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H.M.S. “DREADNOUGHT.”
(Daly Press, 7th April) Any criticism of naval matters by such a well-known authority as Sir CYPRIAN Barbor has to be received with respect; and we note in a long letter to the Times that the late Commander of the China Squadron does not altogether favour the most notable recent addition to the British flect. The newspaper writers, experts as well as empirics, joined in a chorus of admiration over the biggest and most formidable fighting machine in the world, As the Dreadnought was described. We con- fess that we share some of that admiration for what we regard as a brilliant achieve ment of naval engineering. The late Mr. GLADSTONE'S Barcastic remark that fashion in battleships changes like fusbion in bonnets was witty enough, and ap. er ugh, but it would have applied with equal justice to wearons and many other things which hav. had to be changed as the science of warfare advanced. We may enjoy the humour, but we should not take too seriou the implications, of such clever sayings. It will be remembered that the Dreadnought's long range and great need in conjunction were the features specially emphasised. A ten thousand yards, the secondary aring mat of all existing battle- ships would be innocuous, and her speed is to erable the Dreadnought to choose the range at which she can inflict damage with out suffering any herself. Admiral BRIDGE sets up a premise that is hardly a premise. He Buys,
"Now, battles are won with weapons. Speed is not a weapon. It is a factor of strategy and tatics in the guise of mobility, and is no more a weapon than coal endurance, which is also a
factor of strategy. Failure to understand the essential distinction between speed and arma- ment has been at the bottom of many mistakes in naval design, and is the parent of most of the enormous costliness of modern navies.”
Given two men armed with hatchets of identical pattern, and one of the men able to run faster than the other, there can be no question that while his speed is not a weapon it is a complement thereto that cannot be ignored. Sir CYPRIAN BRIDGE's point, however, is made on the fact that six of the Dreadnought's ten twelve-inch guns can be fired right ahead, are what the boys' romances call "bow chasers.” And on this he argues,
"A ship having to fire her guns right ahead sither te stationary-a condition which need not be considered; or be approaching the object
must do so under one of three conditions. She must
fired at, that is to say, diminishing the distance, and thus resigning the very advantage supposed to be conferred by her speed-viz., power of keeping a particular range; or, lastly, be chasing, in which case the enemy would have been already defeated, or so fearful of being defeated that he would be running away. In these cases the Dreadnought's speed would be of little or no use to her. The cost of giving it to her would have been thrown away.
It is surprising to find a naval strategist putting a case so loosely. It will be seen on analysing the foregoing quotation that Sir CYPRIAN BRIDGE grants the Dreadnought only two courses; to fight in a stationary position, or to be approaching the enemy. As the Dreadnought's superior speed to opponents of her own class is assumed, it will be seen that chasing and approaching mean the same thing. Surely when she is getting the range desired, she can slow up or top, in order to maintain the range she favours Then the critic takes no account of the other method of utilising her speed, a method of which we beard much during the recent war. Always assuming that the enemy is a leas speedy vessel, which
present we care-ntitled to do, the
THE HONGKONG WEEKLY PRESS AND
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[April 16, 1906.
pursuit could be continued simultaneously it is one which is not likely to be Rocep with the obtaining of the desired range, byted without some misgiving by foreigal manoeuvring along a parallel course, ToGo-nations in face of old traditions as to their wise. We may have misunderstood the influence and prestige, which it is natural postulate, but there can be no mistake as to they should be disposed to forego with re- the ADMIRAL's remark that in the case of a luctance, and which they can scarcelý evon fleeing enemy, the Dreadnought's speed now be brought to believe has become second would be of little or no use. The to that of an Asiatic nation. But such'"'is' Russian ships at Tsushima were running the state of affairs with which we are faced, away, as we know, and the speed of the and it is idle to ignore it. Japan, from her Japanese, an fur from being useless, might proximity to China, from her intimate usefully have been greater, on that glorious knowledge of Chinese ways and modes of occasion. But the ADMIRAL does not put thought, from her influence in China through the slightest faith in long range fighting, having in part adopted Chinese civilization, and we have no doubt it could be carried to must, now that she has established her extremes that would make naval battles as naval and military preparedness, be ridiculous as the French duel. Then again greater factor at Peking than any foreignTM he has been irritated by reading such state- nation can hope to be at the present time, ments as "ten Dreadnoughts equal twenty or indeed than any combination of foreign Agamemnons,' a style of paper strategy nations that is ever likely to be brought which at one time augured ill for Japa ese about. The fact that Japan can if necessary success, and which a to k occasion at the land troops in large numbers in China within time to di-count. S CYPRIAN BRIDGE a short time stares the Chiness in the face, thinks too much is made of "inert material," and this is a circumstance which will always and deplores its intolerable costliness," | have much more influence upon the Celestial while he wants the British naval officer s0 mind than any conceivable amount of moral to study" the problems of war that a know-force or general considerations. If, there- ledge of them will permeate his whole fore, any large political question arise, w• being." But be will not have it that this may be sure that the Chinese will be more dabbling with material" is a war problem. influenced by the view which Japan will Truth does not always lie between two take than by any other consideration; and
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extremes, but in this case it seems to do so.
If the Dreadnought has been too extrava- gantly welcomed, it has also been too severely belittled this time.
JAPAN AND CHINA.
(Daily Press, 9th April.) The change in the political situation in the Far East consequent upon the recent war has not unnaturally caused some apprehen- sion among those who view with disfavour the alteration between the proportion of European as compared with Asiatic influence in any questions which may in future arise. The fear is expressed that difficulty may ensue from too much power being now rested in the latter direction. The ghost of the old "Yellow Peril" scare has not in fact been entirely laid. There is a feeling that it will be unsafe for foreign nations, if foreign influence is not to continue the dominant force in the Far East, and with the uprise of Japan, this can hardly be expected to be the case. Such a state of the "balance of power" it is surmised may lead to unreasonable demands on the part of China, and there is no gainsaying that there have been some signs that the less informed among the Chinese have been disposed to look upon the changed condition of affairs as possibly affording an opening for returning to the time-honoured policy of withstanding foreign progress, With the old-fashioned China, even the past events would seem simply to indicate that there was still hope that China could re-assert her superiority, and might yet withstand the advances of moderu civilization. The idea that the Chinese would get Japan to side with them in such a movement as against the outer barbarians would be in accordance with the belief of many, and no doubt in some directions utterance has been given to such views; and we cannot hold that those foreign statesmen who have taken had some justification for the fears which this contingency into consideration have not
they expressed.
to
It is not to be denied that the result of the recent war has been to make Japan the dominant power in respect most important questions in these parts and especially in regard to questions which may arise between China and foreign nations. The fact is undeniable, though
it is thus manifest that the future must
depend very largely upon the attitude which Japau may be disposed to adopt. It is not inconceivable that upon certain points she might be inclined to side with the Chinese, and it is here that the apprehensions of those who fear the " Yellow Peril
are to a
J#
certain extent justified. If we look far ahead there is room for some such appre- bension, as a common understanding between two Asiatic nations is prima facie a likely thing to arise. But it is not being too con- fident, to assume that, though such a com- bination may be possible in the distant future, it is not likely to take place for many years to come. Japan is pledged to an advanced policy and has adopted that line of action, not under coercion but after a full and careful consideration of her national and commercial interests. She is not likely to depart from the line she has thus chosen, and in this respect Japan may be looked upon as certain to be at one with foreign nationa in regard to any questions with regard to China that may arise. The attitude which she adopted with regard to the recent threats against foreigners is fairly indicative of her policy generally considered. In any serious questions she would range herself on the side of progress and civilization. She did not hesitate to warn China of her respon- sibility as to preventing outrages against Europeans, and this may be taken to indicate that she is willing to befriend China and to assist her to advance, but by no means disposed to aid her in any re actionary policy.
This state of affairs may be fairly relied·· upon for at least some years to come, and so long as this is the case, there need be no fear of any dangerous combinations between Japan and China. Policy has to be directed by actual facts and not by the considers. tion of distant contingencies; and the facts at present existing certainly point to the most likely to induce a better state of things influence of Japan being that which is in China. If Japan cannot bring Chin to reason in this respect we may be quita sure that no other nation can do so; and, though some might prefer to see China regenerated by means of direct European influence, it will be better that this should be effected through the medium of Japan than not effected at all.