the neutrality, and it would be only in the event of some other Power violating the neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity to act otherwise. Germany replied that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs could not possibly answer before consulting the Emperor, and the Chancellor. Dur Ambassador at Berlin said he hoped that the answer would not long be delayed, and the Secretary gave the. Ambassador to understand that he rather doubted whether he could answer at all, as any reply, in the event of war, could not fail to have the undesirable effect of disclosing part of their plan of campaign. (Laughter.) 1 telegraphed to Brussels, and the Foreign Minister replied that Belgium would do its utmost to maintain neutrality, and added that the Belgian Government believed that they were in a position to defend the neutrality of their country in the event of a violation of that neutrality. (Cheers.) Now comes news that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which is to offer Belgium friendly relations on the condition that she facilitates the passage of the German troops through Belgium.
We were sounded last week as to whether, if Belgian integrity was We guaranteed at the conclusion of the war, that would content us. replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests and obligations we had in Belgian neutrality. (Cheers.) His Majesty the King received. the following telegram from the King of the Belgians:
Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship. and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude in 1970, and the proof of the friendship she has just given us. I make supreme appeal for the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of the Belgians. Cheers.).
We intervened diplomatically last week. What can diplomatie intervention do now?
We have a great and vital interest in the independence and in- tegrity of Belgium and the smaller States in that region of Europe, which. only ask to be left alone (Cheers.) If, in the war which is before Europe, the neutrality of these countries is violated, and if the troops of one of the combatants violates its neutrality and no action is taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, independence will be gone, (Cheers.) Now if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum sent to Belgium asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, her independence is gone if that holds.
And if her independence goes, the independence of Holland will go Now I ask the House, from the point of view of British interests, to con- sider what may be at stake (Cheers). It will be said that we might stand aside and husband our strength, and at the end intrvenu with effect and put things right. If, in a crisis like this we ran away-(Loud and pro longed cheers) from those obligations of honour and interests as regards Bel- gium, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should havn lost (Renowed cheers)..
...
For us with a powerful fleet, if we engage in war, we suffer but little more than we shall suffer if we stand aside. We are going to suffer terribly in this war whether we are in it or not. Our foreign trade is going to cease, not because the trade routes will be closed, but because there will be no trade at the other end.
Sir Edward Grey said with emphasis: If the facts regarding Belgium turn out as they reach me, it is quite clear that there is an obliga- tion upon this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which these facts lead, if they are not disputed. (Cheers.)
We have taken no engagement yet to send an expeditionary armed force out of the country. The mobilisation of the Fleet has taken place.. (Cheers), the mobilisation of the Army is taking place (Renewed cheers), but we have, as yet, taken no engagement because I do feel that it is a case of a European confegration such as is without precedent. With our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, and all the unknown factors, we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland-(Cheers)-the general feeling throughout Ireland, and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad (Loud and prolonged cheers. Does not that make a consideration which we have to take into account? (Renewed cheers.)
Great Britain. could not proclaim unconditional noutrality. We made a commitment to France which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any neondi- tional neutrality. We are bound not to shrink from proceeding to use all the force in our power. (Cheers.) I do not for a moment conceal that we must be prepared, and we are prepared (loud cheers)-for the quences of having to use all the strength we have, at any moment, we know not how soon, to defend ourselves and to take our part. I have announced no final decision; I have delayed until we have the whole case before us
conse
There are absurd complications grown out of this quarrel between Austria and Servia The situation has developed so rapidly that techni cally it is impossible, as regards wer, to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying things which must affect our own policy. I have put the vital facts before the House and if, as seems only too probable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to tako our stand on these issues I believe the country realises what is at stake, what the real issues are, and the magnitude of the impending danger which I have endeavoured to describe, and I believe we shall be supported: throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, resolution, courage and endurance of the whole country. (Loud cheers.) Mr. Bonar Law warmly supported the Government, and referred, amid cheers, to the pledges of support received from the Dominions.
Mr. Johns Redmond expressed Ireland's sympathy, and said that the Government could withdraw the troops from Ireland immediately. (Loud cheers.) The coasts of Ireland would be defended by the sons of Ireland-Nationalista. and Uistermen.
neutral,
Mr. Ramsay Macdonald affirmed that we should have remained The House adjourned until 7 o'clock.