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November 5, 1904.]
THE DISADVANTAGES OF
DIPLOMACY.
(Daily Press, 1st November)
With the highest respect for Mr. BAL FOUR's abilities, and a firm conviction of the inherent honesty of his intentions, it is yet the case that his policy with regard to Russia is bringing the country dangerously near to an impasse from which war with Russia, and possibly with Germany, will afford the only means of honourable escape. Mr. BALFOUR is at one with the whole nation in his detestation of war, and of all wars of one with Russia, and this, not because of y love or affection towards Russia herself, but that neither bopour nor advantage could
CHINA OVERLAND TRADE REPORT.
Russia had,
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In the Russo-Japanese war what was most prominently brought to notice, at sea, was the far-reaching effect of rapid action at the outset and on land, the equally powerful effects of rapid mobilisation. The promptness with which the Japanese s'ruck at the outset at the Russian fleet in Port
and would have raised no embarrassing | of its being possible ultimately to surround issues; it would, moreover, have had the them at Paarde Kraal. effect of saving Russia's face. in fact, overreached herself, she had carried on too far her game of bluff, and had been called upon by Japan to show her hand. Russia, relying on her military prestige, had entered on the war unprepared, and was taken at a disadvantage, and the issue was doubtful; yet without loss of that prestige she could not withdraw, nor could she in as many words acknowledge that she had been compelled by Japan. The same disability could not, of course, attach to her retiring her fleet before the sea power of Great Britain, and she could very well plead with- out loss of prestige that without the assis-
Arthur gave them an advantage which in- fluenced the whole of the subsequent cam- paign, and the lesson thus taught is one of vital importance to a nation like Great Britain, which depends absolutely upon maintaining the command of the sea. war is declared, there can be no hesitation without the greatest danger, and prompt-
Once..
possibly accrue from such a contest. Mr.tance of her fleet she could make no head-ness of action at the outset may mean
BALFOUR has, however, as we lately pointed out, with all the strength of ACHILLES, his one pervading weakness. His miud is essentially philosophic; and this, though not necessarily a source of weakness, yet renders him disposed in the first instance to have too strong a belief in the power of reason, It is but seldom that reason has any strong directing influence in the affairs of nations, which are far more usually based on mere sentiment, and against such a con. dition philosophical argument can make but slow headway. We have before reflected on the small advantage of diplomatic inter- course with a Power like Russia, where the Power that places most reliance on the logical appeal to what we are accustomed to look upon as the fundamental principles of right and reason is at a distinct disadvan- tage. This fact, but half understood, is really at the base of most international troubles; what seems to the one plain and straightforward, to the other appears as a congerie of deceit and duplicity. No two nations persistently think in the same grooves; this is apparent even in the regions of science more when the discussion turns to political topics. The thread of the argument is being continually interrupted by extraneous accretious gathered in its passage. When the Russian volunteer fleet overhauled and took possession of the first Britisk ships in the Red Sea an American
ex-statesman in China tersely remarked :
CG
This is riding for a fall." Admiral FREMANTLE, a man of action, instinctively grasped the situation in recommending that it should be treated as an act of piracy. Unfortunately Mr. BALFOUR saw in it a subject for remonstrance and discussion. In such a course. Great Britain could but come to grief. Before the Crimean war England had always upheld the doctrine of the right of search: on the completion of the war she had unwillingly accepted the new doctrine that a neutral flag covered the enemy's goods-except, and the exception is noteworthy, contraband of war. But the declaration did not defius what was contra- band, and Russia pretended to have her own meaning of the phrase, in which she was bound to have many sympathisers. Mr. BALFOUR thus permitted the main ques tion at issue to be set aside, and in conse- quence allowed himself to be drawn into a profitless controversy in which there was no defined basis for argument.
It is probable that the course taken has been even more
embarrassing for Russia than for England herself. The only question at issue at the moment was the status of the volunteer cruisers; Russia had taken on herself to commit an unfriendly, almost a hostile act, and expected that it would have been met by equally decisive measures on the other side. To have peremptorily demanded the release of the Malacca, and the dismantle- ment of the cruisers as warships would have been a perfectly intelligible course,
the alert we shall always somehow
way in her land combat with Japan. She victory in the end, while the slightest hesi had clearly at the time no understanding tation may equally mean defeat. Unluckily hesitation is just the weak point of British with Germany, and so the way to some understanding with regard to Manchuria doings. It is a fault on the right side was open: now, of course, all this is changed. undoubtedly, and few would desire to see The question of contraband of war, not at any diminution on the part of our statesmen first involved, has becotae a crying question. in the prudence which is wary of the en- and in this she finds a ready ally in Ger- trance to a quarrel. But there is always a many, at all times disposed to question the risk that this may be carried too far. naval superiority of England. The timeReady, aye Ready," is the motto of our. too has become opportune to recall the old sailors, but too frequently when emergencies understandings with Germany, and the at arise it has been found that the nation is The object lesson tacks on British prestige have developed, anything but ready. into a policy supported by a precedent to which the war in these parts has afforded which the weakness of the British Govern- is one whose import cannot be overlooked, ment has itself been a consenting party. and the most sanguine and easy-going. can- This it is that lends importance to recent not with such facts as have been revealed doings in the North Sea. Here Russia has before them content themselves, with a been pleading the vidiculous excuse that vague hope that without being constantly the sinking of British trawlers and the on murder of their crews has proceeded from manage to come out right in the end, however their having been mistaken for Japanese much we may blunder at the commence- In the future, if the British Em- destroyers. Doubtless Russia has been led ment. to take the last sten through an apparently pire is to be safe, it must at all times be well-founded confidence that the same absolutely ready. philosophical weakness, and disposition for palaver, instead of prompt action has pro- ceeded from fear rather than policy, and that the old game may be tried ona nation which has forgotten that it ever was great. Diplomacy, it has been remarked, is the instinctive resort of weak nations; when a great Power condescends to the ignominy, it has ever proved the first step to insult, and so becomes the strongest incentive to aggressions only to be wiped out by war- The first result of yielding in the present case has been to revive the traditional de- pendence of Gerniany on St. Petersburg, so that it is likely to have far wider reaching influence over the future of Europe than a more dignified course would have entailed.
LESSONS OF THE WAR.
(Daily Press, 2nd Novembea.
If the South African war taught us many unexpected lessons, the Russo-Japanese war will surely be the means of teaching us Ju some that are still more unlooked for. the former, the effectiveness of the then new quick-firing weapons was for the first time shown--and in the initial stages of the war, sadly to our cost, as at Modder River, where the strength of entrenched positions against frontal attacks under the new con- ditions of quick and accurate, rifle fire was demonstrated in a manner which surprised even experts. The increased strength of defensive positions was the prominent fea. ture under the new conditions; but in the end it was made clear (as Lord Charles BERESFORD, judging accurately of military tactics from those of the Navy, predicted) that a purely defensive attitude was one which it was impossible to maintain for any lengthened time. The over cautiousness of the Boers in this respect was the cause
In the military operations which have taken place, the chief lesson taught is the all-importance of rapid. mobilisation. The extraordinary ability with which the Japanese have been able to move their forces has been one of the chief causes of their success. In one action after another the same story was told of their having been able to out- flank their opponents. In many cases they were aided by reserves, but they always
knew where to place them, and were always able to being them up at the right time, both of which were due to their powers of been
rapid mobilisation. How this has accomplished is an important study. So little comparatively has been allowed from
time to time to come out as to actual detail- that the precise facts are difficult to arrive The at. One thing, bowever, is certain. Japanese were far less dependent than is ordinarily the case upon the services of beasts of burden and were vastly assisted by being able to effect a large part of their transport by mere force of human limb. It was said during the war in South Africa that the speed of the British column was that of the slowest ox-waggon attached to it; and though this is undoubtedly slower than ordinary transport still it is no had illustration of the chief difficulty which has operation. The to be met in military speed with which the Japanese managed to transport the convoys and the regiments was something evidently unanticipated by their antagonists, who might not unnaturally conclude that, being largely dependent upon carriage by coolies, they would make but slow progress. Active and strong men, however, can do much that the horse or the mule cannot venture upon. They can very much more adapt themselves to their sur- roundings, and are not nearly so much put out by bad roads or mountain paths as is necessarily the case with any beast of
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