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The performance of a military force is always a relative term in many senses. Authors writing about the Battle of Hong Kong have not rigorously compared the performance of the Hong Kong garrison with that of the Japanese invaders, save statistics of casualties and strength. Nor have they compared the performance of the garrison with British garrisons in other theatres of war.
It is true that the performance of the Hong Kong garrison did not prevent the fall of Hong Kong. Yet, it should be recognised by the military historian that the Hong Kong garrison, notwithstanding its inferior strength, did not only (a) manage to hold out for a much longer period of time; but also (b) sustain a much lower loss rate, as weighed by relative strength, than its adversary relative to the latter's strength. The former was probably the true mission of the garrison as contemplated by Churchill and both (a) and (b) testified to the battle worthiness of the garrison.
Evidence of these two points is adduced in Table 1, which compares several dimensions of the Battles of Crete, Hong Kong and Singapore. These battles all involved British forces repulsing invading well-prepared Axis forces which had either absolute or relative local air superiority and which succeeded eventually in overrunning the defended territories, taking a large number of prisoners. Each battle has attracted much post-war criticism of the failure of Churchill's strategy or tactics about defence of the island concerned. In all cases, the battles were mainly fought on land, though the German invaders of Crete were air-borne. In the cases of both Hong Kong and Singapore, the conflict was largely between infantries supported by artillery and there was no naval support during the hostility as the navy either was absent or had been wiped out. Evacuation by sea was only possible for a part of the Crete garrison.