310
THE HONGKONG WEEKLY PRESS AND
CONDITIONS OF THE PRESENT an enemy's commerce as such was not to be
WAR.
(Daily Press, 21st April.) It is an old and trite saying, and one which under a pretence of sententiousness really covers a mere truism, that history repeats itself.
As long as human nature is as it is, and as long as it is a law of nature that the race has a tendency to pro. pagate itself at a rate greater than its means of support, so long must there exist an aggressive tendency on the part of nations; and this aggressive tendency must, when it implies injury to another nation possessed of courage and ability to resist, eventually lead to war. War again arising in each case from the same impelling motive must of necessity follow similar lines, and so it happens that whether we analyse the wars of a SENNACHERIB, of a CYRUS, au ALEXANDER, a CÆSAR, or in modern times of a NAPOLEON, we find the same general principles of attack and defeuce running through the entirety. The circumstances of the present war between Japan and Russia thus partake geographically and physically of the conditions existing in 1854, when Great Britain and France, in order to parry the injurious advance of Russia, undertook an offensive war, and invaded the Crimea. The geographical position of the Crimea and Shengking are very similar; both are peninsulas, both are at an enormous distance from Russia's basis of operations, and both possess at the furthest extremity a capacious and strongly fortified naval station, to cap- ture which is oue of the objects of the war. It is perfectly natural, then, that the incidents in the one war should be compar- able to those unfolding themselves in the
other.
was
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[April 23, 1904. concerned. Russia grudgingly accepts the rule with the stronger Powers who are able to enforce it, but she persistently ignores it with regard to the weaker, whom she hopes to be able to overawe or cajole. Now it is necessary, in order to avoid worse evils, to acknowledge every independent state as internationally equal, and though another neutral may remonstrate, there is no pre- cedent to make such action a casus belli as between neutrals.
interfered with more than was necessary for war purposes. Some nations wanted to go further and assert the immunity from capture of the enemy's private ships, when not actually engaged in warlike operations, or conveving contraband of war, but the majority refused to take this extreme view, or at all events held it to be premature. Other rules were proposed regarding letters of marque given by Governments authoris ing the fitting out of privateers, but the Russia then has been taking advantage proposed rule was not carried. Other regula- of this position to use habitually the har- tions regarding the action of neutrals inbours of certain of the lesser Powers in the aiding or encouraging one or other belliger- Mediterranean for the purpose of fitting ents, though in principle agreed to, were out her cruisers, and obtaining stores, and left to be decided in each particular case. the vessels thus fittel out have been em- Practically no naval war has taken placeployed in plundering the vessels of neutral since these rules and recommendations were Powers, under the pretence of seizing those formulated, and naturally there was room indefinable goods which she is pleased on for misconception, and an absence of pre- her own authority to clais as contrabaud of cedent as to the proper course to pursue. war. The whole proceeding is naturally England and the majority of the Great unprecedented, and as such offends no Powers at once issued proclamations of written rule, though contrary to the whole neutrality, and closed theirs ports uniess intenour of international law, as accepted by cases of distress, and even then under most all the Powers. It might be expected that stringent rules, indifferently to either belli- the nation most interested amongst the is Britain gerent. The practical effect of this was to others, which undoubtedly reuder it impossible for Japan to carry on a would take some strong measures to redress naval war in European waters, or for Russia a palpable wrong, which has no foundation- to reinforce her fleet in the Far East, till at in former precedents, and is contrary to least she had made her own arrangements the whole tone of modern practice; but for coaling on the road. In the, interest of here again comes in the peculiar difficulty peace generally this was an important step, which always arises with a Power as Russia, and tended to prevent as far as possible the which sets but little store on her own spread of the war. Incidentally and at the inconsistency, while vigorously holding moment it appeared to favour Japan, but her neighbour to the letter of her engage at any time the position might change and ments. Were Great Britain to insist under the contrary might result. The conditions penalty of retaliation ou Russia ceasing the might then have been honestly accepted by practice the action would certainly be quoted both belligerents without prejudice, in the against herself, and Britain would have to hope of further developments. Unfortun-yield however unreasonable and irrelevant It is true that at the opening of the ately Russia, looking only to the present the cases. This is doubtless the reason present war one of the conditions moment, has not been willing to accept this why some steps have not as yet been taken markedly different. When Britain and view, but has put forward a claim of her to abate, by force if necessary, the nuisance, France opened the war against Russia, their own, which tends to complicate still further but there are signs, we believe, that some- navies were so far superior in number and a position already intricate. By the Treaty thing is being done towards its relief. efficiency to that possessed by Russia that of Paris each state at war has the right to Hongkong is more immediately interested, from the beginning the latter Power treated seize on the enemy's property on board a which is our excuse for speaking out; but its own navy as of no practical utility, neutral ship, provided only it be contrabaud the matter is really one of imperial interest. and actually sank in its own barbour of war, and as it seemed impracticable to Beven of its best and most powerful define what really is contraband the widest vessels. At the opening of the war with possible extension has been given to the de- Japau Russia had in Eastern waters a navy finition. Russia has been extending the which for numbers, and apparently efficiency, limits so as to include everything which was reckoned fairly comparable with that could be possibly brought into use directly of her antagonist, and in addition, after this or indirectly, not only to make war, but to portion of the fleet had been despatched assist in making machinery which might be possessed an apparently sufficient reserve in employed in producing weapons of war or European waters. The first care of the warlike weapons, and military stores or even Japanese commander-in-chief was thus of clothing, Russian prize-courts being the necessity directed to striking at this for-only authority to decide. Of course, under midable difficulty in the way of offensive operations, and with so much success that for a time at least the Russian fleet became a mere onlooker, and, as in the case of the Crimea, took uo active part in the contest. For some weeks this inactivity was real, and its existence raised one or two points of importance with regard to international law. Some main principles concerning the rights of belligerents and the duties of neutrals have been reduced to writing and met with practically universal acceptance; and each of the principal nations for it elf commence.1 to put these rules in action. After the close of the Crimean war the nations had pro- ceeded to formulate a common course of action with regard to possible neutrals and belligerents, and the time, after one first class war had been decided, aud no political cloud momentarily clouded the horizon, was undoubtedly favourable. The new rule agreed to by all the important Powers, with the partial exception of the United States, was, that the neutral flag covered the cargo, except contraband of war, and that
such a pretension, every article of trade might be brought in contraband. This naturally was not the object of the original rule, which was to injure as little as possi- ble the general trade of the world, and afford some little alleviation to the necessary horrors of war. So long as the stipulations as to neutral ports being forbidden to the ships of either of the parties at war, the former wrong would be to a considerable extent rectified, as either Power would from the impossibility of obtaining supplies find her limits of injury so far as neutrals were concerned coufiued within reasonably narrow limits. But the peculiarity of Russian practice is to take advantage of every circumstance which may favour her immediate aims without any regard for con- sistency, or the possible disadvantage of establishing precedents against herself. The rule which forbids nations at war carrying on warlike operations from neutral ports is one of these, and is probably more in the interests of the belligerents themselves than of the Powers apparently more immediately
UNREST IN CHINA.
(Daily Press, 22nd April.)
Without paying too much attention to Chinese rumours or reports, it is always well to take note of what is circulating in native circles. Before the Boxer outbreak
in 1900 numerous warnings were received, which were disregarded until it was prac- tically too late, and scores of missionaries iu various parts of North China had been massacred. There can be little doubt that the tardiness shown by the Powers in moving after the first of the outrages served to embolden the Boxers, and possibly en- couraged some of the officials to join the movement for the extermination of foreigners in China. It is to be hopel, therefore, that the foreign Ministers will not be caught napping a second time. The Chinese Go- vernment is so utterly backboneless and its real disposition is so difficult to gauge. accurately that it would be worse than folly to rely on any assurances the Waiwupu (the successor to the Tsung-li Yamen) could give. For some time to come the Treaty Powers will have to rely on their Legation guards for the protection of their repre- sentatives in the Chinese capital, and it should be the business of the Legations to keep as accurately informed as possible as to the temper of the populace and as to the conditious in the Palace, where intrigues It was reported are perpetually going on.
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