378
THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
I.
The statement made by the New York
correspondent of the Times, to the effect that President MCKINLEY has determined to retain the Philippines until the close of the war, when if Spain fails to pay an indemnity the islands will be sold to a European Power, preferably to Great Britain, is interesting if correct. Even if Spain were able to raise the indemnity it is doubtful whether she would be able to re-establish her power in the islands or to make her occupation permanent.
Her de cadence indeed would seem to have been far more thorough than was ever suspected; her collapse has been more complete than that of China when Japau pricked the bubble of her vainglorious boastfulness, In Cuba Spain has fought on for years, em- Iploying her whole strength and lavishing lives andmoney with equal prodigality in
or
THE HONGKONG WEEKLY PRESS AND
Islands to a European Power, preferably Great Britain, the newspapers of France, Germany, and Russia have commenced a campaign for the acquisition of the islands by those Powers, with the object of keeping England out. Whether they would pro- pose to place the government under the joint control of the Powers named to divide the islands up it is impossible to surmise, but it would seem not unlikely that the Philippine question may lead to complications as difficult and delicate as the recent China question, which almost gave rise to a great European war. From our American mail news we learn that as long ago as the beginning of last month the Deutsche Zeitung, un organ of the German Conservative party, had suggested that Ger- many should get something for herself out of the struggle between Spain and America, and had mentioned Samoa and the Spanish West Indian Islands. At that time the Philippine question had not loomed so largely into view and it was probably not
onc of
[May 14, 1898.
THE CAUSE OF THE SPANISH DEFEAT AT CAVITE.
the Spanish fleet at Cavite appears to have The complete and disastrous defeat of been due principally to the bad marks- manship of the Spanish. They were well supplied with good guns, both afloat and ashore, had an ample supply of ammunition have been lacking in courage, for they did and torpedoes, and they do not appear to not surrender until their fleet was totally destroyed. With all their advantages, how- ever, they were unable to do any material execution or make anything like au equal fight of it. It was like an expert at billiards playing with a novice and running out before his opponent scores. The inexpert ness of the Spaniards in the game of naval warfare is not difficult to be accounted for.
The consumption of ammunition in tar- get practice is a costly item which in some navies is for reasons of economy cut down to the lowest possible point. The penny wise and pound foolish character of
a vain attempt to suppress rebellion. In anticipated that the islands would so easily this policy is demonstrated by the result the Philippines, after a long series of fall to America as has actually been the of the action fought at Cavite on
case. America is placed in rather au she does not want the islands herself, and cmbarrassing position in the matter, because
1st May.
the
operations against the insurgents which certainly brought no credit to the Royal attempt to buy up the rebel leaders. That ex- yet, having overthrown the existing govern it prudent to haul out of Manila Bay, if
forces, she was constrained to make the
pedient would seem to have failed also, even had not the quarrel with the United States intervened to divert attention, and none but a consciously weak and venal adminis tration would ever have thought of attempt ing to check rebellion by such means.
The future fate of this fine group of islands is a matter of the highest interest. The islands are fair to see, they are pos sessed of large and varied resources, they contain an interesting and intelligent popu- lation-not, however, equal to the burden of self-government--and there is already a great and growing trade with Europe and the East. If the Spaniards were able to raise the indemnity demanded, they could not give a guarantee against a renewal of internecine warfare. The Filippinos, after a taste of liberal government under the Stars and Stripes, would not be content to submit to a renewal of priestly tyranny and the re-imposition of heavy duties and galling restrictions on trade. If, therefore, a con- dition of chronic discontent and open rebellion in the Philippines is what the Spaniards have to look forward to in the future will they care so greatly to be cumbered with a possession which could only be a drain upon their resources? Events may therefore possibly make for the occupation of the islands by another Power able to preserve order, develop trade, and afford all comers a welcome on equal terms. Under such circumstances, and with general consent, perhaps Great Britain, whose commercial interests in the islands are preponderant, might be induced to take over the administration. The rule of no other Power has anything like an equal claim to be established in command there; and probably under no other administration would trade make such progress or the resources of the group become so rapidly developed.
II.
Reuter reports what in its condensed form appears rather an enigmatical utterance on the part of the Times, namely, that au occupation by the United States is the best temporary solution of the Philippine ques- tion, and that Great Britain is unable to regard French, Russian, and German ac quisition with indifference. The inference is that following upon Mr. MACKINLEY'S suggestion of a possible sale of the Philippine
We
Had the Spaniards been as skilful with their weapons as their opponents the latter might have found they had ever been allowed to enter it. congratulate Commodore DEWEY on his splendid victory, which must be looked upon, as the London papers said when the reached London, as the beginning of the first telegraphic intelligence of the event end. The fate that has befallen the Spanish Philippine fleet will also befall the Spanish Atlantic fleet if it ever comes within range of the American guns, for the deficiency in gunnery that had such disastrous results at Cavite is universal throughout the Spanish service. They have good ships and good guns, but in the hands of men who do not know how to use them they are useless against a foe properly trained.
THE PEKING GOVERNMENT AND THE ANTI-FOREIGN KIOT AT SHASI.
ment, she is morally responsible for carry- on the administration until some other form of government is ready to take its place. If she has a multiplicity of Eu- islands being given to anyone but themselves, ropean claimants, each objecting to the she will have a difficult task to decide between them, and may not be at liberty to follow entirely her own inclinations in the matter. Of one thing we may be sure, how- ever, namely, that whatever the settlement that may ultimately be adopted, America will insist upon the full application of the doctrine of the open door, and in that she would be supported by Great Britain, whether the latter acquired the islands for herself or not. A British occupation would be the most satisfactory solution, both from a political point of view and as favouring the material development of the islands, but Great Britain, we take it, would not be prepared to fight Europe Whatever may have been the case in the on the subject unless her existing trad-past, it must be assumed that at the present ing interests were directly threatened. time nothing could be more distasteful to Japan will also claim to have a voice the Peking Government than the occurrence in the settlement, and would naturally of anti-foreign outrages, with the subsequent oppose a French, German, or Russian oc- claims for compensation. Even the high cupation. Possibly the establishment of a provincial officials are a little cautious at native administration with some form of present in countenancing or encouraging joint foreign control and the application of such outrages, knowing that responsibility the principle of exterritoriality may be cannot be so easily evaded as formerly. found the only possible solution short of The riot at Shasi reported in our special deciding the right of possession by war. It telegram from Shanghai must therefore be is true that joint controls generally prove a set down in all probability to purely local source of inconvenience and friction, and
causes. Some of the property destroyed is are in themselves undesirable, but they Chinese, but the Customs the natives regard must be accepted where nothing better can as a foreign institution, and the China Mer- be obtained. It will be remembered that chants Company, being conducted on semi- some years ago Germany took possession of foreigu lines, is probably also regarded in the Caroline Islands, to the east of the somewhat the same light. The remainder Philippines, but on Spain claiming a right of the property destroyed is British, which of prior possession the dispute was arbitrated is a fortunate thing for China, for had some upon by the Pope, whose finding was in other Powers been interested the claims for favour of Spain, whereupon Germany compensation might have taken extraordin retired. Now that the Spanish Colonial ary forms. As it is only British property Empire is breaking up Germany may fairly that is destroyed no doubt the case will be claim to have a voice in the disposition of met by money compensation and the pun- the Carolines, on the strength of her old ishment of the officers more immediately claim, and her commercial interests in the responsible for the failure to preserve the Philippines entitle her, like ourselves, to be peace. In regard to the latter point it is to heard on the subject of their future govern- be hoped that the British Government will ment. Neither Russia nor France, however, take up a firm stand. As yet we are in ignor have any interests in the islands, and if a ance as to the causes leading up to the riot, but joint control be established it should be con- they may possibly be found in the machina- fined to the United States, Great Britain, tions of the lekin officials against the trans- fer of the lekin collection to the Foreign and Germany.