98
These figures compare with the total American investment in China of £32,000,000).
Feeling had been further embittered recently by the damage and heavy casualties caused when Chinese pilots, attempting to bomb the **"Idzumo"**, had dropped 1000-pound bombs in the most crowded street of the city, while evading Japanese pursuit planes. These incidents were attributed to carelessness and, though the victims were mainly Chinese, the Chinese population of Shanghai at that time was around five million; many foreigners, moved also largely by sympathy for the victims, felt the Chinese government had given insufficient consideration to the international investments at stake in Shanghai. They resented the fact that the Chinese had deliberately brought the war to Shanghai. They argued that the Chinese intention was to provoke the foreign powers to intervene on their behalf.
In such an atmosphere, whispering campaigns detrimental to Chinese morale flourished. One of the most ridiculous, which to this day is still firmly believed by many, was that had the Chinese troops succeeded in driving the Japanese into the Whangpoo, they would then have turned to looting the International Settlement. If there was one thing that was clear at that time to the unprejudiced, it was that Chinese advantage lay in courting the goodwill of the powers, not in estranging it by allowing Chinese troops to commit anti-foreign excesses. It is true that in the past Chinese troops had acquired an unenviable notoriety for rapine and looting, but unfortunately, the seclusion from China in which the majority of foreigners resident in Shanghai lived had not allowed them to discover the great improvements the Central government had brought about in the administration and discipline of the Chinese army. The discipline in the 86th and 87th divisions, who were inspired at Shanghai to fight to the death, was equal to that of any Western troops.
It was not realised that the Chinese were fighting for the democracies against fascist aggression. What the Chinese needed most at that time was sympathy and the expression of some confidence in their ability to weather the storm; and that is just what they did not get. No confidence was shown in the ability of the Chinese government to withstand Japan. The prolonged resistance at Shanghai came as a surprise, although Chinese troops had already proved to...