MISAPPREHENSIONS AND MIS TAKES ABOUT CHINA.
papers
(Daily Press, 24th October.)
are
64
on
19
"
E
[October 27, 1900,
up to the standard of that of Germany, may have reckoned a secondary or other "base at Weihaiwei as the equivalent of two or three battleships. If so, few students "of history will agree with them."
42
THE HONGKONG WEEKLY PRESS AND
fighting race that it was safer to make a "of the Taungli Yamen in place of friend than an enemy of that stern hard Chusan, and now I imagine that the Englishman whose deeds follow SÒ close
in the street is beginning to realize his words, and who, be it friend or foe, never **what we want in the Far East, if there forgot or forgave. Compare this with the
any 'balance of power which must be nerveless, lifeless attitude we have assumed 'redressed,' is a superior squadron and an up in Peking seems to have paralysed our “miralty, in not bringing our squadron even throughout this struggle. A Minister shut “ effective field force. Possibly, the Ad- Foreign Office, who, instead of at once grasp “ ing the situation and giving over the control to the man most fitted to assume charge, left our various representatives throughout China to take sich disjointed and in- dividual action as they thought fit, with the result that their general attitude is listless inactivity expectation of the arrival of the news
relieved only by the paper to learn how things are going on cent traveller in China. So much for the as it was not inaptly described by a re- past and the immediate present; but what about the future? Thinking men will do well to ponder on the causes which have brought about such a state of things, and strenuous efforts must be made in order to force the Government to inaugurate and British interests in China-a policy which carry out a policy in support of legitimate can only be brought into being if backed by the force of strong public opinion at home; and a policy which the appointment of Sir ERNEST SATOW as Minister to Peking gives England must give one of her best and no guarantee will be adopted and pursued. ablest sons to the task now confronting her in China, or bitterly will, she regret in the future her failure. to secure that position which the preponderance of her trade justly entitles her to take.
The failure of the artists in the illustrated
sto grasp and portray the charac teristic features of the Chinese is typical of the ignorance prevailing at home with regard to China generally. A Japanese girl serving in a Chinese tea-shop and a "Boxer" leader mounted on a CATON WOODVILLE horse of at least seventeen hands are not a bit more exaggerated than Lo FENG-LUH's statement that "an Imperial Edict cannot lie." And yet both seem to be accepted by the public at home as being a truthful record of things as they are in China. The Government no. better informed; but relying on the general ignorance they feel that they can with safety assume an attitude of passive resist ance to the demands of that small portion of the people who, more fully posted than their neighbours, ask that a steady and last ing policy should be adopted and carried out in the Far East. Two reasons can, in a measure, be given for the neglect of interests vital to the trading classes of England; in addition to the one of general ignorance already referred to. The one is the reaction following the pitch of excitement to which the public were worked up by the reported massacre of the inmates of the Legations. The other is the false estimate conveyed to them of the power of a fighting resistance on the part of the Chinese, due to the somewhat unexpected opposition offered by the foreign drilled troops round Tientsin and Peking. Public indignation once excited and finding itself deceived will not be easily raised again, and the fear of rousing, what they consider, the overwhelming forces of the whole of China act as a deterent now to those who in their more excited moments would have been advocates of a strong policy at any cost. We say mistaken estimate of the power of fighting resistance davisedly, because, to those who know the country, it is absurd to suppose that the Chinese troops could offer successful resist- ance for any length of time to the large body of foreign troops that will be under the command of Count VoN WALDERSEE. Transport alone precludes any such idea, not to mention the impossibility of the Chinese supplying their soldiers with arms and ammunition when their source of foreign supply is cut off, their principal northern arsenals in the hands of the enemy, and the certainty that their southern ones could be in a few hours reduced to ruins by half a dozen of the allied fleet.
OLD AND NEW POLICY IN CHINA.
two Powers wrest from China with nó As a result of the events of 1898 we saw
vileges, while we did not take the opportunity expenditure of labour very substantial pri-
of establishing our influence in the region an early opportunity which concerned us most. Germany took when in the same
emphasize this, HATZFELDT pointed out to Lord Salisbury e year, 1898, Count that Germany had acquired “a special posi- tion" in Shantung, "whereas, Great Britain not having occupied any place in the Yang- tze region, that region is still unreservedly comment on the failure of our diplomacy open to German enterprise." A better could not have been written. by the most earnest British critic of his country's Chinese policy. The question now is, What chance is there yet of remedying past errors? To the utmost ingenuity of him who attempts. supply a satisfactory answer to this will tax the task. We have declared, too late in the day, for the strict maintenance of China's integrity, and have bound ourselves to act with Germany to secure this end. Our part- ner, content with the monopoly of all com- promise of free trade for her nationals else- mercial enterprise in one province and the,
where, enters on the work with a light heart. (Daily Press, 25th October.) The letter addressed to the Times of the result of previous mistakes and follies and Great Britain starts handicapped with the 20th ult. by the correspondent who veils his relying only on the ability of her traders identity under the pseudonym of “ MILES" is a trenchant criticism on past British
to hold their own with any possible rivals policy in China, and re-states in concise form to throw great doubt, adducing as arguments -an ability on which many do not hesitate the often urged case of those who know the the many cases in which our traders in the country and the effect of that policy on British interests therein. "MILES
last few years have allowed themselves to be forward prominently the inherent mistake ed competitors, and the notorious neglect by puts supplanted by more supple and better train in the way in which the authorities at home sought to meet the results of foreign aggres- of the commercial men who look to them for British Government officials of the interests sion in this quarter of the globe. The main support. Viewed then in the light of the principle of British conduct in reply to Ger- events of the last three years, the Anglo- man and Russian proceedings in the north, German Agreement seems one-sided. But he points out,. was not to safeguard our it is at least as good an Agreement as we great national interests on the Yangtze, could hope for, provided that it is strictly which then we might have done effectually, carried into effect. We are fold that but to try to counteract the establishment of the home newspapers doubt its utility, of Russian power at Port Arthur by post unless it be made retrospective If by this Unfortunately the spirit which actuates ing ourselves at Weihaiwei. In so doing is meant unless the past seizures the Government at home is reflected by its we "substituted an indirect object. for one Chinese territory be restored, it is plain representatives out here. Never at any of primary importance"--an error not less that those journals have nothing to hope time anxious to take up their nationals dangerous, the writer continues, in national from the Agreement, for it is certain that no interests, owing to the certainty that policy than in naval or military strategy: Power has any intention of receding from their action would get no backing from At the time when the lease of Weihaiwei the positions gained by it in China. If it the Foreign Office, their attitude is ac- centuated by the state of affairs now pre-writer pointed out in the Times that the occurrences that is to say, in short, to the was in course of arrangement the same refers, on the other hand, merely to recent vailing in China and the resultant desire to
other is based upon nothing. However, the annexation by Russia of the south bank of Foreign Office approved of the idea, which if the Agreement does not cover this the Tsungli Yamen pressed upon us to the two contracting Powers are about avoid giving anything of more value, to make another concession and in May, 1898, Mr. GoSCHEN stated fear of Russia. The reason for in the House of Commons that outpost of this kind was of value to those a concession is to seek. It may well suit who had the supremacy of the sea, and it which concerns her but little, with Shantung Germany's book to yield in thia matter was from the point of view that we had supremacy at sea that we should approach tion in the centre and south guaranteed Awaiting her exploitation and free competi what had to be done at Weihaiwei." So we and a good understanding with Rusgia got our tung, and since its acquisition experts have 'secondary naval base" in Shan-
in Europe to be cultivated. But wrangled constantly as to its worth:"
two years have passed," says the writer in Only the Times," since we adopted the suggestion
avoid any cause of friction with the provin- cial officials. Evils which at other times would call forth a protest, feeble indeed, but still a protest, are now allowed to pass un- heeded-sacrificed to the bugbear of keep- ing the Chinese in the central and southern provinces quiet at any cost; regardless of the well-known axiom in Oriental politics that force combined with strict justice is the one thing that commands Eastern obedience and respect. It was not by such a policy as is now being pursued that CLIVE or WARREN HASTINGS were wont to secure the safety of those whom they desire to protect. Swift, sharp retribution following deeds of evil quickly taught even native princes of a
theory that one fortress can neutralise an-
164
"an
many.
the Amur-all that can be said is that,
Britain
to their
such
the consent
this
China will not lead to any better state of aggrandisement of Russia at the expense of feeling between the two Powers, True it