September 3, 1898.]
13
duty
CHINA OVERLAND TRADE REPORT.
more in accordance with the traditions of that service and of the Anglo-Saxon race of which it is largely composed.
CONTROL OF THE PHILIPPINES,
191
American Government have, however, we believe, entered into no pledge to give independence to the islands, and will not be guilty of breach of faith if they elect to retain one or more of the islands of the Philippine Group. The proposal will pro- (Daily Press, 27th August.)
bably be that the United States shall annex The statement made by Reuter in his mes- Luzon, and that the others, the Visayas and sage of the 23rd inst. would seem to in- Mindanao, shall be placed under native dicate that the feeling in the United States rule but protected by the Stars and Stripes. in favour of the retention of the Philippines If the experiment proved successful, well is having its effect on the policy of the Go- and good; if native rule proved unacceptable, verniment. Reuter says that there are in- or corrupt, or inept, it might be discarded dications that President McKINLEY is in after a fair trial and the whole group favour of the retention of the island of governed from Manila again.
But an ex- Luzon only, but nothing definite is as yet periment will have to be made, and one of We were informed, on the 1st the nature above sketched out will pro-
"the
reported intentionbably be tried. We can only hope that, "of President MCKINLEY to abandon whetever course is adopted by our "the Philippines had provoked strong | American cousins, they will find able "protests in America." The President has men to carry out their policy to a now brought himself to the point of favouring successful and beneficial conclusion, sustain- ^ the retention of Luzon. It is by no means ing to the full the Anglo-Saxon reputation clear that at the outset, or even when the for colonisation and administration. terms of peace were first considered, the retention of any of the Philippines by the
settled.
instant, that
United States
was intended, hut events
have marched and the necessity for this measure has been brought home to the Washington Government. They have had time to learn many things since the war commenced, and they entered upon hostilities idea of acquiring dependencies
without any
remedies we will briefly deal with the im- portant points in connection with the rules which all admit to be necessary for the opening of the waters of China. Putting aside for the moment places such as Kino- chau, which have only a problematical trade, there are certain modifications needed for the South of China uot perhaps necessary for the North, owing to the presence in this neighbourhood of free ports like Hongkong; but even these do not appear to be insur mountable obstacles to contend with, as a glance at the Customs returns for Kowloon, etc., will show. From these it will be seen that foreign and Chinese goods pass these places in thousands of tons, carried in junks to and from Hongkong On these goods the Imperial Maritime Customs levy certain duties. To do this they either make an examination of the cargo on, as is generally done, accept the junk master's manifest as correct, inflicting a heavy fine in cases where fraud is discovered. What difference the addition of a boiler and propeller woul make to the craft carrying these gonds, as tar as revenue is concerned, is not quiet clear, except that in the case of steamers of
(Daily Press, 30th August.) any size, whose owners would probably be
The news from Manila is disquieting. The respectable firms and the captains their em
insurgents are evidently proving intractable ployés, the Customs are more likely to get
and the situation is such that an open a reliable manifest from them than from
rupture between them and the United States junks. The cargo destined for other places
forces may take place at any moment. That thau treaty ports and ports of call now
such an unfortunate contingency may be opened could be so declared and duty paidabad as the result of the war. They had avoided every one must hope, but the set- on it; the goods to be c:fed by
trong sympathy for and no little faith in tlement of the Philippine question is going the Cuban insurgents; and they no doubt to be a difficult matter for America. The paid memo to their place of discharge, where, if necessary, they could be examined imagined the Philippine rebels were patriots out and out annexation of the islands would by the local authorities and, if found to cor-
of a sterner type than was actually the fact. be in the long run the simplest and easiest respond with the duty men released. The They have suffere some disillusion. The solution, and in adopting that course Am- case of exports is, we confess, somewhat Cubans are proved to be not quite so imerica would be serving not only her own more difficult, but examination at the paint culte as they painted themselves; and interests, but the interests of the natives
the Americans, "on of shipment and payment of duty in accor-
closer acquaintance, and of international trade. She might bave foun the Filippinos rather less allow the natives full autonomy in the dance with the “memo giving the result
reliable Than they of that examination, at the Kowloon or
expected, Cuba management of their municipal affairs, if will 00 doubt be declared a other station, would probably be feasible.
republic they were found capable of the intelligent United exercise of such functious, but international The form which the duty to be so paid would under the protection of gradually take would be that of bank States, and the experiment of govern- relations and the administration of the ment will be tried in the island be use, if Customs should be exclusively under the cheques purchased beforehand from the Customs bankers and sent forward in the successful, Uncle Sam can alway step control of the protecting power. The
into the breach. The Philippines steamer for the purpose. This system, im-
opinion of foreigners resident in the Philip perfect as it is, would at least be some at differently situated in every way. They pines is quoted in support of the view that have the Philippinos are hopelessly incapable of tempt to meet the difficulty, and in a short are mainly inhabited by antives wh while the chief centres of trade for imports
no experience in the art of government self-government, and it must be frankly .ule, be in a conceded that if they were left exposed to and experts would soon be found and could and who would, if suffered be substituted for some of the ports of call position to retaliate on their former masters, the aggressive designs of foreign powers for there will be many Spaniards who will their independence would prove very now opened such as Kumbhuck, where
still make Manila their home, having all shortlived; but as regards their ability goods are landled, ctc., simply because it is a port of call, not because there is any demand their interests and worldly possessions there to at the place itself. The present Customs staff and the Spanish missions, who have invested in this case could be shifted from one place large sums in real property in the islands, might find small consideration at the bands of a Filippino administration. Moreover, foreign trade might suffer, if the natives were allowed to try their prentice hands at raising revenue, which they might possibly prefer to get from Customs and shipping dues rather than from taxes on real estate and other sources which would be unwelcome to the indigenous population. There is also the risk- -a very real one, we fear-of a native governinent getting embroiled with a foreign power, and being made pay up by concessions of territory. Can it be supposed for one moment that a Filip pino administration could long hold out against the demands of say Germany or Japan? Now it is not the desire of the United States to in any way facilitate the schemes of either of these Powers, and if there is any likelihood, either now or here- after, of their gaining a foothold in the Philippines it will not be by the good will or connivance of the Washington Govern- ment. At the same time the United States desire to keep faith with the Filippinos by delivering them from Spanish misrule. The
to the other.
With regard to the carriage of cargo from place to place in China, we see no reason why the whole of the waters should not be thrown open to all craft irrespective of their flag or means of propulsion, and if internal taxation there must be, abolish all lekin or other stations at the treaty ports and ports of call, letting the Imperial Maritime Customs deal with the whole trade, junk or otherwise, while at the same time a list of the stations at other places should be called for and a tariff to be enforced on all alike, junk or steamer, foreign or Chinese, compiled and published, as suggested in our leader of the 12th of July when dealing with the same subject. We by no means overlook the difficulty in connection with the drawing up of these re- gulations, but it appears to as that if in tend of devoting their time to concocting absurd and vexations restrictious calculated only to prevent legitimate trade the Cus oms would accept the situation as it is and make a bold effort to meet it, it would be
་ ་ :
are
to
|
manage their own affairs uncom- plicated by international relations, it is possible the unfavourable opinion attri- buted to resident foreigners may not be untinged by racial prejudice. However that may be, the foreign community would rightly object to being placed under native jurisdiction at the outset, and if native rule is to be established it will have to be accom- panied by some form of ex-territoriality. The, re-establishment of Spanish rule is a solution of the difficulty that hardly comes within the scope of practical politics. The reconquest of Luzon would greatly tax the resources of Spain in her present crippled condition, and if she ultimately succeeded in the task it would only be at the cost of many years of strife, much bloodshed, and the disorganisation of the trade of the country. It could not be expected that America would effect the reconquest for her, and the natives and Spaniards if left to themselves would probably prove pretty well matched. If any outside power came to Spain's assistance such power would naturally require for her services some substantial recognition, in the shape of territorial concessions, and this would give rise to international complications.