No. 2. Earl of Auckland
to Sir John Hobhouse, 10 May 1841.
Encl. 1, in No. 2.
CORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO
3. That movement upon Amoy should be deferred till the general operations to the northward could be undertaken.
4. That the Commodore should proceed with all despatch to Calcutta in the steamer; and that the "Jupiter" should be sent with the like speed to Cananore, there to await further orders.
Charles Elliot.
(No. 12.)
(signed)
-No. 2.-
H. Gough, Major-General.
J.J. Gordon Bremer, Commodore.
Copy of a DESPATCH from the Right honourable the Earl of Auckland to Sir John Hobhouse.-(Received 2 July 1841.)
Fort William, 10 May 1841.
Sir,
I HAVE the honour to forward and to request that you will submit to Her Majesty's Government the accompanying copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries on the coast of China, with reference to the intelligence of the state of affairs to the end of March last, received by the Company's steam-vessel "Queen.” I append also copies of letters addressed by me to the Naval Commander-in-Chief and to Major-general Sir Hugh Gough, acknowledging their reports of the operations which terminated in the advance upon Canton, and the placing of that city at the mercy of Her Majesty's forces.
I trust that the observations which I have offered to the plenipotentiaries on the course of the proceedings of the expedition during the present year will be in accordance with the views of Her Majesty's Government.
In a despatch addressed to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, a full detail has been given of the measures adopted by the Government of
India for complying with the requisitions of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, and of Sir Hugh Gough, for reinforcements of every description.
It has been my object, in addressing the Plenipotentiaries, to urge them to direct the employment of the expedition with the utmost possible promptitude and vigour, and I heartily hope that the measures to be adopted will be successful in their execution and satisfactory in their results; but I may in this place add, that from the lateness of the season, the limited means at disposal for land operations, from the difficulty of navigation in the dangerous seas of China, and from the stubborn temper of the Chinese Court, this hope may be partially disappointed; and it will be for the authorities in England eventually to determine in what manner and upon what scale a third campaign, should a third campaign become necessary, is to be conducted.
The Government of India may be able to send some reinforcements of native troops to China, but we should not be justified in further weakening the European force now in this country. One early measure of reinforcement from England appears to be obviously expedient, namely, the sending directly to Hong Kong (touching, of course, for orders, at Singapore) the recruits necessary to fill up their complement, the 18th, the 26th and 55th regiments; I have not named the 49th, as possibly the General Commanding in Chief may have designated that corps, in consequence of their long service in India, for early return to England; and this remark might, perhaps, also be applied to the 55th, which left England in the same year as the 49th; but it is a most valuable and efficient corps, and it might, perhaps, be retained for a service so entirely under the orders of Her Majesty's Government as that of the China expedition.
Upon the condition and wants of the naval force, his Excellency the Naval Commander-in-Chief will, no doubt, have addressed the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
I have, &c.
(signed) Auckland.
Enclosure 1, in No. 2.
EXTRACT of a LETTER from the Earl of Auckland to the Plenipotentiaries on the Coast of China.
Gentlemen,
Fort William, 10 May 1841.
I HAVE had the honour to receive the despatches from Captain Elliot, of March 24th and 28th, and have hastened, in concert with his Excellency the naval Commander-in-Chief, to expedite
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CHINA.
the reinforcement required, with a view to the renewal of active operations against the Chinese government.
7. The operations of this season will be conducted under considerable disadvantages. The expedition to the northward can scarcely be collected and move from the Canton Waters till from the 10th to the 15th July. Not more than six weeks will remain for any movements in the Gulf of Petchelee and in the immediate vicinity of the capital; and it is to be apprehended that after the end of September the fleet could not, with safety or advantage be retained at the mouths of the Yellow or Yang-tze-kiang rivers. Under these circumstances you will, doubtless, decide upon pressing the employment both of naval and military means with the greatest possible force and activity. Secrecy, promptitude and energy may, even in the short time which will be at command, do much towards displaying the exposed and defenceless condition of important points of the Chinese empire, and carrying a lively alarm to the court itself.
8. At Canton, the season of trade will have passed before the reinforcements arrive, and I am not aware that there would be benefit in re-establishing a blockade of the river for the present, while many irritating questions might be avoided by the continued suspension of such blockade. The possession of the Island of Wangtong, and the presence of the naval force which will be left, under all circumstances, at and near Hong-Kong, will always furnish the means of reimposing the blockade, if the conduct of the provincial authorities at Canton should appear to require that measure. But, as it seems to me, the general good-will of the population, and the free resort of commerce to Hong-Kong, may best be ensured by abstaining, while no paramount necessity may call for a renewed use of force in that quarter, from a course of annoyance and restriction in the Canton River, or on the coast of that province.
9. It may be calculated that the military force assembled at Hong-Kong, early in July, will amount to from 3,600 to 4,000 men, in addition to the marines of the fleet. If, of this force, 1,500 men, with the sick, be left on the island, and for the occupation of Wangtong, the protection of these ports will probably be amply provided for. These are points for the determination of Major-General Sir Hugh Gough, but I may be permitted generally to refer to them in estimating the force which may be available for service in operations along the coast.
10. It may be gathered, then, that a column of nearly 3,000 men, including the marines and disciplined seamen from the ships, can be landed for occasional employment at points of disembarkation; and I should hope that such a column would give a commanding preponderance at those points, against any opposition that may be offered, for the purposes for which their temporary occupation would be of value to us.
11. It has been shown, I think, that little would be gained by any attempt to blockade the great rivers of the empire. Such attempts would dissipate our force, and would apparently be ineffectual, and, at some seasons of the year, exceedingly hazardous.
12. What we have to do in movements along the coasts, is to excite throughout the maritime districts, and yet more at the capital, a keen dread of our power, and, if possible, to seize property sufficient to satisfy our heavy and growing pecuniary claims.
13. For both of these objects the assault of Amoy, of any accessible towns on or near the great rivers of the central provinces, and of the port of Tientsin near the capital, would appear to be the course the most to be recommended. One blow of this kind, rapidly succeeding another, may have much effect in bringing the court to a temper which shall admit of a suitable accommodation. With these measures might possibly be conjoined the holding and shutting up the point of intersection of the great canal with the Yang-tze-kiang river, so long as a naval force can be kept at that point.
14. The towns thus assaulted must be held for the time in the most effective possession practicable; and all such valuable property as might become prize by the usages of war, and is capable of being carried off with facility, should be secured. All Government property, which may not admit of being removed, should probably be, as far as possible, destroyed. The levying a money contribution on a town, instead of seizing property, will be subject for consideration with the officer commanding, if he finds such a measure within his power.
20. If the season will not admit of operations before the setting in of the northerly monsoon at Amoy, in the central rivers, and in the Peiho, it will be a subject of grave deliberation with you in which of the two last named quarters the force should immediately act. There are obviously very powerful motives for making our strength felt as soon as possible in the Peiho; but the question can alone be decided upon your approach to the scene of operations, and there may be reasons which would render the contrary resolution the proper one: still I would say that the movement to the Peiho ought not to be postponed, excepting in consideration of manifest and pressing urgency.
23. Even during the brief period of the active operations of this season on the coast, inconvenience may be experienced from the want of an island, or other post, to which the fleet may repair for shelter, for water, for the establishment of depots, the protection of prize property, and other objects: and as I have before recommended, so I would now again urge, that the Pescadores islands should be visited, their value for our purposes ascertained, and the Chinese garrison expelled. But your most careful inquiry will also be given at every point on the upper coasts, in order to discover whether there be any other island which would better suit our object in seeking a place of settlement and trade than Chusan itself; and if you should not find such an island, then I should suggest that you should, after leaving the Peiho, or otherwise closing the operations of the year, land a sufficient body of troops, say 1,200 or 1,500 men, to retake the city of Tinghaee, and to occupy a position in the neighbourhood, 596.
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