26
REPORT ON
civil expenditure without one shilling charge on the British exchequer, but also contribute a considerable sum annually towards military defences and protection. Both of these places are also entrepôts of a large trade.
Every colony of the British empire pays for its own civil govern- ment, except small sums which are voted annually in part aid for the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Falkland Islands, St. Helena, and Heligoland, but all these places are intrinsically valuable. The Bahamas, for the geographical position of their harbours; Bermuda, as a strong fortress and dock-yard in the Western Atlantic; the Falkland Islands, for their important position and fisheries in the great Southern Ocean near Cape Horn; St. Helena, as a strong fortress and recruiting station for our numerous ships doubling the Cape of Good Hope in their voyages to and from India, China, and Australasia (and in the event of war, the possession of St. Helena would be of great value to our merchants, and save us a large fleet in the Atlantic); Heligoland during the late European war was a large commercial depôt for the Elbe and the northern parts of Europe. Its expense is only about 500l. a-year.
Numerous as are the colonies of the British empire, they are each of some utility to England: for their territorial extent as emigration fields to provide employment for a surplus population; for their production of sugar, coffee, corn, cotton, silk, indigo, timber, oil, wool, &c.; as mari- time positions or military posts; as trading emporiums or fishing-stations. I have in vain sought for one valuable quality in Hong Kong. There are other good harbours around, and for 200 years we have not found the want of such. Government spending one shilling on Hong Kong.*
I can see no justification for the British
*This was previously stated in detail, accompanied by statements to Governor Davis, and in the following letter to the Lords of the Treasury:
"Hong Kong, June 19, 1844.
"I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, copies of the correspondence which I have addressed to the Governor of Hong Kong, on the financial condition of this colony.
"In my letter of the 17th June, I have expressed to his Excellency my respect- ful opinion that no further avoidable expense should be incurred here, without fur- ther and most mature consideration. a most useless expenditure of the resources of the British exchequer. I would Every shilling of public money spent here is most respectfully, but most earnestly, implore their lordships to pause before they sanction any outlay for fortifications, roads, &e,
Hong Kong is not only valueless on political, commercial, or financial grounds, but it is positively injurious to our interests in China, by keeping up a constant state of excitement, with a large military and naval establishment, within cannon shot of the mainland.
"In the event of an European war, Hong Kong must fall before any strong in- vading force, unless one million sterling be spent in fortifying the island, and half a million sterling be annually devoted to maintaining a garrison and protec- tive force. But if Hong Kong be left as a free port, open to all nations, with a superintendent and a couple of clerks, the traders established here will provide, out of their own resources, for the police of the settlement, and the protection of life and property.
C
Instead, therefore, of spending from 50,000l. to 70,0001. a-year, for mere civil government, there need not be an expenditure of 5000% a-year; and in the event of
HONG KONG.
27 477
Religious and Social Influence. The benefits derivable from our laws, institutions, and religion, can never be conferred on the Chinese by the colonization of Hong Kong.
We are here, in fact, almost as much isolated from China, its people, and supreme Government, as if we were located in the Eastern Archi- pelago. By the adroit policy adopted by the Chinese authorities, a "cordon sanitaire," if I may so express it, has been drawn around Hong Kong; no Chinaman is permitted to come here willingly, except he be a thief, a pirate, or a spy; no respectable Chinese with their families locate themselves in Hong Kong if they did, their relations still remaining on the mainland, would probably be squeezed, imprisoned, tortured, and considered as traitors to the Celestial Empire. Hong Kong is viewed by the Chinese as a spot where adventurers and reck- less characters may make something out of the English; and where burglars and robbers may resort with impunity, and live upon the profits of their villany,
I am strongly of opinion, from circumstances that have come to my knowledge, that the Mandarins view with indulgence all vagabonds who propose to quit their own country and proceed to Hong Kong; that, in fact, direct encouragement is afforded them to do so. It is therefore the height of improbability to suppose that the possession of Hong Kong will ever enable us to disseminate our religion, language, and institutions in the Chinese empire. For two hundred years we have had extensive and profitable intercourse with Canton, without our missionaries and other good men ever producing the slightest effect on the people or government. The inhabitants of the southern districts are decidedly hostile to us, and are daily becoming more and more filled with a deadly animosity, which the possession of Hong Kong will not remove.
No converts are made by our missionaries on this island; but were such the case, no convert from Hong Kong would be favourably received by the respectable Chinese on the mainland. The Christian converts would be considered as coming from an island of thieves and pirates; they would be received with a suspicion which would check rather than advance the progress of Christianity. The missionaries with whom I have conversed, take this view of the subject.
They consider it hopeless to attempt the spread of Christian doctrines in China by means of converts from Hong Kong. Thus, in a religious aspect, Hong Kong is as valueless as it is on financial and on commer- cial grounds.
war, no nation would gain honor or profit by capturing a barren rock, which protects nothing, and which is not likely ever to have much property to defend ashore or afloat. These opinions will, I am sure, be corroborated by the able high officers of the line, artillery, engineers, and commissariat. As a mere port of shelter, the island may retain the British flag, hoisted under a superintendent; but there is not the slightest advantage gained by maintaining a single soldier on the island. Even as matters now stand, I consider my department perfectly unnecessary; the whole of “the colonial and consular payments may be passed through the commissariat, and
my own salary and that of the clerks, &c., may be saved.
I should be unworthy the confidence reposed in me by Her Majesty's Govern- ment, did I not unreservedly communicate to their lordships the strong conviction of my mind, after long and anxious thought, aided by an extensive experience in other British colonies.
I have, &c.,
R. M. MARTIN,”