338
RUSSIAN DESIGNS IN THE NORTH.
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS.
The fact that the shares of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank were unquotable on the London market on Friday last is indica- tive of the serious apprehensions that have been entertained of war with Russia break- REUTER now informs us that " a rial communication declares that and not calculated Morite
out.
the Br
THE HONGKONG WEEKLY FRESS. AND
has her part to play as well as ourselves and it should not be our policy to costruct her or to maintain the present evil condition of things.
THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE
મ
AND ITS EFFECT IN THE FAR EAST.
November 7, 1895.
Russia herself has, we believe, no desire to enter on any conflict with England, and the large additions she has been making to her fleet out here and to the Vladivostock Sapan rather than with oursel garrison are in view of conflict with. ourselves. If war with England were in contemplation the majority of the Russian ships would be re- The Times, in an interesting article on the quired in European waters and would hardly alliance between France and Russia, after be left in the Far East. But while Russia's showing that the alliance was of France's sentiments may not at present be actively seeking and that the predominance must hostile the machinations of France may remain with Russia, goes on to say: "It is succeed eventually in bringing about a easy trough to understand the usefulness breach of the peace. For that we must be of France to Russia, but it is less obvious prepared but the contingency, notwithstand- "in what way Russia can be made to sub-ing the uneasy feeling that prevails, we serve permanent French interests. Bus believe to be a remote one. The conflict sian policy is patient and continuous. It for the present is more likely to be confined is simply a policy of expansion at the ex-
to the diplomatic field, and it is here that pense of nations endowed with less bulk the danger lies of Engla. 1 being jockeyed "and momentum. To Russia any ally is out of the place she at present holds in the capable of being serviceable in turn, for field of commerce. it pleases China the purpose of breaking down resistance to give a contract for making a railway "and paving the way for its own ultimate to a French syndicate, as she is said to subjection to the process it helps to apply have done, England may have no more "to others. France has no analogous policy. right to object than France would have "She has only particular aims which are
if the contract aad gone to Englishmen, "but indirectly and slenderly connected but she has every right to object to with secular evolution. In virtue of this China's being tied down by treaty never to "difference Russia must always have the avail herself of English skill or capital in use it to further her own aims, secure in of the avowed objects of French policy. She general control of the alliance. She will the construction of railways, which is one "the knowledge that she can wait without has also a right to object to France obstruct- standing still. France will be in Russia's ing the opening of the West River to "hand as a hammer to break down resist foreign trade, or to any control of China's ance, but she will have to be content with finances be ing established designed to "such gratification of her own ambition as work inimic ally to British tradal interests. may be incidentally obtainable in the pro- England's influence in China has been cess of working out Russin's schemes. declining ever since the shameful and un- She may be encouraged to weaken a rival, fortunette convention by which it was "but she will not be helped to grow strong agreed that, a tribute mission should policy is less continuous than that of Russis..
at his expense." It may be that the French se sent every ten years from Burmah but it is a noteworthyst that notwith self so far as that, China not unnaturally to China. England having abased her- standing all her revolutions and charges of thought she could afford to treat her with Governmit the foreign policy especially her
'rance, contempt, and she has not failed to do so. tinued to
Asiatic policy, lines. Granting, however, that Fra.
run on fairly per. has
"only particular aims that "but. indirectly and slenderly connecte "with secular evolution she nevertheless attaches great value to those aims, and the alliance with Russia is not intended by her
"L
to inspire a official communication questions are not ordinarily to unreservedly. Several times Russia has declared that she did not intend to occupy such and such a place, and the declaration has been speedily followed by the actual occupation of the territory in question." That language is given to conceal thought is a cardinal principle of Muscovite diplo- macy, and if there was any fixed intention of making war on another
power the execu- tion of the intention would in all probability be preceded by some such declaration as that made in connection with the present crisis. On this occasion, however, the declaration may, we think, be accepted as correct, in so far as the decision rests with Russia herself. She will pursue her designs quietly but persistently, but they will not lead her into conflict with England unless England deems it necessary to her by force of arms.
If there is to be a fight it is England that will start it, not Russia. The responsibility is not one to be shirked if there be any real interference with British interests, but we fail to see anything in the present position, or in the designs at- tributed to Russia, to justify any serious apprehension of a breach of the peace. The natural development of the great Northern power is a factor to be reckoned with, but it would, in our view, be criminal and foolish to attempt to check it. That the whole of Manchuria will ultimat come under the away of Russia
be accepted almost as a certainty. We might delay it for time, but sooner or later Russia's chance auld come and she would take what she wanted. as we ourselves would do under similar ir- cumstances. As to the effect on ourse" tradal interests would not be likely to
our uffer,
may
oppose
for although the commercial policy of Russia
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fi
17.
rents, however, have led to Eng-
more asserting herself, and with Lance of a policy of firmness some ground may be recovered and uence again become of sufficient at Peking to prevent the Chinese ment lightly entering into anti- oritish agreements with other powers under
THE FRANCO-CHINESE CONVEN- TION AND BRITISH
INTERESTS. ·
is illiberal the territory would be vastly In European politics the alliance has ap-
to be entirely one-sided in its advantages. t he very nose of the British Ambassador. better governed than under it present preciably increased the influence of France, rulers and its trade would expand in pro- but it is perhaps in the Far East that its portion. The political situation (reated by Tect is most noticeable. Both Russia and the new arrangement would nat. quire England to augment her for as in the influence in this part of the world, to the turally re- Fice are interested in diminishing British Far East: the fleet would have to be extent at least of restricting our power to strengthened and the Hongk rison increased, which would
ong gar- interfere with their own schemes of aggran- ditional expenditure, but it
entail ad- disement. Russia wants territory in the long time before that world amount to ceivable Great Britain might object to and would be a North, France in the South, and it is con- what a war would cost Russia does not directly
So long as
thwart the designs of each, if they acted British interests it will
interfere with independently. By mutually supporting policy to let her
be England's wisest each other, however, they reduce Great her! go
wn way while we Britain's It seems to be the fate of China increase their own libertion The power of effective interference an d up
amongst the powers, and terms of the alliance have to be divided special interest in prevent- public nor is it on wh England has not a share; it would be led to its formati ing Russia getting she looked out for a concerned it is 1 more to the purpose hould think it neces- support she would share herself. If Japan sat would be her the Far Fast was sary to oppose Russia, than why Eng with her. As to
I
go ours.
In the course of an article on the Mekong question and the Franco-Chinese treaty the 'ndépendance Tonkinoise remarks that Eng and's claims under the most favoured na- tion clause will not affect the fact that, thanks to the energy and intelligence of the French Minister, thanks especially to the authority possessed by the voice of Fra nce in the European concert, when "united with that of Russia, Frenchmen. "have the priority in all that concerns com- "mercial concessions and the exploitation of mines in China. The recent Franco-Chi- nese Convention has given us these pri- vileges and we will know how to maintain "them intact." If this view were
ere to pre- vail the favoured nation clause might as own affair, and there is no reasrrel.
well be struck out or the treaties, and then The the Far P. land should be drawn into the quaro spirit she
Last is chiefly anti-English; it would be open to Great Britain to make situation is one in which a Jing Lord
wishes to obstruct
to arrangements for her own advantage with be shared in by. might casily precipitate war, but to of the cradle by artificial advantages. Be
the markets and herself to gain control China, which could no
a very different friends, who
SALISBURY is too far-seeing a statemar enter on a conflict that could result in L permanent advantage, however brilliant our victories on sea and land might be. In the opening up and civilization of China Russia
J
been made
(3
፡፡
FC considerations but so far as Russia is
receive from France in t improbable that the what chiefly weighed France, her policy in
our access
tween the two it behoves the British ayernment to walk warily, but not timidly. interests are threatened, we must be
defend them.
fer
France. We would he tale then from our Inch would regard any infra 101 nation clause to their oy n rageously dishonest and into.erable. Eng-
f the favoured riment as out-