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HONG KONG AND
cannot discern any one advantage which England gains by the reten- tion of an island which can never become a colony, a commercial port, or a fortress.
If left with a superintendent, a small local corps of Malays as a police force, a ship of war in the harbour, and with a municipal power in the inhabitants to assess themselves for police, &c., the British flag might remain and time would show whether, under the most perfect freedom, Hong Kong would be ought but an opium depôt.
I am aware that the view here taken of Hong Kong will be opposed by several gentlemen now in England, but whose opinions must neces- sarily be influenced by their being owners of houses and building loca- tions on this rock, from which considerable profits are derived. Some also, unwilling to acknowledge an error in judgment, and others fearful of losing in position, income, or property, will object to a transfer of the seat of Government from Hong Kong to Chusan; or to any reduc- tion of the large Government expenditure on Hong Kong. But their opinions will, I doubt not, be considered with due caution, as are those of all men whose sentiments are guided by their immediate personal interest, or by those motives which almost imperceptibly bias the judgment.
If a Commission were appointed, I doubt not that Her Majesty's Government would obtain full and impartial statements on Hong Kong and on Chusan. My report on Chusan will, I trust, tend to demons- trate that the qualities which are wanting to make Hong Kong a British colony are all to be found at Chusan,
Its geographical position at the central point and to windward of the coast of China-opposite the great Yang-tze-kiang river- within twenty-four hours' communication with Nankin and the other large cities and towns on the borders of that vast artery of the Chinese empire, whose trade may thereby be immediately and effectually con- trolled; its proximity to the Peiho and Yellow rivers; its secure haven and spacious harbours around; the ample size, great fertility, numerous agricultural population, healthy climate, capability of contributing a revenue to meet an adequate civil establishment, and perfect adaptation for a naval and military station-all indicate its importance as a position by which England can maintain peaceful relations, and at the same time develope her trade with China, with Japan, Corea, Mantchouria, and the neighbouring islands.
These, and various other considerations, all point out the advantage
CHUSAN COMPARED.
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of our being permanently established at Chusan, whence a single war- steamer could, in twenty-four hours, be prepared to stop the fleet of 6000 grain junks, bearing each 2000 peculs of grain, valued at 2 dollars per pecul, or the 24,000,000 taels of silver which annually pass the Yang-tze-kiang to Pekin, and thus avoid the grievous calamity of another war.
I have endeavoured, Sir, briefly, though I fear very imperfectly, to bring this subject under your earnest and early examination, because I know of no question connected with the eastern hemisphere which involves higher considerations for England, particularly if we reflect that the condition of one-third of the human race is interested therein, and that a weighty and solemn responsibility rests on England with regard to her position in China.
I believe it to be for the interest of China, more than even for that of England, that Chusan were a British colony; and that but a brief period will elapse ere the Celestial Government, whether Tartar or Chinese, will rejoice that they have a powerful, equitable, and friendly nation so adjacent to their shores,-one whose main object is peaceful and profitable commerce,--who desire no territorial aggrandizement,- and whose best interests are identified with the tranquillity, prosperity, and independence of the Government of China.
The dispatch of an Ambassador Extraordinary, of high rank and of tried ability, to the Court of China, would (especially at the present moment) be productive of beneficial results, and well worthy any ex- pense which might be incurred. The permanent cession of Chusan to England might be one of the primary objects of such a mission; but to be successful, no person who has been formerly connected with trade, either individually or on behalf of the East India Company at Canton, should be the representative of his Sovereign--even if he possessed the statesman-like qualifications necessary to the mission, and which is exceedingly difficult for any man who has been the greater part of his life at Canton, keeping records or supplying the tea trade, to possess.
By diplomatic policy,--peaceful relations, advantageous intercourse, and a secure, profitable, and commanding position on the coast of China, may be accomplished. But the evacuation of Chusan, in December, 1845, will, in my opinion, be the precursor of a disastrous state of affairs for British interests in China.
I am ready to undergo the expense and fatigue of a journey over- land to England, and also the sacrifice of half my salary- -if six months
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