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her over there until she could get a passage across the Atlantic to England.
I had been hoping to be called up myself, and in the meantime saw a good deal of the two able liaison officers left behind by the British Army in Shanghai. One was a Japanese interpreter, and the other spoke Chinese. We were all impressed with the importance of the Chinese guerilla effort, and hoped that the British government would be able to provide technical assistance for their support. I am afraid that the seed then sown fell on stony ground. Regular generals do not comprehend the implications of guerilla warfare, nor do those schooled in concentration appreciate the advantages of dispersal; moreover, generals are not interested in small groups; they prefer the big battalions.
When the time came, in May, and I was recalled to join up in Burma, I was glad to leave Shanghai. Many excellent people, detained by their duty, reluctantly remained there; but generally the atmosphere, so thick with complacency, had long jarred on me. As late as September 1941 the deluded residents of Shanghai were willing to oversubscribe fifty times a new share issue, which a British Cotton Mill Company elected at that time to place on the market. Long after the comforting assurance of the period of "phoney" war had ended so catastrophically in Europe, its demoralising effect continued at work in the Far East. At last, on December 7th, 1941, the house of cards collapsed; and the final bankruptcy of British leadership in Shanghai shewed itself, when the young men, caught there by that cataclysm, failed even to attempt to escape from a net, whose meshes were not closed until some weeks later.