No. 7. Viscount Palmerston to Sir Henry Pottinger,
2 June 1841.
CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO
and military force as may be considered by the Governor-general of India sufficient for the service which it may be called upon to perform; but it is desirable that you should proceed to China as soon as you can, if you find, on reaching Calcutta, that such a force is already gone thither; and you should accompany that force, if it shall be despatched to China after you reach Calcutta.
The first operation which the naval and military force will have to perform, if that operation is not accomplished before your arrival in China, will be the re-occupation of the island of Chusan; and that should precede any negotiation on your part. As soon as Chusan is occupied, you should establish yourself there, either on shore or on board ship, as you may find most convenient; and you should send from thence a communication to be forwarded to the Government at Pekin, announcing your arrival, and stating that you are ready to treat with any Plenipotentiary duly commissioned and furnished with full powers by the Emperor of China for that purpose.
It is for many reasons inexpedient that you should negotiate in the neighbourhood of Canton. The distance of that point from Pekin would furnish fair excuses for delays, which would be highly inconvenient; and the Chinese negotiator would, in the neighbourhood of Canton, be exposed to many influences unfavourable to such a settlement as Her Majesty's Government require.
But you might negotiate either in the neighbourhood of Chusan, or at the mouth of the Peiho River; and you will use your discretion in fixing upon the one or the other of these points, according to circumstances. It appears to Her Majesty's Government, that if the state of the season, and other considerations, should leave you at liberty to choose between those two points, there would be some advantage in negotiating at the mouth of the Peiho, because of the nearness of that point to Pekin, and because, on account of that nearness, the negotiation might more easily be brought to an early conclusion, one way or the other. If you should negotiate there, it is desirable that the Admiral should accompany you thither, and that he should take with him, if the season admits of it, such a force as might give a respectable character to the mission; but this is less important now than it would have been before the Chinese had felt the force of the British arms. On the other hand, if you should negotiate in the neighbourhood of Chusan, the Chinese Plenipotentiary would have before his eyes greater and more manifest evidences of the power of Great Britain; but then the distance between that point and Pekin might justify and even render necessary delays which it is desirable to avoid.
But whatever arrangements you may succeed in making with the Chinese Plenipotentiary, those arrangements must be embodied in a Treaty, to be signed by yourself and by the Chinese Plenipotentiary, in the name of your respective Sovereigns; and to be afterwards ratified by each Sovereign; and you should obtain a formal announcement of the ratification of the Treaty by the Emperor of China, before you can consider the Treaty as valid, and before you send it home for the ratification of Her Majesty. The Chinese ratification will of course not be actually placed in your hands till Her Majesty's ratification shall have reached you for the purpose of its being exchanged with that of the Emperor. But the payments ought to begin, and the other arrangements should take effect, as soon as the Emperor shall have ratified the Treaty.
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(No. 17.)
-No. 7.-
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Copy of a DESPATCH from Viscount Palmerston to Sir Henry Pottinger, Bart.
Sir,
Foreign Office, 2 June 1841.
SINCE my instructions of the 31st ultimo were written, information has reached this country, that towards the end of February hostilities had recommenced between the British forces in China and the Chinese Authorities, and that the forts in the Canton river had been forced and taken possession of by the British forces, and that British troops had occupied the British factory at Canton.
Her Majesty's Government have not yet received the official accounts of these transactions, but may probably do so before the messenger departs from hence on the 4th to convey the overland mails to Marseilles. If those despatches should arrive before that day, and should lead to any change in the instructions
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CHINA.
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already given to you, I shall not fail to write to you again; but in the meanwhile, and as at present informed, I have to state to you that the only alteration which this intelligence seems to render necessary in my former instruction, is that you should be left at liberty to enter into negotiation at Canton, if, on your arrival there, you should find in that place any Plenipotentiary sent thither by the Emperor of China, for the purpose of negotiating with the Plenipotentiary of Her Majesty.
You will, however, even in that case, exercise your discretion as to removing the seat of negotiation to some more northerly point, if you should think it expedient to do so.
--No. 8.-
I am, &c. (signed)
Palmerston.
Copy of a LETTER from Viscount Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
Foreign Office, 2 June 1841.
My Lords, I TRANSMIT to you, for communication to Rear-Admiral Sir William Parker,
No. 8. who is about to proceed to India to take the naval command on that station, a copy of the instructions (Nos. 16 and 17) which I have addressed to Sir Henry Pottinger, who is going out as Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary to settle the differences between this country and China; and I have to signify to your Lordships
the Queen's pleasure that instructions should be given to Sir William Parker in conformity with what is contained in that part of the instruction to Sir Henry Pottinger which relates to the naval and military force.
It is the wish of Her Majesty's Government that the general direction and superintendence of the military and naval operations which may become necessary in China should be placed in the hands of Lord Auckland, Governor-general of India; it being convenient that this should be, on account of the greater nearness of India to China, and also because the land force employed and to be employed in China consists chiefly of troops sent from the East Indian Establishment. I have therefore to signify to your Lordships Her Majesty's commands, that instructions to this effect should be given to Sir William Parker, and that he should be directed to follow, in regard to the operations to be carried on in China, such directions as he may receive on that subject from the Governor-general.
I have only to add, that it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government that the operations which it may become necessary to carry on in China should be directed as much as possible against the Chinese Government and its Authorities, and as little as possible against the Chinese people. That consequently, attacks upon forts, and the occupation of military and commanding positions, and the capture or destruction of war junks, should be the kind of operations to be preferred; and that in no case should towns be burnt or destroyed; that if it should become necessary to prevent commercial or other communication between different Chinese ports, that measure should, in the first instance at least, be enforced by sending private junks back, and by preventing them from coming out; and that seizure and detention of private junks should only be resorted to if it should ultimately be found necessary. Her Majesty's Government, however, do not include in the class of private junks those which may belong to the farmers of the public revenue.
It is probable that Sir William Parker would be able to send a force up the Yang-tse-Kiang, and to occupy an island in that river, near the place where the Grand Canal intersects the river; and he might, in such case, either content himself with stopping all communication between the northern and southern provinces by means of the canal; or he might, by blowing up the locks and sluices by means of which the canal communicates with the river, render the canal for some time useless for purposes of communication. As long as he might be able to maintain his position in the river, and thus to stop the traffic on the canal, it might perhaps be unnecessary for him to destroy the locks; or he might possibly attain the same purpose by letting the water of the canal out into the river.
It is also supposed that an island near Amoy might be occupied, which would give to the British forces the command of all communication between that town and the mainland, or between that town and the sea.
596.
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Upon