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THE WAR.
(Daily Press, 4th June.) Next to, and usefully supplementing the ability of the Japanese leaders to keep their own counsel, is the skill that they have undoubtedly displayed in rapidly changing their plans to suit the changing necessities of the campaign. There seems to be little doubt that up to the 15th May, when the loss of the Hatsuse compelled the Japanese commander to review his position, the main objective of the war had been the posses- sion of Moukden and the basin of the Hun Ho, with the eventual object of isolating Vladivostock. According to this plan it would seem to have been considered un- necessary to make any active attack on Port Arthur, which apparently was to have been left to the eventualities of famine. As the Japanese at the time had complete com- mand of the sea, this plan, although con- trary to the fundamental principle of war which forbids the leaving of a powerful post of the enemy in the rear of an advanc- ing army, had much to recommend it. The loss of the Hatsuse and Yoshino very con siderably altered the fighting capabilities of the fleet, and reduced to an impractical number the ships needed for any successful operation in the neighbourhood of Vladi- vostock. This apparently accounts for the slacking of the Japanese operations in the neighbourhood of the river Liao. Whatever lack of initiative the Russians may possess in the active carrying on of a war in an enemy's country, the conduct of the defence of Sebastopol proves their capacity in the equally important art of rapidly making good a damaged position, and quickly throwing up formidable earthworks. The three eventful days succeeding the 27th September, 1854, were made such good use of by the beleaguered garrison of Sebastopol, that on the 30th the capture by assault of the fortress, a perfectly practicable feat on the first day, had become an absolute im- possibility without regular siege operations. On the 17th October these hasty fortifica- tions of the Russians, mainly, it is true, through the genius of TODLEBEN, had been so far perfected that a regular attack assisted by a formidable train of siege artil- lery proved a fiasco, and for the entire of the succeeding winter was the aspect of affairs completely changed, and the be- siegers had themselves to undergo the bard.
■hip of a siege. Apparently inspired by a new hope after the events of the 15th May the Russian garrison at Port Arthur had evidently followed, probably instinctively, the same tactics. The result was that when the attacking force reached the intrench- ments at Kinchow on the 21st ultimo, they found the enemy had made formid. able arrangements for the defence, that all the heights commanding the ap. proaches were occupied in force, and the foot of the hills was still further protected by mines, wire fences, and barbed entangle- ments. Prior to the attack the Japanese had located some thirty pieces of artillery of from 10 to 20 centimetres calibre, a large number of which were quick-firers, besides & number of smaller capacity, the number of which was unknown. It was evident therefore that a determined defence was in- tended, and that unless the Japanese were prepared for a formidable loss of life no attack could expect to be successful. It will thus he seen that on both sides the action was intended to be serious, and the Japanese evidently from their preparations fully comprehended this. It is well that this should be understood, as a French contemporary, which has undertaken the thankless office of Russian claqueur géneral,
THE HONGKONG WEEKLY PRESS AND
[June 13, 1904.
has described the part taken by the Russians | but have the useful result of indicating to as a simple demonstration! In view of the Europe how effectual a stand a determined heavy loss incurred by the winning side it people like the Japanese can make, even is well to enquire if the result warrants the when opposed to a huge conglomeration of expenditure of life, which the Japanese nations such as is Russia at the present allow to have been about 3,500 of all ranks | day. killed and wounded. To answer a question of this sort more must be taken into con- A famous general sideration on both sides. once remarked on a like occasion "One more Generals such victory, and I anı undone." in modern times have been actuated by feelings of humanity to spare the lives of their troops even at the sacrifice of an im- mediate success, and more than one comman- der in modern times has been arraigned by military critics for having without just cause sacrificed his troops. On the other hand, there are cases when an apparently uncalled-for sacrifice of life at the outset There has in the end proved an economy. are two causes of loss of life in an army on active service; as a rule disease is the cause of many more fatalities than the hostile acts of the enemy. A Commander is thus generally justified in bringing a war to a speedy issue, even at the immediate sacrifice of life, pro- vided of course that the way is clear before him.
In like manner, to bring about an early or immediate victory military critics will look leniently on a heavy death roll. An- other cause always held to exempt the general from blame is where the general tries successfully to produce a condition of Pro- disorganisation in the hostile force. bably it is not necessary to apply any of the above palliating reasons in the case of Kinchow, which will remain on record as one of the bloodiest battles of the half century. The victory was probably bloody because neither of the commanders could help it: it was in fact one of the un- fortunate effects of Russia's uncalled-for encroachment in Asia, that she has hitherto been unable to put any check on it. Her armies have acquired so much vis inertia in the mere mechanical process of advance that the first serious check could not fail of being serious. The late action was even more important; Russia and Japan were both on trial. Russia with her but semi- assimilated civilisation had matched herself against Japan, the latest claimant for admission into the select circles of the higher-toned nations; and considerable jealousy had been evinced by some of the others who might have been expected to know better. Russia had the advantage, of course, that her Tsars belonged to one of the high families, and it was vulgar to ask any questions as to the manner in which the Japan, on establishment was conducted. the other hand, not belonging to an old county family," was all the more anxious to prove her respectability. To give way meant for Russia the loss of that prestige shady though it undoubtedly is, which ha, taken her two centuries of somewhat questionable effort to arrive at; for Japan it meant her extinction as a nation. It was plainly impossible for either to retire; for good or evil the fight had to be brought to an issue. It is not too much to say that Civilisation itself was concerned in the result. Had Russia won the day, it would not have been Russia's best qualities that would have gained, but those base pro- pensities which have made the Muscovite empire a terror to humanity. What will be the ultimate effect of the fight at Kinchow, whether it imply the early fall of Port Arthur and the removal of one of the most potent causes of disorder in the Far East, or whether Russia be permitted for a little longer to continue in Asia her policy of aggression, the fight at Kinchow cannot
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(Daily Press 9th June.) There seems now no longer any doubt that General KUROPATKIN is marching to the relief of Port Arthur. It would appear that he is confronted with a most difficult, not to say a most perilous task, for "Russia's bulwark in the Far East" seems now to be closely invested by the Japanese, and the Russian garrison driven in upon its works and shut up. This being the case, military experts agree that it will require but a relatively small part of the Second Army to maintain the siege, leaving a good part of this Army for operations elsewhere. It is impossible to judge precisely of the value of the statements emanating from St. Peters- burg, but we can hardly credit the sug- gestion contained in a REUTER's telegram which we publish to-day that the announce- ment of a southward movement to relieve
conceal Port Arthur is intended to general retreat northward which a strong rearguard is demonstratively covering. We have to bear in mind the fact that the cap- ture by the Japanese of this Eastern Sevas- topol, which appears to be garrisoned accord- ing to the generally accepted estimate, by about 25,000 men, including the sailors, would be a tremendous blow to Russian military prestige, and the feeling in St. Petersburg that Port Arthur must be re- lieved at all costs can be fully understood. The scepticism with which the announcement of a southward movement has been received is no doubt ascribable to the information which has these last two months been
emanating from St. Petersburg attributing to General KUROPATKIN a plan of campaign entirely different from that which he has been obliged to accept. In the very latest home papers to hand we note the statement that the Commander-in-Chief had advised his Sovereign in the sense of abandoning the whole of Manchuria and concentrating his entire army of 200,000 men in the It would appear Trans-Baikal district. from these reports that General KUROPATKIN considers that he has much too small an army for the task he is required to perform, and that he recognised when he came to take up the command the impossibility of transporting and feeding a very much larger No doubt time has improved the one.
the respect, and possibilities in this number of troops he controls will surely if slowly be considerably increased. question of the moment is: Will the Japanese force investing Port Arthur quietly remain inactive as though the inten- tion were to bring about the fall of Port Arthur by famine, or will they speedily follow the simple investment, siege, or bombardment, by a determined assault?
The
Statements of a most contradictory nature have been published as to the supplies at Port Arthur. On the one hand we are told that there are scarcely three months' provi sions and not more than six weeks' coal supplies, while on the other we get the as- surance that Port Arthur is sufficiently provisioned to enable the garrison to hold out for twelve months. If there is such a large stock of provisions in the town the authori- ties seem to have well concealed the fact from the knowledge of the residents who fled before the investment began. It will be remembered that after the first bombard- ment, reports came from Port Arthur that prices of the ordinary necessaries of life advanced enormously, but between that
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