A
192
THE HONGKONG WEEKLY PRESS AND
C+
[ March 19, 1908. terranean, did not go off to consult Germany on each occasion been withdrawn, and no | Government, appealed to by the Chinese for was that the idea of at all interfering with claim to any permanent occupation raised. advice whether the concession of Por Germany never entered the imagination of It is unlikely that in the face of history Arthur to Russia should be refused, de either. When thoge little grievances England should now claim to inaugurate a clined to promise support in case suel had on one occasion become a little different policy: far more likely is it that refusal should be followed by a Russian more irritating than usual Germany she has for ever abandoned any policy of attack, and that China " feeling hersel had very wisely said in as many words interference which would lead her to send deserted by England, powerless to resist. the affair was none of hers, and an armed force amongst her continental | Russia without help, consented to all certainly nothing that had since turned neighbours. Such an event could, indeed, Russian demands." The writer adds that: up appeared to alter Germany's interest in only take place in the case of a gross breach as a consequence the impression received by: the affair. We say appeared deliberately, of existing treaties on the part of one of the China was that foreigners were one and alli because of course Germany may have viewed other Powers. France too has seen the bent on obtaining for themselves as much the affair from another standpoint, and inadvisability of seeking in the political Chinese territory as possible, and he blames things which in England's and France's slang of the day to rectify her boundaries." | England for not having made an alliance perspective may have seemed so insignificant The lesson taught to each by the events of with Japan for the purpose of securing to as not to strike the retina, seen from the the last century has been that it is far better, that country the position she had gained in different point of view of Germany may and far safer, to bear with the irregularities the war with China, and of helping China to have loomed large and important. Some of the present than seek to rectify them by defend herself against Russia. This course, thing of the sort may of course have been violence, which, however successful, would he argues, might have spared the Far possibly the case, though Germany has not result in far more serious loss. Any serious Eastern world many of its subsequent on her side made any attempt to explain; breach, in fact, between Germany on the trials." perhaps considering that what was evident one hand and France and England on the to her could not but be equally plain to her other would dislocate the entire European neighbours. On the other hand what from system, both political and commercial, so a French or English point of view may completely that the vacuum would have to be seem an inconsistency in the utterances of filled from outside. Now Germany knows Germany with regard to Morocco in 1880 this as well as France; but from the remains and again in 1905, may very possibly from of an old suspiciousness which she has felt a German standpoint seem but the carrying some difficulty in freeing herself from she out of an identical and perfectly consistent has not been able to appreciate it so line of policy. It is, for instance, quite completely. Unfortunately sentimental natural that Germany should view with entire grievances are frequently more difficult to complacence a divergence of opinion between remove than substantial wrongs, and this it the two western states as to the two en- seeins has been the great bar to an under- trances, from east and west, of the Mediter-standing. On the other hand, the position ranean; while at the same time she might not feel so happy at finding both in entire agreement. Germany has ambitions of her own, none the less real that she does not parade them from the house-tops. She is not quite content that she has all the coast line that she would desire: Holland and Belgium, for instance, block her approach to the southern part of the North Sea, and she would feel it a grievance, if nothing more, were France and England to combine to appropriate what she considers her rever- sionary rights. The idea is perfectly natural, and we have no reason to cavil at it. But she has, or a party within her dominious fancies she should have, certain aims with regard to a German port on the Adriatic. True she does not parade her aims, and scarcely airs them within her inuer consciousness; still she likes to keep them snugly there, and as long as France and England had any serious differences as to their Mediterranean policy she might continue to uurse the idea as a possible if remote contingency, Too good an under- standing between the two might possibly remove such a contingency from the domain of imaginable politics. Fostering then within herself such dangerous, though un- expressed even to herself, ambitions, we can understand why Germany should have ber suspicions, even though no foundation for them exist, aroused by what she would fain believe to be a well-laid plot to curtail ber freedom in the Mediterranean. The present political divisions of Europe in the eyes of the philosophic statesmen may not be ideally perfect, but they are the outcome of forces working for more than a millen- nium, and in consequence may be looked upon as fairly stable. This doctrine has been accep d in its entirety by, at least, France and England, both of whom are well content from previous experience of the danger of meddling to allow Europe to rest as she is. Within the last three centuries English soldiers have on more than one occasion been found fighting the battles of the Continent, but in every case it was to preserve the balance of power threatened by one or other continental states; and when that was arranged the English troops have
has been one where, without compromising themselves, friendly Powers have been able to offer suggestions, and this has apparently been the case at Algeciras. Once assured that the understanding between France and England really covered no cunning attempt to lower German prestige, or interfere in any way with German interests, there should be little difficulty in coming to an under- standing mutually satisfactory. It has been difficult for France to make this fully understood, but there is no reason why a friendly Power looking on the affair from a different horizon should not be able to convince each of the reasonableness of the other's doubts. In any case, in view of the melancholy failure in nearly every instance of the principle of "international" control, on which Germany founds her objections to the French proposals, it is evident that France had fairly reasonable grounds for objecting to the suggested measure where her own interests are so immediately con- cerned ; and it is apparently only Germany's failure to appreciate this one point that bas stood in the way of a complete under- standing.
CHINA AND THE POWERS,
(Daily Press, 15th March.) Following the view which has been put forward by the Times on the authority of its correspondent in China, we find that the Morning Post has called prominent attention to the state of feeling existing in China and has raised a warning_voice as to the pos- sibility of danger. Reviewing the policy of the British Government in the past, the writer says that "from 1825 to 1895 British policy in the main consisted in the effort to secure for British traders in the Chinese Empire such conditions of security for person and property as would render pos. sible the continuance of a trade the existence of which was its own justification; but that "the Chinese Government never seems to have kept its engagements except under pressure of the same force, either actual or potentially visible, by which they had been imposed." He goes on to observe that in 1895 a new period opened, when the British
This argument is likely to be accepted somewhat too hastily now, when the relative position of Russia and of Japan is totally different from what it was at the time in question. No one in 1895 would imagine that Japan could by any possibility hold her own against such a Power as Russia then was; and indeed everything pointed to an opposite conclusion. An alliance between Great Bri- tain and Japan at that time would have meant that we should have taken upon ourselves an enormous responsibility in a matter which might, so far as our interests were concerned, in all probability be settled by peaceful negotiation. To have rushed into a war with Russia, aided, as then appeared likely, by other European Powers, would have been in the highest degree imprudent, and it would in all likelihood have led to most disastrous results. It is not be overlooked that at that time Japan was quite unpre pared for a struggle with Russia alone, to say nothing of her being supported by some other Power; so that, as far as could be judged at that time the attitude that is advocated would have meant that Great Britain was to be the champion at all costs: Under suchy of the integrity of China. circumstances, clearly the prudent plan was to await the course of events and see whether the difficulty might not be adjusted by pacific means. This, in effect, was the policy that was adopted. Japan, the Power most immediately concerned, did her best to stay, the progress of Russian aggression by: means of negotiation and in this she was supported by Great Britain. At the same time she prudently made herself strong enough to cope with a Power whom she could not have faced at the time the question arose; and was thus ready to meet the matter if possible by diplomacy, but if no other course were left to her, by resins tance. Under such circumstances it was reasonable that Great Britain should form an earlier stage an alliance, which at would have been an act of imprudence for her to effect.
.
Even at the time when thé first Japanese alliance was formed, there were many who doubted the prudence of the action and considered, not without some show of reason, that too great a respon- It is, therefore, sibility had been incurred. unreasonable at this stage of affairs to ory back, and argue as if the conditions were the same in 1895 as they are at the present time. But even if such had been the fact, it could scarcely be expected that Great Britain would be very enger to move in the matter at the special instigation of China. The Chinese have never shown thémselver- the friends of Great Britain; and havo always gone upon the principle of mis- trusting her, and of pitting other nations against her, so as to prevent aggression, which they foolishly, as we say, assumed was!
.: