No. 9. Viscount Palmerston to Sir Henry Pottinger, 5 June 1841.
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CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO
Upon all such matters of detail, however, Her Majesty's Government would wish to leave full discretion to Sir William Parker, acting in conformity with the views and wishes of the Governor-general of India; and Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that Sir William Parker and the officer in command of the land force will see the necessity of not placing any British detachment in such a position on the mainland of China, that it might be liable to meet with any disaster, and to have its communication with the ships cut off.
(No. 18.)
I have, &c. (signed) Palmerston.
EXTRACT of a DESPATCH from Viscount Palmerston to Sir Henry Pottinger, Bart., dated Foreign Office, 5 June 1841.
SINCE the date of my instructions Nos. 16 and 17, despatches to the 28th of March have been received from Macao, and accounts from Calcutta of the 21st of April, which render necessary an alteration in the instructions above mentioned.
When those instructions were written, Her Majesty's Government were led by the accounts which they had received from China, to imagine that a provisional arrangement had been concluded between Captain Elliot and Ke-Shen; that in virtue of that arrangement Chusan had been evacuated by the British forces; and that a considerable part of those forces, naval and military, might possibly have been sent away from the China station,
Instructions indeed were sent out by the last monthly overland mail for the re-occupation of Chusan; but it was doubtful whether those instructions would have been carried into execution at the time when you will arrive in China, or whether you would find their execution still suspended in consequence of the necessity of waiting for the return of troops and ships from India.
Under those impressions you were instructed to communicate personally with Lord Auckland in your way to China, if your going round by Calcutta for the purpose of doing so would not so much delay your arrival in China as to prevent you from reaching Hong-Kong till the season was too far advanced for you to go up to Chusan or to the Peiho River for the purpose of negotiating.
But the accounts which have now been received from China show that affairs in that quarter were taking an entirely different course from that which the preceding accounts had led Her Majesty's Government to expect. The arrangement agreed upon by Captain Elliot and Ke-Shen had been disavowed and rejected by the Emperor of China; and Ke-Shen had been disgraced for having consented to it. Hostilities had been re-commenced between the British and Chinese forces; all the forts on the Canton River had been taken by the British; Chusan and British ships of war were lying opposite the factories at Canton, had indeed been evacuated, but no part of the naval or military force had been sent away from the China station; and, on the contrary, the Governor-General was going to send thither reinforcements both of troops and of ships, to enable the British commanders to execute those further operations which they intended to carry on against Amoy and in the Yang-tse-Kiang.
Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government think, on the one hand, that it is of still greater importance than before, that you and Sir William Parker should have full communication with Lord Auckland before you proceed to China; while, on the other hand, it matters less whether you arrive in China three weeks earlier or three weeks later.
According to the view of things upon which your former instructions were prepared, hostile operations against the Chinese were not to commence, unless and until your negotiations should have failed; and as hostile operations to the northward could not well be carried on after October, it was desirable that you should reach China as soon as possible, in order that there might still be time to strike a blow, if your negotiation should fail. But it now appears that hostilities began in February, and that the British commanders had the whole southerly monsoon before them for the prosecution of their operations, and therefore the commencement and progress of those operations will in no degree depend upon the time of your arrival.
Nor would the time of your arrival be important for the purpose of preventing the conclusion of any arrangement by other persons, on conditions inconsistent with your instructions, because the despatches which were sent out by the last overland mail will have precluded the possibility of such an event. I have therefore to desire that you will in the first place go to Calcutta, in order to communicate fully with Lord Auckland upon all matters connected with your mission, unless upon your arrival in Bombay you should receive any information, either from Lord Auckland or from China, which should lead you to think that, according to the spirit of these instructions, it is unnecessary for you to do so.
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- No. 10.-
EXTRACT of a DESPATCH from the Right honourable the Earl of Auckland to Sir John Hobhouse, dated Fort William, 11 August 1841.--(Received 8 October 1841.)
No. 10.
I HAVE for your information, and for that of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to acknowledge the communication which has been made to me, under date June 5th last, of the desire of Her Majesty's Government that I should take upon myself the general direction of the military and naval operations which may become necessary in China, and I willingly, for the time which I may have to remain in India, accept this honourable responsibility, and am prepared, to the best of my power, to act upon it. Yet I would beg Her Majesty's Government to bear in mind, that, even at this comparatively short distance from the scene of action, I can exercise but a partial influence upon passing events, that from four to six months must generally elapse before an answer to a reference made to Calcutta can be received at Hong-Kong, and that I can do little more than lay down general views, and endeavour to supply and anticipate the wants of the forces.
It will be in the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government, that in my letters addressed to Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries on the coast of China of the 10th of May and the 20th of June, I have already recorded these views. Sir Henry Pottinger, Sir William Parker and Sir Hugh Gough, are in possession of them, and I do not foresee that it will be necessary for me to issue further instructions until I shall have heard of the arrival of Sir Henry Pottinger and Sir William Parker at Hong-Kong, and shall have had a report from them upon the state of affairs, and upon their sentiments, and those of Sir Hugh Gough in regard to it.
5. Upon the instructions given by Lord Palmerston to Sir Henry Pottinger, I would remark
6. Upon this and upon other points connected with the precise ends to which our operations are to be directed, it is necessary that I should obtain a definite expression of the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government, after having before them the opinions which I have been led to form, subject of course to the modifications which may, on his nearer means of observation, be recommended by the deliberate judgment of Sir Henry Pottinger. A knowledge of the ends, the attainment of which is to be regarded as indispensable, is obviously required in order that I may acquit myself of the responsibility imposed upon me, by making some accurate estimate of the force which may be reasonably considered as sufficient for the accomplishment of the results expected from it.
8. I will assume, however, that we may be able, by forcible means, to procure a satisfaction of our pecuniary claims which will be admitted as sufficient. And the question then follows, whether that satisfaction having been made, insular positions both on the lower and upper coasts being held in safety by our own troops, and trade being free from violence or interruption on the part of the local authorities at Canton, the war is to be actively prosecuted for the remaining objects of securing privileges of residence and trade at different points on the mainland, and a declared confirmation of all our possessions and rights by a treaty, duly signed by the Emperor of China.
9. It is in obtaining such direct and formal concessions, involving an open abandonment of the long-established policy of the Empire, that the greatest difficulty must be expected. I do not think that we can look for these concessions merely from the effect of such attacks upon towns, accessible from the coast, as can be executed by the force now employed on the expedition. Before extorting so signal a proof of unequivocal submission, we must, I apprehend, be prepared to disembark
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