DISFUNCTION OF CHINESE RURAL SOCIETY
RAMON H. MYERS
A talk presented to the Royal Asiatic Society,
April 6, 1984, Hong Kong
The title of this talk, essentially, derives from an analogy with the human body. Just as the skeletal structure, nervous system, etc. must have their functional elements working so that the human body can perform normally, so too must a society have its fundamental organizations and transactional relationships performing effectively as in the recent past. If not, certain dysfunctions emerge which are soon associated with social breakdown, disorder, and even misery.
The land tenancy issue in the twenties and thirties elicited great controversy in China, and indeed many studies indicated that tenancy had worsened and rural misery had deepened in those years. The causes of these developments were blamed on different factors, and the policies ultimately proposed called for major programs to restructure rural property rights and redistribute incomes. I want to raise two historical issues in this regard, propose an answer, and present a very different argument for interpreting the land tenancy issue of these years.
Why was it possible for the British Government and the Japanese colonial regimes to virtually double land tax revenues when they began to administer their respective territories in Ch'ing China? Why did the KMT fail to reduce tenant rents in Chekiang province in 1929-30 and then never try to carry out a land tenure reform thereafter? I believe the answer lies in the type of land tenure arrangement in central and southeast China which was then very prevalent,
This unique arrangement had two different claimants to the land: one claiming the sub-soil rights, the other claiming the top-soil rights. Both parties had different rights and obligations. The former paid a tax to the imperial state and collected a fixed rent, usually in kind, in perpetuity or re-negotiated rent terms.